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ABSTRACT 
Essays on Monetary Integration in Southern Africa 
Twahibu Kambi Djabir, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2008 
Following the successful introduction of the euro in Western Europe, several 
regional economic blocs in Africa are planning to launch a common currency as an 
intermediary step towards the emergence of a single currency for the entire continent. The 
purpose of this dissertation is to tackle several economic issues related to monetary 
integration and empirically apply it to the context of the Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC). 
In the first essay, we estimate trade potentials for southern African countries using 
the gravity model approach. More specifically, we use the level of intra-regional trade as 
predicted by the gravity model and compared it with the observed trade in order to assess 
the trade potentials in the region, as well as the South Africa's trade potentials with its 
SADC partners. Our results demonstrate that the observed trade flows among SADC 
countries are largely greater than the ones predicted by the empirical model. We also 
found that other SADC member countries over-trade with respect to South Africa. 
However, there are still some unexploited trade potentials for several pairs of SADC 
countries. 
The second essay deals with the issue of the choice for the optimal nominal 
currency anchor to which the national currencies of the region have to be pegged to. Using 
a panel of 63 countries, we obtained OCA indices a la Bayoumi and Eichengreen for 
SADC countries vis-a-vis five potential nominal anchor currencies, and we find that the 
. • • • ' . . . • i v 
optimal nominal currency anchor for these countries is the US dollar. We also find 
several pairs of SADC countries which are suitable for a common currency on the basis of 
the estimated OCA indices. 
In the last essay, we empirically assess the expandability of the CMA within the 
SADC by investigating the convergence of monetary policies of each SADC member to 
that of South Africa, a proxy for CMA. Empirical tests show evidence of long-run 
relationship between South Africa and two countries, namely Botswana and Mauritius 
suggesting that these countries may able to follow the leadership of the South African 
Reserve Bank. Following the results of the Granger-causality test, the leadership 
hypothesis in the strict sense is rejected for the case of Mauritius and Botswana. 
However, the only other country which shows evidence of following the South Africa's 
leadership in terms of Granger-causality is Malawi. 
ABREGE 
Essais sur 1'integration monetaire en Afrique australe 
Twahibu Kambi Djabir, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2008 
L'introduction d'une monnaie commune entre certains pays membres de 1'Union 
Europeenne a suscite de Pinteret pour ce genre d'arrangements dans d'autres regions du 
monde. Plusieurs blocs economiques regionaux en Afrique projettent de lancer une 
monnaie commune comme une etape intermediate vers Pavenement d'une monnaie 
unique pour le continent Africain. Le but de cette these est d'aborder certaines questions 
economiques liees a l'integration monetaire et de les appliquer empiriquement dans le 
contexte de la Communaute de development de P Afrique australe (SADG). 
Dans le premier essai, nous utilisons le modele gravitational afin d'estimer les 
flux potentiels des echanges commerciaux entre les pays de l'Afrique australe dans 
Phypothese que ces derniers adoptent une monnaie commune. Nos resultats demontrent 
que les flux des echanges commerciaux actuellement observes sont, dans Pensemble, 
plus eleves que les predictions du modele empirique. Les memes conclusions 
s'appliquent pour les flux commerciaux des autres pays de la region, pris separement, 
envers l'Afrique du Sud. 
Le dernier essai examine la question du choix de la monnaie d'ancrage nominal 
pour les differentes monnaies des pays de la SADC selon les predictions de la theorie des 
zones monetaires optimales. A Paide d' estimations econometriques en coupe telles que 
vi 
proposees par Bayoumi et Eichengreen (1997), et sur un echantillon de 63 pays, l'analyse 
empirique demontre que les pays de l'Afrique australe devraient privilegier le dollar 
americain comme mormaie d'ancrage nominal. Sur la base des indices calcules a partir 
du modele theorique, nous avons egalement trouve que certains pairs de pays de la region 
sont compatibles pour adopter une monnaie commune. 
Dans le dernier essai, nous evaluons empiriquement l'elargissement de la 
zone monetaire commune (CMA) pour inclure d'autres pays de la SADC en se basant sur 
la convergence des politiques monetaires de ces demiers pays a celle de l'Afrique du Sud. 
Les resultats empiriques mettent en evidence la relation de long terme entre le taux de 
croissance de la base monetaire de l'Afrique du Sud avec celui de deux pays, a savoir 
Botswana et les lies Maurice, suggerant de ce fait que ces pays devraient etre capables de 
suivre la politique monetaire de la banque centrale sud-africaine. En se basant sur les 
resultats du test de Granger-causalite, le seul autre pays pouvant suivre la politique 
monetaire de la banque centrale sud-africaine est le Malawi. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The recent experience of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
has stimulated the debate over currency union, and reinforced the incentive for the 
emergency of currency blocs in other regions of the world. Indeed, it is the first time that 
large industrialiazed countries give up their national currencies to create a new, common 
currency. Several studies have been conducted to investigate whether the EU experience 
is a blueprint for regional integration that can be applied directly and entirely to other 
regions. Examples of these studies include for Latin America and North America (Yeyati 
et al., 2000; Courchene and Harris, 2003; and Salvatore, 2003), for Asia (Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen, 1999; Bayoumi and Mauro,1999; Lee, Park and Shin, 2003; Saxena,2005; 
Wyplosz, 2001) and for Africa (Honohan and Lane, 2003; Bayoumi and Ostry, 1995; 
Mkenda, 2001; Sparks, 2002; Grandes, 2003; and Masson and Pattilo, 2005). 
Regional economic integration has been a major element in most discussions of 
economic development in Africa, and its promotion dated back since colonial times. 
Shortly, after the independence of many African countries in the 1960s and at the 
inception of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, the prospect of an 
economic and monetary union has been one of the objectives to be achieved by the 
continental organization. The concept of a single monetary zone for Africa was for the 
first time proposed in the Organization of African Unity's Treaty in 1991 (The Abuja 
Treaty). The Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) outlines 
six stages1 for achieving a single monetary zone for Africa. In the early stages, regional 
cooperation and integration within Africa would be strengthened, and this could involve 
1
 We present in Appendix 1.1. the different stages as outlined in the Abuja Treaty. 
2 
regional monetary unions. The African Union's plan for an African monetary union relies 
on the earlier creation of monetary unions in five existing regional economic 
communities: The the Arab Monetary Union (AMU); the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS); the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS)2. The proposed regional monetary 
unions can be the starting point, and once these unions would be strengthened, they 
would ultimately merge towards a unified economic and monetary system by creating a 
single central bank and a common currency for the entire continent (Masson and Pattillo, 
•a 
2005) . We should notice, at the outset, that there exist two functioning monetary unions 
in Africa: the CFA franc zone4 and the Common Monetary Area (CMA). 
The Southern African Development Community (hereafter SADC) is a recent 
regional economic integration scheme, which evolved out of the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)5, was established in 1992 with a view, 
among others, to promote economic co-operation and integration, and to harmonize 
economic development among Southern Africa countries. At the time of its formation, 
SADC excluded apartheid South Africa from membership, and its key objective was to 
reduce the region's economic dependence on South Africa. Following the end of 
apartheid and democratic elections in South Africa, the country was admitted to SADC in 
1994. DR Congo and Seychelles joined the SADC later. The organization has actually 
2
 See Appendix 1.2 for the list of country members of the different proposed regional monetary unions. 
3
 Furthermore, the African Union's 1999 Sirte Declaration retained the African economic and monetary 
union agenda, but made a case for an accelerated implementation of the process for creating institutions of 
the union, especially, the African Central Bank. 
4
 CFA franc zone is composed mainly of former French colonies, with the currency linked to the euro. 
5
 The SADCC was created in 1980 and was more intended to provide a bulwark against the Apartheid 
system prevailing in South Africa than to foster a regional trade arrangement. 
3
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14 member states .- In the original structure of the SADC, each member state was given 
responsibility for an economic sector and South Africa had responsibility for the Finance 
and Investment Sector. South Africa also chaired the SADC Committee of Central Bank 
Governors (CCBG)7. In 2002, the SADC governments agreed on a set of economic 
indicators which would allow them to monitor progress toward macroeconomic 
convergence, and emphasis has been placed on the reduction of the rate of inflation to 
low and stable levels, therefore laying the groundwork for an eventual common monetary 
policy (Masson and Pathillo, 2005). From the form of monetary cooperation outlined 
above, it has to be recognized that the issue of monetary integration is not new in the 
region and it has already received considerable attention. The SADC agenda is to create 
a free trade area by 2008, a SADC customs union by 2010, a common market by 2015 
and a monetary union by 2016 with a single currency and central bank. 
Several studies have been conducted to assess whether a monetary union is 
feasible among southern African countries (Bayoumi and Ostry, 1997; Jenkins and 
Thomas, 1998; Horwath, 1997; Khamfula and Huizinga, 2004; Masson and Pattillo, 
2005). These studies differ, however, in terms of methodology, focus, sampling period 
and countries coverage. Bayoumi and Ostry (1997), for instance, focus on the size and 
correlation of real output disturbances and the level of intra-regional trade across Sub-
Saharan African countries to investigate the possibilities for closer regional monetary 
6
 By the time we started this dissertation, SADC had 14 member states. In 2005, Madagascar joined the 
group. Notice also that in late 2004, Seychelles left SADC, but it was readmitted again in 2007. Thus, for 
this dissertation, we only consider the former 14 member states. 
7
 The projects for which the CCGB is involved include the following: to develop a common database of 
monetary and financial statistics, to develop payment systems in SADC countries, to examine the impact of 
exchange controls, to coordinate training, and to analyze difference in legal and operational frameworks 
among central banks. 
arrangements in the region in the future. They find that the real output disturbances8, 
have low correlations among Southern African countries . Coupled with an extremely 
low level of intra-regional trade, this casts doubt on the desirability of monetary union 
within Africa. 
Horvath and Grabowski (1997) attempted to empirically determine whether or not 
temporary and permanent shocks influence various African nations in a symmetric or 
asymmetric manner. With respect to southern African countries , they found that while 
South Africa has symmetric demand shocks with almost each country, it has no 
symmetric shocks in real supply. Therefore, they concluded that the scope for a currency 
union is quite limited for most of Africa. 
Jenkins and Thomas (1998) use the convergence hypothesis, in terms of sigma-
and-beta convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992)) and a Markov chain-type 
methodology (Quah, 1993), to investigate the possibility of monetary integration in the 
region using a set of 12 SADC countries and a sample period from 1960 to 1990. Their 
results show a lack of economic convergence in terms of per capita income for the whole 
set of countries. However, they find evidence of per capita income convergence for 
subsets of countries, the five member states of the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) as well as for the CMA countries. 
estimated as residuals from a regression of real output per capita growth on its first and second lags. 
9
 Their sample of Southern African countries included eleven present members of SADC, namely Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
10
 Their sample of Southern Africa includes the following countries: South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Swaziland, Madagascar and Mauritius. 
.5 . 
Sparks (2002) uses annual data covering mostly the years 1995-1998 and focuses 
on six potential criteria that are essential for the feasibility of a monetary union11 and 
finds evidence of convergence for only two criteria. Based on this result, he concluded 
that unless there is more convergence, the chances for a successful monetary union are 
low. Sparks (2002) added that if CMA expands, it will probably be gradually, one new 
member at a time, and Botswana, Mauritius or Seychelles, may individually negotiate 
joining. 
Agbeyegbe (2003) has sought to investigate the feasibility of monetary union in 
SADC by looking at evidence of nominal exchange rate and inflation convergence. He 
applied the methodology of time-varying parameter estimates (Kalman Filter) analysis to 
study ten, non-CMA, member countries of SADC, and based on the analysis to determine 
whether the member country indicators point towards a direction of being able to join a 
new single currency system. He examines the convergence of exchange rates to that of 
South Africa, the leading country in the CMA, and also the convergence of inflation rates 
to the average of the CMA members. He found evidence suggesting non-convergence 
among the SADC members examined, and argued that the chances of SADC member 
countries satisfying some form of Maastricht-type criteria is presently quite low. 
Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) employed a Generalized Auto-Regressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model to consider the share of the variation in 
real exchange rates (RERs; vis-a-vis South Africa) that can be explained by the 
divergence in monetary and fiscal policies. They find that monetary integration would 
substantially eliminate real exchange rate variation due to different monetary policies for 
11
 The following criteria were used: currency exchange rate fluctuations, inflation rates, public debt as a 
percentage of GDP, foreign economic assistance per capita, foreign economic assistance as a percentage of 
6 
some members and conclude that a monetary union that embraces all SADC members 
would amass large costs relative to the benefits and hence would not be desirable. 
However, the following countries would be suited to form a monetary union today: South 
Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe12. 
Finally, Masson and Patillo (2005) simulate and calibrate a theoretical model for 
the existing monetary union in the region, the CMA, assuming that monetary policy is set 
by South Africa. In fact, the model results indicate that compared to independently 
floating currencies, the CMA is in the interest of all participants given their close trade 
links and the generally large positive correlation of shocks. Each of the CMA countries 
would prefer to be a member than to pursue its own, independent monetary policy. When 
they consider whether adding other SADC countries individually to the CMA is incentive 
compatible, both for the new member and for the countries that form the existent CMA, 
and assuming that the current asymmetric arrangement would continue, the authors found 
that all countries except Mauritius would find joining CMA in their interest, on the basis 
of the economic criteria in their model. Moreover, the existing CMA members would all 
gain, if any country (including Mauritius) joined. 
One weakness of most of these above mentioned studies13 is that the discussion 
has been centered on whether these countries or regions satisfy a limited range of the 
optimum currency area criteria, from which strong conclusions have been drawn on 
whether monetary union is feasible or not. Based on available evidences, the African 
regional economic arrangements do not satisfy the text-book OCA conditions. However, 
the OCA theory has been recently criticized for being static since it is mainly concerned 
GDP and trade 
12
 Due to data scarcity, Angola, Mozambique, Seychelles and DR Congo were excluded in their analysis. 
7 
with an analysis of the costs and benefits of monetary integration given the present 
economic conditions. It ignores changes in economic activity that are induced through a 
policy of integration (Volz, 2006). Frankel and Rose (1998) introduced the notion of 
endogeneity and argued that a group of countries that does not qualify as an OCA ex 
ante, may evolve into one ex post, by virtue of adopting a common currency14. 
Moreover, these previous studies do not take into account political considerations. 
Several economists, such as Mintz (1970), Cohen (1972, 2003) and Willet (2004), have 
argued that political factors also need to be considered since country characteristics alone 
fail to wholly explain the choice of exchange rate regime 5. Therefore, the fact that the 
African economic integration arrangements fail to satisfy the OCA criteria ex ante does 
not represent an obstacle to the African integration effort, because the OCA conditions 
could still be met ex post if there is a strong political commitment and the need to achieve 
sound macroeconomic policies and adherence to the pre-set convergence criteria. 
In the African case, Masson and Milkiewicz (2005) argue that there are basically 
two major motives that could probably explain the quest for monetary union. First, it is 
obvious that the successful commencement of the euro zone has stirred interest in other 
regions and that monetary union is therefore perceived as a way of strengthening regional 
solidarity and signifying dedication to regional harmony. A second important reason to 
create a monetary union may be to improve on the monetary policies provided by 
national central banks by delegating monetary policy to insulate it from pressures to 
13
 The study by Masson and Pattillo (2005) does not use an OCA approach. 
14
 They contended that countries with closer trade links tend to have more tightly correlated business cycles 
and thus, would converge towards the ideal conditions for monetary integration. 
15
 Cohen and several others economists have argued that the formation of the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) was not purely based on economic considerations, but also on political factors. 
Willet (2004) also argues that economic policy decisions are made through a political process, and political 
considerations dominate OCA theory when it comes to the formation of currency unions. . 
8 
finance governments16. Moreover, Yehoue (2005) demonstrates that the case for 
monetary integration is even stronger for Africa in addressing the problems of 
multiplicity of currencies and exchange rate variability17 that often impede trade flows 
among African countries18. Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) argued that some current 
members of SADC have major problems due to monetary and fiscal instability, and these 
countries need to make monetary and fiscal adjustments as a basis for sustainable long-
term growth. In fact, these adjustments are among the required measures which are 
prerequisites for forming a monetary union. Therefore, the argument can possibly turn 
around as follows: In order to attain monetary and fiscal adjustments SADC countries 
should enter a monetary union which would set binding constraints to monetary and 
fiscal policies. The union would pressure them to adjust, thus the monetary union would 
work like a nominal anchor. Similarly, Roy and Betz (2000) argue that it is important to 
ask whether and in what ways monetary integration can contribute to overcoming 
structures that present obstacles to economic development. Finally, in the African case, 
Hohonan and Lane (2000) stated that economic and monetary union can be viewed from 
four perspectives: these relate to the extent to which the cooperation arrangement fosters 
the development of an agency of restraint to the government, the extent to which the 
arrangement deepens the financial system, the extent to which the arrangement reduces 
the probability of speculative pressures, and the extent the arrangement deepens 
integration of economies, via the creation of a single economic space. 
16
 Most African central banks have typically fallen to resist from pressures to finance government deficits, 
resulting in high inflation and depreciation of national currencies. 
17
 In this respect, Yehoue argues that the majority of national currencies in Africa are not convertible and 
highly volatile. Moreover, African countries are characterized by exchange rate policies which are, in most 
cases, unstable and unpredictable. 
18
 In a study of intra-regional trade in West Africa, Ogunkola (1998) estimates that the level of unrecorded 
trans-border trade is several times larger than the reported trade flows. 
9 
Unlike several other studies which focused on the feasibility or desirability of 
southern African countries to form a monetary union, the purpose of this dissertation is to 
tackle several economic issues related to monetary integration and empirically apply it to 
the context of the major regional economic grouping in Southern Africa (SADC). In the 
light of the literature on monetary integration, three different economic issues19 are 
investigated in this thesis, and they provide answers to the following research questions: 
(i) Assuming that the SADC countries were sharing a common currency, what 
would be the effects (of sharing the same currency) on their intra-regional trade? What 
about the trade flows of other SADC members with South Africa, the dominant economy 
in the region? 
(ii) Many monetary integration projects around the world are trying to use the 
European EMU as blueprint. The European experience demonstrates that before 
launching a common currency, European countries started to co-ordinate their exchange 
rates through the Exchange Rate Mechanism (EMS) by pegging their bilateral nominal 
exchange rates. In this case, what would be the appropriate nominal currency anchor20 
to Which all SADC countries would peg their national currencies? 
(iii) In southern Africa, there exists a long-standing monetary union, the CMA21. 
Assuming that there is possibility for expanding membership of the current monetary 
arrangement to other SADC members, what would be the potential new members of the 
monetary union? 
19
 The three issues are: the trade effect of a common currency, the choice for an optimal nominal currency 
anchor for a group of countries and the possibility for new members entering an existing monetary 
arrangement. 
20
 The nominal currency anchor may be a regional (from a member state) or a major currency, external to 
the region. 
21
 Strictly speaking, the CMA is not a full-fledged monetary union. It is like a currency board (Grandes, 
2003). 
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• Starting from the seminal paper by Rose (2000), several authors22 have found that 
the use of a common currency increases trade. These studies have applied the gravity 
model of trade to discuss the effect of sharing a common currency on intra-regional trade. 
Due to the fact that Southern African countries are aiming to form a monetary union, and 
therefore, share a common currency, in the first essay, we investigate whether the fact of 
having a common currency will have an impact on the intra-regional trade. More 
specifically, we use the level of intra-regional trade as predicted by the gravity model and 
compared it with the observed trade in order to assess the trade potentials in the region, as 
well as the trade potentials of each individual S ADC country with the Republic of South 
Africa, the dominant economy of the region. 
In southern Africa, some national currencies are not convertible and highly 
volatile23. Given the fact that these countries are mostly primary commodity producers, 
hence competitors in third markets, and are also willing to strengthen their intra-regional 
trade, an exchange rate mechanism seems to be appealing. Chapter four deals with the 
issue of the choice for the optimal nominal currency anchor to which the national 
currencies of the region have to be pegged to. This essay follows the literature on 
optimum currency area and employs the methodology developed by Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1997a, 1997b). To the model specified by Bayoumi and Eichengreen, we 
added other variables which are relevant for the countries under consideration. We also 
use the normative approach developed by Benassy-Quere et al. (1998) to choose the 
optimal nominal currency anchor for SADC countries. 
22
 Rose (2000), Glick and Rose (2001), Engel and Rose (2002) as well as Frankel and Rose (2002) have 
generated a substantial literature on the relationship between currency integration and intra-regional trade. 
23
 This situation is common to many African countries. 
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Finally, it is worth to consider whether the African Union's strategy of creating 
regional monetary unions which would merge to form a single monetary zone is rational. 
In fact, Masson and Patillo (2005) suggest that achieving a single currency for Africa can 
be promoted through successful selective expansions of existing currency areas within 
African regional Economic Communities24 by adding to them countries that have 
demonstrated their commitment and ability to deliver sound economic policies by 
satisfying convergence criteria for a significant length of time. In the case of southern 
Africa, extending the CMA may be a more attractive possibility in the short run25. 
Chapter five explores the possibility for the other ten SADC countries to join the existing 
regional monetary union (CMA). For these countries, their membership in the existing 
monetary union (CMA) will depend on their ability to align themselves with the 
institutions and the macroeconomic policies of the CMA. In this chapter, we examine 
whether these countries will be able to achieve the necessary stability between their 
exchange rates and those of their CMA partners. We proceed by investigating the extent 
to which they have been able to achieve some measure of convergence between the 
evolution of their money supply growth rates and that of South Africa, a proxy for the 
CMA. This would be done by investigating whether there exists a long-run relationship 
Currently the existing currency areas within the African Regional Communities are: 
-West African Economic and Monetary union (WAEMU) among French-speaking countries of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). A new monetary zone, West African monetary 
zone, comprised of English-speaking countries of ECOWAS, was exected to begin operations in 2005. 
-The Common Monetary areas (CMA) in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Other African Regional communities namely the Arab Monetary union, The common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) do not 
have a currency area within them 
25
 However, many SADC members are, with a few exceptions, too far from the macroeconomic stability 
necessary to converge with South Africa. An expanded monetary zone could involve shared monetary 
policy responsibility by South Africa's Reserve Bank with neighboring central banks. 
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between the money supply of the potential candidates and that of South Africa using the 
Johansen cointegration approach. 
This dissertation contributes to the discussion of the implementation of a single 
currency in southern Africa by providing additional evidences on issues regarding a 
monetary union in the region. One contribution of this research is the assessment of 
the effect of a common currency in the trade flows among SADC member states. From 
the outcomes of several studies which find that sharing a common currency increases 
bilateral trade flows, our goal is to assess whether a single currency in SADC can be 
justified on this ground. However, our analysis demonstrates that, in general, SADC 
countries over-trade using data on current trade flows. 
A second contribution of this research is the use of the theory of optimum 
currency areas to empirically find the optimal nominal currency anchor for the SADC 
member states. We combine the OCA index approach of Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1997a,b), and the normative approach of Benassy-Quere et al. (1998) to choose the 
optimal currency anchor among five currency candidates. 
Another query that this dissertation considers is whether the logic behind the 
"German dominance" in the European Monetary System (EMS), among a group of 
industrialized countries, can be imported to developing countries. South African's 
leadership in the SADC has been investigated in terms of the convergence in money 
supply growth rates between South Africa, a proxy for the Common Monetary Area 
(CMA), and its SADC partners taken individually. A finding of a long-run relationship 
among the money supply is an evidence for future membership of a SADC (non-CMA) 
country to join the existing monetary union in the region. 
13 
Due to data limitations, in some cases, we exclude a set of SADC countries in our 
analysis. We are also limited to the choice of the sample period since South Africa, the 
major economic of the region, has been on international economic sanctions. Finally, the 
choice of the choice of variables has been affected by lack of time series data. 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. The second chapter provides 
general background information to southern African economies. The third chapter deals 
with the issue of trade effect of a common currency for SADC countries. The optimal 
currency peg for southern African currencies is the subject of the fourth chapter. The 
expandability of the CMA to the other SADC members, based on the convergence of 
their monetary policy, is discussed in chapter five. The last chapter provides a summary 
of the findings. 
14 
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND TO SOUTHERN AFRICAN ECONOMIES 
2.1. Regional Integration Arrangements in Southern Africa 
There are five major regional economic integration schemes in the Southern and 
Eastern African region. These are the Southern Africa Customs Union, the Common 
Monetary Area, the Southern African Development Community, the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa and the Cross Border Initiative. Table 1 shows the country 
membership of these regional integration schemes. 
(a). Southern African Customs Union (SACU): 
Originally, the SACU was formed in 1910 with South Africa and the BLS 
(Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) and the agreement was renegotiated in 1969 with the 
independence of the three smaller countries. Namibia formally joined SACU in 1990 . 
Under the SACU agreement, there is a duty free movement of goods among members 
and a common external tariff (CET) is applied on imports into the union. One of the 
main features of SACU agreement is the revenue sharing formula which includes a 42% 
enhancement factor to compensate the BLNS countries. A renegotiation of the SACU 
Agreement was concluded in 2002, but it still has to be ratified by all parties. The new 
SACU Agreement provides for a more democratic institutional structure; a dispute 
settlement mechanism; the requirement to have common policies on industrial 
development, agriculture, competition and unfair trade practices; and a new system for 
the common revenue pool and sharing formula. 
15 


































































(b). Common Monetary Area CCMA) 
In order to understand the functioning of the CMA and the outstanding role of the 
Republic of South Africa, we need to take into account the historical framework in which 
the Common Monetary area has been set from the beginning. At the establishment of 
the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) in the 1920s, the South African pound already 
became legal tender in the so-called BLS-states27. In 1961, the South African Rand 
(ZAR) was introduced. After the independence of the BLS-states from Great Britain, 
negotiations between them and South Africa resulted in the first official agreement about 
Namibia has been a de facto member of SACU. 
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the establishment of a Rand Monetary Area (RMA) in 1974, and the Rand remained legal 
tender in all these countries. Although Botswana participated in the negotiations, it opted 
out in favor of a managed floating of its currency. Since then, however, Botswana has 
pegged its national currency to a basket of currencies with an estimated weight of 60% to 
70% for ZAR . Swaziland and Lesotho began to issue their own currencies in 1974 and 
1980 respectively. The Common Monetary Area (CMA) replaced the Rand Monetary 
Area in July 1986 under the terms of a Trilateral Monetary Area agreement between the 
three countries accommodating changes in the position of Swaziland. This trilateral 
agreement was replaced by the present multilateral monetary area agreement_(MMA) in 
February 1992, when Namibia formally j oined the CMA. 
According to Grandes (2003), the CMA is a hybrid of a currency board and a 
monetary union. Even though the rand is the dominant currency, member countries have 
not made an irrevocable commitment to keep a given parity. This makes the arrangement 
a less than fully-fledged one. On the other hand, it is a currency board because foreign 
assets back domestic currency issuance and the monetization of fiscal deficits is not 
allowed. However, unlike an orthodox currency board, the monetary systems are 
administered by Central Banks which perform functions such as extending loans to their 
respective governments. 
Concretely, the CMA arrangement covers the following features: (see Van Zyl 
(2003), Grandes (2003) and Sparks (2002)). 
- Each of the four members has its own central bank, which is formally responsible for 
monetary policy within the respective country, and issues its own currency. 
BLS-states: Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. 
This is the reason why Botswana is often called a de facto member of the current CMA. 
17 
- Both Lesotho and Namibia have to back their currency issues by South African rand 
assets. In order to maintain financial stability within the CMA, the South African 
Reserve Bank acts as a lender of last resort. 
- In both Lesotho and Namibia the ZAR serves as legal tender; Swaziland abolished the 
legal status of the ZAR in 1986, although de facto it is still widely used. By contrast, 
none of the other currencies is legal tender in South Africa, nor are they commonly 
used within South Africa. A clearing system repatriates ZAR coins and notes 
circulating in the other member countries. 
- Already in 1986, South Africa committed itself to making compensatory payments to 
members in return for circulating the ZAR within their currency areas; therefore 
Lesotho and Namibia partly share the seigniorage of the ZAR; this does not apply to 
Swaziland. 
- The national currency of Lesotho and Namibia are all pegged at par to the ZAR; 
Swaziland abolished this commitment in 1986, but it is still valid de facto. 
Within the CMA, there are no restrictions on capital movements, vis-a-vis the rest of 
the world. CMA members apply a common exchange control system, determined by 
the South African Department of Finance and administered by the South African 
Reserve Bank in cooperation with central banks of the other members. 
- Member countries share a common pool of foreign exchange reserves, managed by 
South African Reserve Bank and increasingly also managed by South African 
authorized dealers (banks); central banks and authorized dealers of other member 
countries have free access to the foreign exchange market in South Africa. On 
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request, the South African Reserve Bank will make the foreign exchange of the 
common pool available to other member countries. 
- Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland may hold additional foreign exchange by 
themselves for direct and immediate needs; up to 35% of this foreign exchange might 
be held in a currency other than the ZAR. 
Since the South African Monetary Policy is guided by an inflation targeting 
monetary framework, the arrangement has impacted on the macroeconomic stability of 
the region and is thus generating a low inflation rate. Hence, it can be said that the SARB 
de facto determines monetary policy for the CMA although every member has its own 
central bank with formal competence for the design of monetary policy. It is also widely 
acknowledged that the process of inflation assimilation at the South African level, for 
Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia, is due to CMA membership. Besides, a clear evidence 
of convergences of fiscal and monetary policies is attributable to this arrangement. The 
central banks of the three countries vary their interest rates to defend the nominal peg and 
thereby "import" price-level stability. This convergence has been empirically proved by 
Jenkins and Thomas (1997) in terms of real per capita income and Honohan (1992) for 
inflation and interest rates. 
(c) Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA): 
The COMESA was previously named the Preferential Trade Area, which was set 
up in December 1981. In the 1990's, it included 21 members. The slow progress of the 
PTA towards trade liberalization has resulted to the signature of a new treaty establishing 
COMESA in December 1994. COMESA included in addition to the PTA members 
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Madagascar and Mauritius. Lesotho and Mozambique withdraw from COMESA in 
1996. COMESA's •original objective was to establish a common market by 2000 and 
ultimately an economic union. Besides a common market, COMESA has the objective of 
establishing a monetary union and a common central bank by 2025. 
Roughly speaking, COMESA is a large economic and trading unit capable of 
overcoming some of the barriers faced by individual states. COMESA's strategy is trade 
liberalization through market integration. 
(d). Cross Border Initiative (CBD: 
The CBI was jointly launched in 1992 with the support of the African 
Development Bank, the European Union, the IMF and the World Bank as a mechanism to 
foster continued trade liberalization, increased cross border trade, facilitate investment 
and payment in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean. Countries are 
expected to harmonize import tariff regimes and to reduce internal tariffs and non-tariffs 
barriers (NTBs) significantly. Fourteen countries are participating to the CBI. The 
original deadline for removing intra-CBI NTBs and tariffs (1996) has already passed. 
Regional Integration Facilitation Forum (RIFF) has grown out of the Cross 
Border Initiative (CBI) program implemented in 1992. It was established primarily with 
the aim of creating conditions for a more beneficial integration of the countries of eastern 
and southern Africa into the regional and world economy. It aims to achieve this by 
facilitating the dismantling of barriers to the cross-border flow of goods, services, persons 
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and capital. It also seeks to ensure the consistency of national adjustment programs and 
• 29 
regional integration measures . 
(e). Southern African Development Community (SADC): 
The SADC evolved out of the Southern African development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC). The latter was created in 1980 and was more intended to provide 
a bulwark against the Apartheid system prevailing in South Africa than to foster a 
regional trade arrangement. SADCC became SADC in 1992 and broadened its concerns 
to facilitating regional economic integration. The participation of South Africa in 1994 
enhanced the viability of the SADC as an economic community. For now, SADC 
encompasses 14 members. One of the main features of the SADC is related to the sector 
coordination approach because each member country is responsible for coordinating a 
specific sector programs. The S ADC-secretariat is located in Gaborone in Botswana. 
SADC's main objective is to achieve the levels of policy harmonization and 
resource rationalization required for the complex task of regional economic integration. 
The main economic goals can be summarized as development and economic growth; 
poverty alleviation; improvement of living standards; harmonization of socio-economic 
policy; and the establishment of suitable institutions and mechanisms for the mobilization 
of resources to implement the programs of SADC (www.sadc.int). One important step is 
the creation of a SADC Free Trade Area, which was initiated in 2000 and will be fully 
implemented by 2008. In the process of the creation of a full-fledged FTA, intra-regional 
29
 The CBI/RIFF was never meant to be a permanent structure nor is it a new kind of regional 
organization. It promotes a pragmatic approach of variable speed towards regional integration (so that 
progress is not determined by the slowest-moving member state). 
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trade and investment is expected to grow significantly as the issues of market access,' 
rules of origin and non-tariff barriers are resolved. 
SADC has allocated the co-ordination of specific sectoral responsibilities to 
member countries in order to achieve the Community's goals. In such co-ordination, 
member countries "... are supervised by Sectoral Committees of Ministers. The Minister 
representing the sector co-ordinating country, chairs the Sectoral Committees of 
Ministers. Sectoral Commissions may be established and ratified by member states. 
Commissions are regional institutions, supported by all member states..."(Background 
information on SADC, www.sadc.int). 
As the Republic of South Africa accepted sectoral responsibility for finance and 
investment in SADC, it is responsible for the co-ordination and monitoring of progress 
with the convergence criteria set by SADC and the Governor of the South African 
Reserve Bank chairs the CCBG. 
2.2. The Socio-Economic Situation in Southern Africa 
Qualman (2000) argues that the integration process among SADC countries has 
become more demanding and more difficult following the accession of South Africa and 
the DR Congo, its enlargement to include fourteen member countries and its entry into 
the phase of creating a free-trade area. However, Henning et al. (2001) sustain that 
regional cooperation and integration are preconditions for accelerating economic and 
social development in southern Africa. They argue that major weaknesses for most 
SADC members are that these countries are small and agricultural based primary 
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commodity exporters, hence they will not be able to attract the necessary financial and 
technological transfers needed to support a sustained industrialization process. 
The SADC is a regional organization which is characterized by a heterogeneity 
among its member states in terms of land size, population figures, size of their domestic 
markets, per capita incomes, resource base, development, and social and political 
situation. Table 2.2 presents some basic indicators for the countries of the region. 
Among the 15 members of SADC, six of them are landlocked while three other 
countries are islands in the Indian Ocean30. In terms of land size, the Democratic 
republic of Congo is the largest country, with 2 345 000 square kilometers, following by 
Angola and Republic of South africa, with 1,247,000 and 1,219,000 square kilometers, 
respectively. The two islands of Seychelles and Mauritius are the samallest countries 
with a land area of 456 and 2,000 square kilometers, respectively. Lesotho and 
Swaziland are also small countries with land size of less than 18,000 square kilometers. 
The remaining eight countries are large with a land area ranging from 118,000 square 
kilometers (Malawi) to 945,000 (Tanzania). 
The combined population of SADC area is approximately 236 million in 2004. 
In terms of population, the most notable feature of SADC constituent members is that the 
smallest state, Seychelles, has a population of only 84,000, while the two largest, the DR 
Congo and South Africa, have 60 and 47 million, respectively. Almost two-third of the 
SADC population lives in three countries, namely South Africa, Tanzania, and the DR 
Congo, while the remaining countries unevenly share the other one-third of the 
population. The five smallest countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia and the 
30
 The landlocked countries include Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe, while 
the islands are Madagascar, Mauritus and Seychelles. 
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Seychelles) account for only 3.4% of the population and six of 15 countries have a 
population of less than 10 million people. 
In 2004, the combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for Southern Africa was 
approximately $296 billion, and is more than double that of ECOWAS and equivalent to 
more than half (56%) of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)'s aggregate GDP. SADC's total 
volume of exports (estimated at US$66 billion) is three times that of the CFA Zone and 
more than double that of ECOWAS (Kritzinger-van Niekerk et al., 2002). Hence, in 
terms of combined GDP and volume of exports, SADC forms the largest regional 
economic integration arrangement in Africa. 
One of the main aspects of economic performance in Southern Africa sub-region 
is that it is dominated by the Republic of South Africa (RSA), the largest economy of the 
region. Indeed South Africa represents more than 70%) of the combined regional GDP, 
32%o of its population and about two-thirds of SADC's total volume of exports in 2000. 
South Africa, which has long been a middle-income developing country, also 
dominates CMA, comprising 96%> of total CMA's GDP. South Africa dominance in 
terms of economic size is also associated with economic strengths such as its relatively 
sophisticated financial markets, its physical and social infrastructure, its business 
capacity, etc. This predominance is even more evident when comparing RSA's data to 
that of dominant countries in other Sub-Saharan Africa regional arrangements: In 2000, 
Nigeria represented 40.4% of ECOWAS'GDP and 45.4% of its exports. Similarly, Cote 
d'lvoire accounted for 40%> of the West African Economic and monetary Union 
(WAEMU) aggregate GDP and 53.1%) of its volume of exports. For Cameroon in the 
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Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CAEMU), the percentages are 47.7% 
and 35.7%, respectively (Kritzinger-van Niekerk et al., 2002). 




























































































































Source: SADC Website www.sadc.int 
Another fundamental characteristic of the SADC region is that it is poor. The 
region's average GDP per capita is $984, and the per capita GDPs range with a low of 
$ 111 in Democratic Republic of Congo to a high of $8090 in Seychelles. In terms of per 
capita income Mauritius, Seychelles, and more recently, Botswana, have even surpassed 
South Africa, while Namibia is also relatively wealthy. Half of the SADC countries have 
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annual per capita incomes below $500. Challenges of post-war disarmament and 
reconstruction (in Angola and DRC), and continuing internal strife (Zimbabwe) have 
adversely affected economic performance in these states. The Zimbabwean economy has 
experienced a sharp deterioration over the past five years, with real GDP contracting by 
about 30 percent during that period and inflation reaching 600 percent in 2003, before 
dropping to 124 percent in 2005. The economies of DRC and Angola have begun to 
experience GDP growth as peace agreements in both countries begin to take hold (IMF, 
2003). 
When we compare SADC to other regional economic integration schemes in 
Africa, we find that SADC has ahd the highest level of per capita income, even though 
the per capita income in southern Africa fell over the past two decades (US$ 984 in 2004 
compared with US$1023 in 1980). The 2000 income per capita was US$932, almost 
three times that of ECOWAS. In terms of growth rates of GDP, the average GDP growth 
rate for the region in 2003 was 2.3% which is almost similar to that of the period 1997-
2001. In 2003, Tanzania and Mozambique experienced the largest growth, about 7.1%, 
and followed by DR Congo and Zambia. Finally, in Zimbabwe, the growth rate is 
negative at -9.3%. For the CMA countries, the growth of real GDP is quite stable for the 
period under consideration. 
The member countries of the SADC are unequally endowed with natural 
resources. For example, South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, DR Congo, and to a lesser 
degree Zimbabwe and Zambia have significant and important strategic mineral reserves 
including copper, cobalt, diamonds and gold, Angola is heavily endowed with petroleum, 
while other member countries, e.g., Swaziland, Lesotho, and Tanzania have very little 
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such natural resources (Sparks, 2002). Angola, DR Congo, Lesotho and Lozambique are 
the countries with abundant water resources, while South Africa is the main water 
importer in the region (Qualman et al., 2001). 
In table 2.3, we present some macroeconomic indicators for the member countries 
of SADC for the periods 1997-2001 and 2003. While a number of countries were able to 
limit inflation to one-digit levels, prices have been rising by 20% per year, and more in 
Angola, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Compared to the average of 1997-2001, Angola and 
DR Congo have brought their inflation levels from three to two-digit numbers, while 
Zimbabwe is experienced a large increase in its inflation rate. 
Most of the countries in the region are marked by heavy dependence on a limited 
number of export goods as well as on external transfers. Only South Africa, Mauritius, 
and Zimbabwe have a manufacturing sector of any significance and, correspondingly, a 
more markedly diversified external-trade sector. In most of the member countries, 
however, two or three primary commodities account for over 50% of exports. Hence, as 
(Qualmann, 2000) noted, this dependence on a limited number of export goods makes the 
region subject to the sharp, often asymmetrical price shocks typical for world-market 
cycles. 
With the end of apartheid, South Africa's trade with its SADC partners is 
expected to increase over time and also by taking into consideration the establishment of 
the free trade area. Qualmann (2000) notes that the most dynamic development in the 
region is shown by the increase in the volume of trade between South Africa and the 
other SADC countries in the course of the last five years since the volume of trade has 
grown by a factor of 1.5. However, trade and capital flow linkages have until recently 
27 
been very low between South Africa and the rest of SADC, expect for South Africa's 
partners in SACU. The intra-regional trade, with its volume of US$ 5.2 billion according 
to SADC data, accounts for 20% of all exports, a figure that is relatively high for intra-
regional trade among developing countries (Qualmann, 2000). 
Overall, southern African economies are largely undiversified because the region 
has not transformed its productive base sufficiently with progressive industrialization. 
For example, in the period from 1970 to 1998, the share of agriculture in GDP increased 
in Zambia and Zimbabwe. However, the share of industry in GDP decreased for 
countries such as Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. In South Africa and Zimbabwe, the share of manufacturing also declined. 
Finally, the lack of complementarity in production limits the scope for trade, except 
between South Africa and the rest of the region. 
The economies in the region are reasonably open, and given that all countries in 
the region, including SA, are heavily dependent on exports of primary agricultural and 
mineral commodities, the regional economy remains excessively vulnerable to rainfall 
variations and to commodity market fluctuations (Kritzinger-van Niekerk et al., 2002). 
2.3. Macro-Economic Convergence in SADC 
When countries decide to pursue a full monetary unification (i.e. the adoption of a 
single currency), the question is whether the adoption of a common currency should be at 
one stroke (a shock approach) or it should be introduced after a long gradual process of 
preparation and economic convergence (gradual approach). 
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Source: IMF (2003) 
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The first strategy (gradual approach) is based on the idea that transition to a 
monetary union should be gradual and paced by convergence criteria , especially if the 
participating economies are less homogenous. However, the process of gradual 
economic convergence may be risky due to the problem of sustainability during the 
transition period in the case where the formulated policies are overly rigid and unrealistic. 
The gradual approach has been used strategy by the European Union through the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
The second strategy (the shock approach) assumes that it should be speedier and 
without accompanying convergence criteria. In this case, a strong political commitment 
could create the economic conditions to make the monetary unification work. The 
monetary unification of East and West Germany in early 1990s represents the "shock" 
approach, i.e. a monetary reform, where the East German mark was replaced by the West 
German mark, which began legal tender in the whole of Germany (Agbeygebe, 2003). 
In SADC region, the gradual approach is followed, i.e., convergence of a set of 
macroeconomic variables is required for a monetary union, as it is presented in the recent 
"Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Macroeconomic Stability and Convergence" 
set by the SADC Ministers of Finance in 2002 (Masson and Pathillo, 2005; IMF, 2003). 
The MoU emphasizes the fundamental role that needs to be played by macroeconomic 
stability in bringing about successful integration and that convergence on stability-
oriented economic policies should be the prime aim of national economic policy within 
SADC (Roussow, 2006). 
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 The macroeconomic convergence which entails the setting of lower and/or upper limits for selected 
macroeconomic variables is usually underpinned by the desire to guide certain key aspects of future 
economic and financial policy and its management among the member countries concerned. 
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In this respect, the MoU calls for national convergence programs, containing 
rolling, country-specific targets for a set of indicators and for a regional surveillance 
procedure that will assess, annually, progress towards each country's targets. The focus 
of the regional surveillance over macroeconomic policies is to maintain a low rate of 
inflation; other indicators are the ratio of the budget deficit to the GDP, the ratio of public 
debt to GDP, and the balance and structure of the current account. The Committee of 
Central Bank Governors (CCBG)32 of the SADC is responsible for monitoring progress 
towards the achievement of macro-economic convergence criteria since satisfactory 
progress is necessary to achieve the goal of monetary union and a single central bank by 
2016. The first of the macro-economic convergence criteria set by SADC should be 
achieved by 2008. Table 2.4 presents the specified reference values for these economic 
indicators. 
We present in Table 2.5 the evolution of the inflation rate in SADC for the period 1999 to 
2004, and compared it with the target set for 2008. An examination of Table 2.5 shows 
that among SADC countries, the SACU member states and Mauritius have been the most 
converging using the underlying inflation rate. Angola and democratic republic of Congo 
which are post-conflict economies have also demonstrated a rapid move towards lower 
Macroeconomic convergence should serve as an eligibility test for membership to an economic grouping, 
i.e., only those countries that attain the convergence benchmarks would qualify (Roussow, 2006). 
32
 The CCBG was established in 1995 with the specific purpose of achieving closer cooperation and 
integration in the area of monetary policy among SADC central banks. The work of the CCBG has 
contributed to major developments towards regional monetary cooperation such as significant progress in 
the harmonization of the payment and clearing systems, the approval of Memoranda of Understanding on 
Cooperation, Coordination of Exchange Control Policies in SADC, and Cooperation in the area of 
Information and Communication Technology. The CCBG has also contributed to the coordination of 
training for central bank officials in SADC and the creation of a Training and Development Forum. The 
South African Reserve Bank has established a small specialized research unit in its Economics Department 
to assist the Committee of Governors in its pursuance of these objectives. The Reserve Bank also provides 
secretarial services to this Committee. 
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levels of inflation rates, although the 2004 levels still remained high for Angola. 
Zimbabwe, which is experiencing economic decline or stagnation has the highest level of 
inflation, and is therefore the least convergent using inflation trends. Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Tanzania having succeeded in reaching the regional inflation 
targets. Five countries, namely Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe 
are yet to achieve the single digit inflation rates, but some could do so by 2008 if the 
current inflation reduction trends are maintained, Zimbabwe being the exception. SACU 
member states, Tanzania and Mauritius have already achieved the targets ahead of the 
2008 schedule. For these countries, they only need to maintain these inflation rates at 
current levels. 
Other indicators of convergence generally follow a similar pattern as described 
above for the targets set for 2008 (See, Roussow, 2006, for instance). Some countries 
were already within the macro-economic convergence targets while others are making 
satisfactory progress towards the achievement of such targets. 
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CHAPTER 3: MONETARY UNION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: A 
BUILDING BLOC FOR TRADE INTEGRATION 
3.1. Introduction 
Following the example of Western Europe, Southern African countries, members 
of the SADC, are planning to have a common currency by 2016. A rationale for 
countries to share a common currency or to adopt fixed exchange rates is the notion that 
exchange rate variability and uncertainty affect negatively the level of bilateral trade 
flows . However, recent developments in international monetary arrangement push 
many economists to assess the economic effects of currency unions. Recently, a set of 
empirical studies by Andrew Rose and his co-authors provide evidence of large positive 
effects of common currencies on the volume of trade. Rose (2000) finds that two 
countries sharing the same currency trade three times as much as they would with 
different currencies. 
It has also been argued that belonging to a free trade area (FTA) has a large 
impact on intra-regional trade. In the case of African regional groupings, several authors 
have demonstrated that the level of intra-regional trade is quite low. However, 
membership in an African regional trade agreement (or an economic bloc) has a positive 
impact on bilateral trade (see, for instance, Agama, 2001; Carrere, 2004). From the 
empirical evidences that sharing a common currency and also belonging to the same 
regional economic integration scheme have positive effects on bilateral trade, one would 
expect that if the SADC member states have a successfully implemented FTA and share a 
single currency, the level of intra-regional trade will be increased. 
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In international trade, the gravity model has been used as an empirical tool for 
modeling bilateral trade flows. The predicted trade flows obtained from this model are 
considered as the "normal" trade flows. The aim of this paper is to estimate trade 
potentials for southern African countries using the gravity model approach. We use the 
gravity model to first analyze the bilateral trade flows and, more specifically the effect of 
a currency union and a FTA on bilateral trade. The coefficients obtained are then used to 
predict trade potentials for SADC countries (intra-SADC trade). This allows us to assess 
the relevance of a FTA as well as a single currency for this region in terms of trade flows. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, an 
introduction to the gravity model of trade and its theoretical foundations are presented. 
Section three briefly reviews the existing literature on the theory of regional integration, 
including the empirical evidence for southern Africa, while section four discusses the 
empirical evidence on the effect of a common currency on trade. Section five presents 
the specification of the empirical model, the data and the econometric procedures used 
for the estimation of the gravity model. Empirical results are analyzed in section six. In 
section seven we discuss the trade potentials for SADC countries. The last section 
concludes. 
3.2. The gravity model 
3.2.1. Basic concepts 
Newton formulated his law of gravity in seventeenth century stating that the attraction 
between two bodies is directly proportional to the product of masses and inversely 
proportional to the distance between these bodies. In the context of international trade, 
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 See, for instance, Brada and Mendez, 1988; Frankel and Wei, 1993; Belanger et al. ,1992. 
3 5 
the physical bodies are the bilateral trade partners (the exporting and importing 
countries), and the size of their economies represents their masses. 
In economics, the gravity model to study bilateral trade flows was first introduced by 
Jan Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonnen (1963) in their analysis of trade flows between 
European countries. The gravity model of international trade establishes that trade flows 
between two countries depend directly on the size of their economies as clearly reflected 
in their income levels, and negatively related to" the geographic distance between the two 
partners. The distance variable reflects the degree of trade resistance between these 
countries as measured by the transportation costs. 
The simple version of the gravity model has been augmented by many other 
explanatory variables facilitating or hampering trade among countries such as the level of 
development of the trading partners which should result in higher trade opportunities. 
This stems from the empirical observation that demand tends to be more diversified at 
higher levels of development. Other factors include the size of the population, sharing the 
same border, landlockness, historical links (language, colony,...), membership to a 
preferential trade area or customs union, exchange rate variability. In sum, the variables 
entering into the gravity model can be classified into one or more of the following 
categories (Brulhart and Kelly, 1999): 
i) variables describing the potential supply of the exporting country, i.e; income and 
per capita income, population of the exporting country; 
ii) variables describing the potential demand of the importing country, i.e; income 
and per capita income, population of the importing country; 
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iii) variables describing the resistance to trade such as geographical distance, 
landlocked countries, policy and cultural barriers to trade, etc. 
Mathematically the gravity model in its most basic form can be expressed by the 
following equation: 
X^pjrpYfDfsv (1) 
where Xij is the value of bilateral trade between country / and country j , Y; and Yj 
represent the national income of countries i and/, respectively, and Dy is the geographic 
distance between the two countries34. The exponents Pi, fa, and P3 in equation (1) 
indicate that there is not necessarily direct proportionality between the explanatory 
variables and the trade flows. However, in order to estimate equation (1) 
econometrically, the basic gravity model has to be expressed in its log-linear form 
lnXij = lnp0 +PilnYi +p2 lnYj +p3lnDij + etj (2) 
The gravity model reflects the normal pattern of trade between two countries. Once 
this pattern of trade is established, dummy variables are introduced in equation (2) to 
reflect how some particular conditions affect bilateral trade. A positive and significant 
coefficient on a dummy variable means that this particular condition increases trade 
above what the "normal" trade would be in the absence of this condition while a negative 
and significant coefficient represents the opposite. 
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3.2.2. Theoretical foundations of the gravity model 
Following the works of Tinbergen and Poyhonen, the theoretical foundations of 
gravity equations explaining international trade flows have been widely discussed and 
developed within the last four decades. In what follows I briefly review some of the 
main contributions to the micro-foundations of the gravity equation and at the end of this 
short review, I present the recently proposed theoretical derivation of the gravity model 
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). 
Linneman (1966) was the first author who attempted to provide formal theoretical 
foundations to the gravity equation. He extended the basic model by including the 
population size of the countries which denotes the share of domestic demand in total 
national product. He showed how standard gravity equation can be derived from 
Walrasian general equilibrium model of export supply and import demand. Based on 
simplifying assumptions, the gravity equation turns out, according to Linneman, to be a 
reduced form of a four equation partial equilibrium model. 
Learner and Stern (1970) showed how a probability model of trade patterns could 
be used to derive the gravity equation. They assumed that world trade is generated by 
thousands of small independent transactions in which the probability that a transaction 
involves a particular country / is its share of world trade ft. The probability of a trade 
flow between countries i andy, py, is given by 
P^fJj (3) 
The expected trade flow from country i to country/ is 
Distance in the gravity model is measured using the great circle formula, that is, the shape of the earth is 




assuming that all transactions are of size p, and the number of transactions is equal to N. 
Due to the fact that there are resistance factors that alter the probability of a transaction 
involving countries i and/, R,y, then the expected trade flows between two countries 
become 
X^NfSfJjgiR^ (5). 
Helpman (1979) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) provide the theoretical 
rationale for the idea that bilateral trade depends on the product of GDPs. The authors 
argued that the neo-classical Heckscher-Ohlin theory of competitive advantage does not 
have the property that bilateral trade depends on the product of incomes, as it does in the 
gravity model. In this theory, consumers seek variety in the products they consume, 
products that are differentiated by firm, not just by country, and firms are 
monopolistically competitive. In addition, Helpman and Krugman (1985) introduced the 
assumptions of increasing returns to scale in the gravity model to assess the sectoral 
pattern of trade (inter-industry or intra-industry trade volumes). They argue that 
economies of scale lead to more specialization and that the gravity equations tend to fit 
the trade pattern better, the more important are increasing returns. 
An inconsistency between the Heckscher-Ohlin theory (with Cobb-Douglas utility 
and production functions) and the gravity equation have been found by Sanso et al. 
(1989) who examine the theoretical foundations of the gravity model provided by 
Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985). They show that the inconsistency arises from 
the fact that income in the labor (capital) abundant country is negatively (positively) 
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related with trade; and population in the labor (capital) abundant country is positively 
(negatively) related to trade. 
Deardoff (1998) derives the gravity model from two extreme cases of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model. The first case shows that if trade is frictionless and producers 
and consumers are indifferent among trading partners, and if markets are settled 
randomly among all possibilities, gross trade flows will follow a gravity equation with 
distance and prices playing no role. In the second case, he proves that if trade is impeded 
and each good is produced by only one country, the Heckscher-Ohlin framework will 
result in the same bilateral trade pattern as the model with differentiated goods. It can be 
shown that, if there are transactions costs to trade, distance should also be included in the 
gravity equation. He suggested that countries with similar pattern of factor endowments 
would trade more with each other. High income countries are likely to be capital-
intensive in their production and consume capital-intensive products due to their high 
income, which results in the higher volume of trade among high income countries. 
Product differentiation is the basis of new approaches in the derivation of the 
gravity models where some authors, on the one hand, employs the Armington (1969) 
assumption that goods are differentiated symmetrically by country of origin, while others, 
on the other hand, use the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977)'s assumption that goods are differentiated 
symmetrically by monopolistic competitive firms. 
Theoretical derivations using the Armington-differentiated goods assumption 
include Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), 
among others. The gravity model as proposed by Anderson (1979) is based on an 
expenditure system with identical constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility 
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function, goods differentiated by place of origin, and distance as proxy for transportation 
cost. In this work the gravity model constrains the pure expenditure system by specifying 
that the share of national expenditure on tradable goods is a stable unidentified reduced-
form function of income and population. 
Bergstrand (1985) propose a theoretical foundation of the gravity model using the 
assumption of CBS preferences over Armington's assumptions that goods are 
differentiated by country of origin and that firms are monopolistically competitive. He 
derives a reduced-form equation of bilateral trade including price indexes and found that 
imported goods are close substitutes for each other than for domestic goods, which 
supports his assumption. Improving on his previous work, Bergstrand (1989) applies the 
microeconomic foundations of the gravity model to the factor endowment variables and 
also includes exporter and importer income and per capita incomes as exogenous 
variables, assumpting perfect substitutability of products across countries. 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) use a theoretical framework derived from 
Anderson (1979), in which building blocks are the same as in Anderson (1979). The 
authors argue that there is an omitted variable bias in the derivation of the standard 
gravity equation due to the fact that the variable distance does not capture the majority of 
the factors which negatively affect bilateral trade flows. In fact, they derive a theoretical 
gravity specification explicitly taking "multilateral resistance" terms into account which 
consist of country specific price indices. In their derivation of the gravity model, the 
authors demonstrate that bilateral trade flows between two trading partners are function 
of the ratio of specific bilateral trade barriers over the product of their multilateral 
resistance terms. Hence, they propose the simultaneous use of both importer and 
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exporter fixed effects to replace the resistance terms, the latter are not observable. The 
second approach (with Dixit-Stiglitz assumption) has been used by Helpman (1987), 
Bergstrand (1989), as well as Evenett and Keller (1998), among others. As an empirical 
test of the monopolistic competition model, Helpman (1987) derives a variant of the 
gravity model from product differentiation at the firm level, in which bilateral trade 
depends positively on the economic size (measured by their GDP's) of the trading 
partners. Bergstrand (1989) extends the micro-foundations of his previous work by 
explicitely linking the Heckscher-Ohlin model and the monopolistically competitive 
model. He derives a gravity equation, in a two-sector economy, in which each 
monopolistically competitive sector has different factor proportions. Evenett and Keller 
(1998) find empirical support for formulations of the gravity model based on both the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model and increasing returns to scale, which leads to the conclusion 
that both models explain different components of the volume of trade. 
3.2.3. The Anderson and van Wincoop's Gravity Model 
Based on the seminal work of Anderson (1979), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
derive a theoretical gravity model from a framework that maintains the Armington 
assumption, i.e, goods are differentiated by place of origin, and where consumers exhibit 
a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences across the differentiated goods. In 
addition, they also assume that, on the supply side of the economy, each region is 
specialized in the production of only one good with a fixed supply. 
Let Cjj denote consumption of region j consumers of goods from region i, then the utility 
function to be maximized by consumers in region/ is expressed as 
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max U (c) = 
\<tK<r-D 
^ / 3 ( . ^ ) / « . c ( a - l ) / a ( 6 ) 
V / J 
subject to the budget constraint 
where 
Cy is consumption by region j consumers of goods from region / ; /?, is a positive 
distribution parameter35 ;cr is the elasticity of substitution between goods from different 
countries;^, is the price of the good from country i in country/6, and yf is nominal 
income in country j . Due to trade costs, prices vary across countries. Let py be the 
exporter's supply price, net of trade costs, and let ty be the trade cost factor between i and 
j . Then py = pity. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) assume that the trade costs are 
imputed to the exporter. Hence, the exporter incurs export costs equal to ty - 1 of country 
i goods for each good shipped from i to j , which are passed on to the importer. 
The nominal value of exports from i to j is xtj = ptctj, the sum of the value of production 
at the origin, picy and the trade cost (ty - l)piCy that the exporter passes on to the importer. 
Total income in region i is therefore yt = ^ xtJ . 
The solution to the optimization problem is 
where P. is a consumer price index of region j given by 
*u = 
f a * V 1 - C T ) 
J3 can be interpreted as the number of goods within the bundle produced by country i (Soderling, 2005). 
Prices differ between locations due to trade costs that are not directly observable. 
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Using a general equilibrium approach, i.e. imposing market clearance yj - ]T xtJ, 
j 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) show that the sum of i's exports to all countries must 
equal i's GDP: 
J^E^E 
v PJ J 
l - c r 
yJ = iP,pltaTl JL 
KPJJ 
yj (10) 
Substituting (10) into (8) yields the following equation 
x„. = 
'" yw yL%lpjt0h ( i i ) 
where yw = ^yj (yw being the world nominal income) and y^y" ~(j)j ( &y income 
j 
shares). Re-arranging equation (11) gives 








i / ( i - C T ) 
(13) 
Substituting equation (13) into (9) yields 
-ll/(l-<T) 
PJ = E /^n,)1-^ ,. (14) 
L V 
. PP \ • J J 
(16). 
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Equations (13) and (14) can be simultaneously solved for all Ili's and Pi's in terms of 
income shares {0j}, bilateral trade barriers {ty} and a. Under the assumption of 
symmetric trade barriers, i.e. ttJ -t}j, the solution of equations (13) and (14) yields 
P,=U, (15) 
with / ^ ^ / f - v / r Y/ 
The gravity equation is obtained by substituting (6) into (12) 
y>yj 
x,, = -
This specification of the gravity model is not used in our estimation. To make 
comparison of our estimated coefficient with those of previous studies dealing with the 
effect of currency union ion trade, we follow the trend in literature by using 
approximately the same specification as Rose (2000), Glick and Rose (2001) among 
others. 
3.3. Regional integration 
In this section, we briefly review the theory of regional economic integration. We 
also include some empirical evidence concerning southern African countries. 
3. 3.1. Regional economic integration: Theory and Evidence 
3. 3.1.1. Theory 
According to Balassa (1961), in his seminal study "The Theory of Economic 
Integration ", economic integration is said to occur when a group of countries in the same 
region, ideally of equal size and at equal stages of development, join together to form an 
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economic union or a regional trading bloc. Any type of arrangement in which countries 
agree to coordinate their trade, fiscal, and/or monetary policies is referred to as economic 
integration. Obviously, there are many different degrees of integration. 
(a) The stages of regional integration 
The first stage is a. free trade area (FTA), where a designated group of countries 
agree to eliminate tariffs, quotas and preferences on most (if not all) goods between them. 
In order to distinguish between foreign and partner products, customs authorities often 
use the share of value-added as a criterion to determine the origins of traded products. 
The second stage of integration is the customs union (CU), where members of a union set 
a common external tariff (CET) against non-members, and completely free trade of 
commodities within the union. The third stage is a common market (CM), which includes 
a customs union as well as the free movement of factors of production and services. 
Economic union (EU) is the fourth stage of integration where national economic policies 
are harmonized. The last stage is complete economic integration where almost all 
policies are unified. This stage includes monetary, fiscal and even social policies, and is 
to be governed by a supra-regional authority rather than by members individually. Each 
stage determines the degree of regional economic integration. 
(b) The theory of customs union 
In 1950, Jacob Viner introduced the theory of customs unions and elaborated on two 
important concepts that are widely used in trade literature, namely "trade creation" and 
"trade diversion". The first, "trade creation", involves the replacement of locally 
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produced products by imports produced by a partner in the union, where trade creation 
came about due to the elimination of tariffs among members of the union. The second, 
"trade diversion", is the shift in the domestic consumption from the low-cost rest of the 
world imports to the higher cost imports from partners of the union. This change in the 
source of imports is attributed to the elimination of tariffs among members of the union. 
Viner argued that "trade creation" will make the union better off because the home 
country can use resources that were devoted to less efficient industries to more efficient 
industries that have a comparative advantage. Also, when a partner country increases its 
exports, it will gain from such trade. On the other hand, "trade diversion" could make the 
union worse-off because of the switch of the home country's imports from low-cost 
sources to higher-cost partners, according to Viner, will make no gain because higher 
prices for production will be necessary to pay the higher costs. Therefore, the whole 
union could lose from such practices. Accordingly, whether or not a regional 
integration scheme produces a net welfare benefit to participating countries is an 
empirical issue. 
The following diagram, drawing fully from Siggel (2005), illustrates the basic 
argument of Jacob Viner's original approach. The typical situation of an importable 
product is shown in the familiar partial equilibrium setting of a country that faces the 
prospect of association with a regional neighbor through a free trade area (FTA) or 
customs union (CU). Its supply curve takes three alternative forms: Before association 
and with a tariff of tm consumers face a supply curve shown by CC's, while under free 
trade they should face AA's. Under a FTA or CU with another country that has higher 
production costs than third countries, the supply curve would be BB's, which represents 
47. 
the cost of production in the member country, when its products enter the home market 
without any restriction (neglecting transport cost). The domestic price would therefore 
fall from Pd' to Pd", when regional free trade is opened up. Imports would rise from 
formerly (Q3 - Q2) to (Q4 - Qi), which represents trade creation. It is trade diversion to 
the extent that the imports from third countries (Q3 - Q2) are replaced by imports from 
member countries as long as the external tariff remains at its formal level. If, however, 
the external tariff is lowered as well-, trade diversion diminishes. The price fall from Pd' 
to Pd" following introduction of regional free trade implies a gain of consumer surplus 
shown by area {a + b + c + d}, but producers lose producers' surplus of area {a} and the 
government loses tariff revenue of area [c + h]. On the whole, the introduction of 
regional free trade results in a welfare gain of [b + d - h]. Whether it is a net gain or loss 
depends on whether the efficiency gain from trade creation [b+ d] exceeds the net loss of 
tariff revenue [h + c -c], that is, the revenue loss net of [c], which is part of the 
consumers' gain. It also remains true that regional free trade implies a shortfall of 
welfare, relative to the situation of total free trade, which sums up to [f + j] (Siggel, 
2005). 
In terms of successive stages in the integration process, the member countries of 
SADC are at the first stage, i.e. a free trade area, which was launched in 2001. Eleven of 
fourteen members of SADC have joined the free trade area. Angola, Seychelles and the 
DR Congo have not elected to join the FTA yet. The SADC Trade protocol, which is 
based on negotiations and offers by contracting parties, aims for liberalization of all trade 
by 2012. Member countries have agreed to liberalize 85 percent of intra-SADC trade by 
2008 and liberalize sensitive products by 2012 (Khandelwal, 2004). More recently, 
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SADC has focused on macroeconomic Stability and convergence in member countries-in 
order to achieve the formation of a common market over the medium term. In this 
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Figure 3.1: Welfare Effects of Regional Integration. 
Source: Siggel (2005) 
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establishment of a SADC customs union and implementation of a common external tariff 
by 2010, a common market pact by 2012, and establishment of a SADC central bank and 
preparation for a single SADC currency by 2016 (Khandelwal, 2004). 
3.3.1.2. A survey of empirical studies on regional integration in southern Africa 
In this section, we briefly review empirical studies which dealt with the issue of 
regional integration in Africa with a particular emphasis on the southern Africa region. 
(a) Potential of a free trade agreement in Southern Africa 
Several studies have been conducted to assess the trade potential expected from a 
free trade agreement among member countries of the SADC. These studies have 
employed different approaches. For this survey, we focus most on the studies using the 
gravity model approach. 
Using estimated coefficients by Frankel et al.37 (1997), Mukherjee and Robinson 
(1996) predict the normal levels of gross trade (exports plus imports) between the eleven 
countries of the Southern African region. While it is certainly not clear that any of these 
arrangements are comparable to a proposed southern Africa free trade agreement, 
Mukherjee and Robinson (1996) find that the increase in bilateral trade arising from such 
membership range from 87 percent to 585 percent and that current intra-regional trade is 
somewhat above what would be expected, based on the experience of other countries. 
37
 Frankel et al.'s results were published in 1997 while they were already available before that period. 
Frankel et al. (1997) use a gravity model, based on a sample of 63 countries, to estimate the impact of 
bilateral trade when one or both partners being members of a trade bloc or free trade area. The following 
trade blocs were considered: the European union, Nafta, Mercosur, the Adean Pact, and Asean. 
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They conclude that economic integration through the establishment of a free trade area or 
customs union with South Africa could greatly increase intra-regional trade. 
Lyakurwa (1997) explores the potential for increased intra-SADC trade using a 
gravity model approach to investigate the extent to which trade patterns have been 
influenced by natural economic factors and the respective regional policy initiatives thus 
far undertaken within SADC. The gravity model was estimated for three discrete time 
periods, 1981, 1985 and 1990. The three periods represent the pre-SADC (1981) period, 
the formative stage (1985), and the period when South Africa was being considered as a 
potential member state (1990). In all the three periods, the results showed that all the 
parameters have the right sign . For 1981 and 1985 the variables (distance) and (SACU) 
are significant at 10 per cent. This indicates that while the BNLS countries' trade flows 
are highly in the direction of South Africa as members of SACU, there is higher trade 
potential between South Africa and the rest of the SADC members than within the 
customs union. 
Using a gravity model, Subramanian et al. (2001) estimate a model of bilateral 
trade flows for African countries for three points in time - 1980, 1990 and 1997- to test 
for the typicality of Africa's overall trade and to check also whether Africa's trade is 
uniform. They disaggregate Africa's trade into that of Central and Western Africa, and 
of Eastern and Southern Africa39. They find that Africa appears to be disintegrating from 
the world economy, a result that is especially strong for Francophone Africa and weakly 
present for Anglophone Africa. The disintegration pattern is particularly evident in 
38
 The signs are positive for GDP, GDP per capita and border, and negative for distance and membership in ' 
COMESA and SACU) except membership in COMESA for the periods 1981 and 1990. 
39
 In this study, the authors use the term francophone Africa for Central and Western Africa countries 
while Eastern and Southern Africa countries are referred to as Anglophone Africa. 
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Africa's trade with the technologically advanced countries of the North. The only source 
of dynamism in Africa's trade - trade growing faster than predicted by the underlying 
determinants - is in Anglophone Africa's trade with itself40. 
(V) Bloc Effects 
Several studies have tested the impacts of regional integration initiatives (or bloc 
effects) on bilateral trade of southern African countries by adding a dummy variable for 
all pairs of countries within a bloc and testing for the significance of the dummy. A 
positive and significant coefficient implies the existence of a bloc effect, namely that 
trade within the bloc, or the regional grouping, is larger than that for the average set of 
countries in the sample, after controlling for the familiar set of variables. 
Holden (1996) conducts a quantitative analysis in which he attempted to assess 
whether regional schemes in Southern Africa and the lifting of sanctions in the early 
1990s had an impact on the direction of trade for South Africa. Based on a panel data set 
covering the 1989-1993 sample period, the results of the gravity model show that the 
direction of trade for South Africa is influenced by the GDP and population variables of 
trading partners, but there is no evidence that regional groupings have any effect on the 
South Africa direction of trade. The results also show that the lifting of sanctions has 
only a marginal effect on the South Africa exports. 
Using data for the 1990-1997 time period, Agama (2001) find that two major 
regional integration schemes in southern Africa, namely SADC and COMESA, enhanced 
bilateral trade in the region. The lifting of sanctions in 1992 had a statistically significant 
40
 The intra-Anglophone African trade dummy, which is negative and insignificant in 1980 became 
markedly positive and significant in 1997. 
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effect on trade flows in the region. South Africa joining the SADC in 1994 also had a 
positive impact on bilateral trade in southern Africa. The COMESA also had a positive 
impact on bilateral trade in Southern Africa. However, COMESA had a smaller impact 
on Southern Africa trade than the SADC. 
Explaining the dynamism of Anglophone Africa's trade with itself, Subramanian 
et al. (2001) focused on the role of various regional agreements in the region. Their 
results show that, in the so-called "Anglophone Africa", the CBI and SADC exhibit bloc 
effects both in the early and late 1990s, while COMESA is the only grouping for which a 
negative bloc effect is found, meaning that countries within COMESA trade significantly 
less with each other than the average pair of countries, 
(c) Trade creation and trade diversion 
The issue of trade creation versus trade diversion in different regional integration 
schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa has been examined by several authors. Different 
approaches have been used such as: (i) use of dummy variables into the gravity equation 
in order to capture the effects of trade creation and trade diversion, or (ii) a multi-country 
computable general equilibrium model. 
Musila (2005) investigates the intensity of trade creation and trade diversion 
effects of COMESA, ECCAS41 and ECOWAS, the three largest regional integration 
arrangements in Sub-Saharan Africa using the approach developed by Endoh (1999)42 
and annual data for the period 1991-98. The empirical results reveal that ECOWAS and 
COMESA have trade creation effects and no evidence for trade diversion effects is found 
41
 ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States; ECOWAS: Economic Community Of West 
African States; and COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. 
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in the case of these two regional organizations. Accordingly, based on the estimated 
elasticities, ECOWAS and COMES A have net welfare gains. In the case of the ECCAS, 
no trade creation effect was found. 
Considering the period 1962-96, Carrere (2004) assesses the average impact of 
each regional agreement on their implementation period and shows how these impacts 
have evolved. During their implementation, the African regional trade agreements have 
generated a significant increase in trade between members, although initially often 
through trade diversion. In the two agreements of the CFA franc zone, the currency 
unions have largely reinforced the positive effect of the corresponding preferential trade 
agreements on intra-regional trade, while dampening their trade diversion effect. 
Following Endoh (1999), she introduces the three dummies needed to evaluate trade 
creation and trade diversion in imports and exports for each regional agreement 
(CEMAC, WAEMU, ECOWAS, COMESA, and SADC) and their precursors. 
Based on the evolution of the regional dummy coefficients, a more detailed analysis 
reveals that, firstly the Sub Saharan African regional agreements generated a significant 
increase in intra-regional trade, but mainly through trade diversion during the first five 
years of their inceptions. Afterwards, the WAEMU and the SADC succeeded in 
generating net trade creation with an increase in the propensity to import from the rest of 
the world. However, in the CEMAC and the COMESA, trade diversion continued over 
the whole period. 
Using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, based on 12 SADC 
countries and 37 productive sectors for each country, Evans (2002) evaluates three 
42
 Endoh (1999) proposes an approach of estimating the effects of regional organizations on the flow of 
trade by introducing dummy variables into the gravity equation to account for trade creation and trade 
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different options for regional integration for the SADC countries, namely a FT A43, a 
customs union, and open regionalism (free trade), by which SADC countries extend tariff 
reductions to all countries on a most favored nation (MFN) basis. His results, shown in 
Appendix 3.1, demonstrates that trade creation dominates trade diversion in a FTA as 
intra-SADC trade increases by 9 percent while trade with the rest of the world hardly 
changes. With free trade, there is also trade creation as SADC trade expands by nearly 7 
percent, but there are potential terms of trade costs. Evans (2002) also provides an 
examination of trade creation and trade diversion for the SADC as a whole by using the 
seven-sector disaggregation of the changes in employment over the base levels. The 
results for the SADC FTA suggest that there is trade creation in the aggregate 
manufacturing sectors. On the other hand, there is trade diversion for agriculture and 
services. 
Lewis et al. (2003) employ a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to 
analyze the impact of various trade liberalization initiatives in southern Africa, and find 
that, under all FTA arrangements, the increased total imports from FTA partners exceeds 




 The following trade liberalization initiatives are under way: 
a. The European Union (EU) - South Africa Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 
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3. 4. Effect of currency union on trade 
Recent developments in international monetary arrangement44 push many 
economists to assess the economic effects of currency unions. Started with the seminal 
paper by Andrew Rose (2000), the potential trade-creating effect of a common currency 
has recently gained wide attention in the literature, reinforcing the trade argument for 
monetary integration. In his study, Rose incorporates a currency union dummy variable45 
into the gravity equation and his results reveal that the impact of monetary union on trade 
was much larger, i.e. bilateral trade between two countries that use the same currency is 
over 200% larger than bilateral trade between countries that use different currencies. 
According to Alesina et al. (2002), this finding the currency union effect was expected to 
be small by many economists due to the fact that currency conversion costs are low and 
the estimates of the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade are small. While there has 
been a lot of controversy about the actual magnitude of the trade-creating effect of 
monetary union (i.e; Rose's finding), a broad agreement has emerged that a currency 
union has a significant positive effect on trade. Despite the heterogeneity in the empirical 
results, Alesina et al. (2002) support Rose's finding and they argue that the currency 
union coefficient is usually statistically significant, and the median estimate of the trade 
effect is 100%. 
Alesina et al. (2002) and Rose (2002) summarize the finding of empirical studies 
dealing with this issue (see Table 3.1). Studies whose results support Rose's findings 
b. The EU's 'Everything but Arms"(EBA) initiative to eliminate trade barriers against imports from 
the least developed countries; 
c. The SADC FTA (the FTA among SADC countries). 
44
 The launch of a single currency in Western Europe, the dollarization of some Latin American countries, 
the prospect for new EU members to unilaterally adopt the euro, for instance. 
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include Lopez-Cordoza and Meissner.(2003) who using trade data from 1870 to 1910 
find similar quantitative effects. Moreover, Rose and van Wincoop (2001) introduce 
country-specific trade resistance measures into their gravity model; the currency union 
effect on trade is smaller than in Rose (2000), but still substantial. Rose (2002) 
conducted a meta-analysis covering 19 studies and find that the average effect of 
currency union is to more than double trade among the members, and this is robust to 
variations in sample composition, time period, estimation techniques (i.e; fixed or 
random effects), and also excluding the six studies where Rose has been involved. 
A major criticism of Rose's (2000) findings has been addressed by several authors 
including Kenen, (2001), Nitsch (2004) and Persson (2001). These authors have shown 
that the currency union members (used in Rose, 2000) are smaller and more open than 
their natural competitors , and that history matters 7. When the currency union members 
are matched with similar countries that are not in a currency union, the differential impact 
on trade is much smaller than when the currency union members are part of a global 
dataset. However, Rose and Engel (2002) show that members of currency unions are 
different, but their case is that currency union members are more integrated with one 
another than similar pairs of countries with independent currencies. 
45
 The gravity equation is then augmented with a dummy variable indicating whether or not the country-
pair shares the same currency. The estimate of the coefficient on this dummy is interpreted as the currency-
union effect. 
46
 i.e; countries with similar economic size and characteristics. 
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Table 3.1: Empirical studies of the effect of currency union on trade 
Authors 
Rose (2000) 
Frankel and Rose (1998) 
Engel and Rose (2002) 
Persson (2001) 
Tenyero (2001) 
Pakko and Wall (2001) 
Glick and Rose (2002) 
Rose and van Wincoop (2001) 
Rose (2002) 
Significance a 
Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2001) 
Levy (2001) 
Nitsch(2002) 
















Point estimate of 







« - 55% 
* 100% 
« 140% 







 s = statistically significantly different from zero, ns = not significant. 
Source: Alesina etal. (2002) 
Several authors investigated the trade effects of episodes of currency union formation 
and dissolution. Glick and Rose (2002)48 use a time series approach to empirically assess 
the impact of currency union formation or dissolution on bilateral trade. While their 
results show a large and positive effect of currency union formation (using different time-
series variations), they also find that dissolution of a currency union halves bilateral 
trade. In contrast to Glick and Rose results, Thorn and Walsh (2002) find that breaking 
the currency union did not have an adverse impact on Ireland-UK trade. On his research 
47
 The CFA members are mostly former French colonies and the East Caribean Currency Union members 
are former British colonies. 
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on the Belgium-Luxembourg currency union, Nitsch (2004) does not-find a measurable 
change in bilateral trade. Nitsch (2004) analyzes the trade effects of currency union on 
the three countries which entered the CFA franc zone in the 1980s and 1990s and find 
mixed results: a decrease in the volume of trade for Mali with its CFA partners, countries 
while the opposite outcome has been experienced by Equatorial Guinea. However, 
Guinea Bissau's trade was largely unchanged49. In the case of the implementation of the 
euro in Western Europe, Rose and van Wincoop (2001) using coefficients from their 
gravity model with country-specific trade resistance measures, estimate that the adoption 
of the euro will boost trade among Euroland countries by 59 percent . 
Finally, Rose (2002)51 provides new estimates of the effect of currency unions on 
trade and finds that the trade effects of currency union range from -68% to a 708%. 
3. 5. Model Specification, Data and Estimation Procedure 
3.5.1. Model Specification 
This study employs the gravity model of trade to investigate the effects of 
currency union on the level of bilateral trade and we use the estimated coefficients to 
predict the trade potentials for SADC countries in the light of the upcoming monetary 
unification of the region. It addresses the issue of whether trade would increase among 
the member countries if they share a common currency. 
48
 Analyzing time series data for correlations between changing currency union status and bilateral trade 
flows, Glick and Rose (2002) use an expanded panel dataset that includes more episodes of regime 
switching. 
49
 Guinea-Bissau enters the CFA zone in 1997 (as opposed to 1984 for the other two countries) and this 
may affect the outcome. 
50
 Such an estimate is only as good as the underlying model, which, like any gravity model, may be 
confounding other determinants of bilateral trade flows in the currency union coefficient. The authors 
observe that in a simpler gravity model the predicted increase in trade due to the euro is 250-400%. 
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The gravity equation specified in this study is different from the one used-in other 
studies in the sense that, in addition to several variables used in previous works related to 
the effects of currency union on trade, this study applies the Linder hypothesis52 to 
explain trade patterns in the developed and developing countries respectively, since our 
sample includes both types of countries. 
As previously stated, in line with previous studies used to estimate the effect of a 
currency union on trade (see, Rose (2000) and Glick and Rose (2002), for instance), we 
estimate the following augmented gravity model. 
ln(Xijt) = Po+ Pim(YiYj), + p2 In (YiY/PopjPopjX + p3lnDij + p4Lindera 
p5 Vj, + p6 Langij + p7 Conty + p8 FTAijt + p9 Landly + p10 Island^ + p n 
ComColy + pn CurColyt + p13 Colonyy + y CUijt + sijt (17) 
where / and/ denotes countries, t denotes time, and the variables are defined as: 
Xyt denotes the average value of real bilateral trade between / and j at time t, 
- Y; or Y, is real GDP of country i or j , 
- Pop; or Pop, is population of country z or 7, 
- Dy is the distance between i and j , 
- Vij is the nominal bilateral exchange rate volatility, 
- Linder is the log of per capita income differential, 
- Lang,y is a binary variable which is unity if i and/ have a common language, 
- Con% is a binary variable which is unity if i and/ share a land border, 
- FTAy is a binary variable which is unity if / and j belong to the same regional trade 
51
 Rose (2002) makes use of the time-series as well as cross-sectional variation in the data using different 
samples and techniques. 
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agreement, 
- Landly is the number of landlocked countries in the country-pair (0,1, or 2), 
- Island,;, is the number of island nations in the country-pair (0,1, or 2), 
- ComCol;y is a binary variable which is unity if i and/ were ever colonized after 1945 
with the same colonizer, 
- Colony,/ is a binary variable which is unity if i ever colonized/ or vice versa, 
- CUy is a binary variable which is unity if i and/ use the same currency at time t, 
P is a vector of nuisance coefficients, and 
- s represent the myriad of other influences on bilateral exports, and the error term is 
assumed not to be correlated with any of the right-hand side variables. 
The dependent variable in this study is the average bilateral trade (average of 
exports and imports from country i toy). Several studies use as dependent variable of the 
gravity model for international trade either exports (imports) or total trade (sum of 
exports and imports), but the studies which deal with the issue of currency union on trade 
mostly use the average of exports and imports as dependent variable. 
The first three independent variables in the model are the conventional variables 
in the gravity model. The basic gravity model specifies that trade between two countries 
is proportionate to the product of their GDPs and inversely related to the distance 
between them. We add the exchange rate volatility (Vy) as an explanatory variable to 
assess the effect of exchange rate fluctuation on trade. We expect a negative relationship 
between the exchange rate volatility and bilateral trade since according to the traditional 
trade theory that high exchange rate volatility would reduce trade by increasing the profit 
52
 Linder (1961) posed a hypothesis that the closer the preference structure between two countries is, the 
bigger the trade volume becomes. This would explain the preponderance of trade between high-income 
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uncertainty among export-oriented firms. We also include a variable to test the Linder 
hypothesis which states that countries with similar levels of per capita income would 
have similar preferences and similar but differentiated products, and thus would trade 
more with each other. Thus, the Linder hypothesis is associated with the prediction that 
the absolute value of the difference of the per capita income of the two trade partners 
will be negatively related to bilateral trade. 
To the baseline gravity equation and the additional variables described above, we 
also introduce a set of dummy variables to capture the impact of geographical factors and 
historical ties between countries on bilateral trade flows. These are explained as follows: 
(i) Contiguity (or adjacency): A dummy variable to identify a pair of countries 
that are adjacent or share a common border53. The dummy variable is unity if 
countries / and/ share a common border and zero when they do not. 
(ii) Common language is expected to reduce transaction costs as speaking the 
same language helps facilitate trade negotiations. Hence, speaking the same 
language has a positive effect on trade. 
(Hi) Shared history is expected to reduce transaction costs caused by cultural 
differences. We include two dummy variables to capture colonial links. 
Comcol is equal to one if both trade partners were colonies after 1945 with the 
same colonizer while Col is equal to one if country i colonized country j or 
vice versa. We expect a positive trade effects for colonial links. 
countries, much of which is of the intra-industry variety. 
53
 This dummy is in addition to the inclusion of the distance variable to account for the possibility of 
center-to-center distance overstating the effective distance between neighboring countries that may often 
engage in large volumes of border trade. 
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(iv) Countries often enter into regional trading arrangements with the intention of 
facilitating bilateral trade. The estimated coefficient on the dummy variable 
representing FT A will then tell how much of the trade can be attributed to a 
special regional effect. On average, it has been found that FT As has a positive 
impact on trade (Frankel and Wei, 1997), and thus, we expect a positive sign 
for this variable. In this paper, we treat all FTA equally, as in Rose (2000) 
and Glick and Rose (2002). 
3.5.2. Data 
The empirical analysis should be based on a maximum geographical coverage of 
world trade flows. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, we cannot include all the 
countries of the world and have been obliged to omit some countries in this study. The 
equation is estimated for a reference sample of 70 countries. Nineteen of these countries 
are members of the OECD and the remaining countries are classified as developing 
countries. By basing our estimates on a sample of countries which includes developed 
countries, the model avoids producing results which are characteristic solely of trade 
flows between developing countries. Since we are also interested on the impact of 
currency union as well as free trade agreements on bilateral trade, we include in our 
sample the members of the existing currency unions54 and also the countries which 
belong to some FTAs.55 The countries considered in this study are presented in Appendix 
3.2. 
54
 Existing currency unions: the CFA zone, the East Caribbean Currency Union and the Euro area (for year 
2002 data). 
55
 The list of FTA are obtained from the WTO website and includes NAFTA, CARICOM, EU15, 
ECOWAS, ASEAN. 
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The gravity model estimated in this study is based on panel data for the period 
1992 to 2002 at five years intervals, i.e., data are for 1992, 1997 and 2002. The year 
1992 marks the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
as well as the lifting of international sanctions against the Republic of South Africa, the 
dominant economy of the region. Since data are not available for the bilateral trade 
among the BNLS56 countries, they are not included in the analysis. With 70 countries in 
the sample57, we should expect (70*69)72= 2415 country-pair observations for each 
single year. But due to missing values, the number of country-pair observations is 
smaller than this. We have in the estimated model an unbalanced panel of 1956 country-
pair groups with a total of 5163 observations. 
The bilateral trade data, in current US dollars, were taken from the Direction of 
Trade Statistics (DoTS) produced by the International Monetary Fund (various issues). 
Trade flows recorded as zero were omitted. These trade values were deflated by US GDP 
deflators. Distance is measured as the great circle distance between the economic centers 
(mostly capital cities) of the exporting and importing countries. The great circle distance 
is computed as follows58: 
DtJ = z* Arc cos[sin <p,. sin<py + cos <p, cos <py cos A,y ] (18) 
where z is the earth radius of 3956 miles or 6367 for kilometres, <p,. and <py are radian 
measures of the parallel of latitude of the two countries' capitals, and A,y = (Ay -A,J is 
the radian measure of the difference in meridians of the two countries' capitals. The 
56
 BNLS: Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland. These four countries are SADC and SACU 
members. 
57
 The list of countries used in the estimation is present in Appendix 3.2. 
58
 See Helmers and Pasteels (2005). 
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measures for the great circle distance between two countries were taken from the 
USDA's web site59. 
Real GDP and population data for countries used in this analysis were taken from 
the World Bank's World Development Indicators CD-ROM with 1995 as base year. The 
nominal bilateral exchange rate series were obtained from the IMF's International 
Financial Statistics CD-ROM. The exchange rate volatility was calculated as the 
standard deviation of the first difference of log of monthly bilateral exchange rates for the 
five years preceding the period under consideration. For year 1992, for example, the data 
include observations from January 1987 to December 1991. The adjacency and the 
common language variable were constructed using Central Intelligence Agency's World 
Factbook (2005). 
3. 5.3. Estimation techniques 
Following previous studies which use the gravity model, we apply different 
estimation methodologies. We firstly estimate our gravity model using ordinary least 
square (OLS) techniques on pooled cross-section and time-series data. Since we are 
dealing with panel data, we then use different techniques which are more appropriate 
with this type of data. As Greene (1997) shows, the use of panel data methodology has 
several advantages over cross-section analysis. First, panels make it possible to capture 
the relevant relationships among variables over time. Second, a major advantage of using 
panel data is the ability to monitor the possible unobservable trading partner-pairs 
individual effects. When individual effects are omitted, OLS estimates will be biased if 




models, the fixed-effects model (FEM) and the random-effects (REM) model. In the 
current study, we use the random-effects model. 
The basic framework for this discussion is a regression model of the form 
yjt = ai+p'x i t + Sit, (19) 
There are K regressors in Xjt, not including the constant term. The individual effects is a.;, 
which is taken to be constant over time t and specific to the individual cross-sectional 
unit i. As it stands, this is a classical regression model. If we take the a,j>s to be the same 
across all units, ordinary least squares provide consistent and efficient estimates of a and 
p. There are two basic frameworks used to generalize this model. The fixed effects 
approach takes otj to be a group specific constant term in the regression model. The 
random effects approach specifies that a; is a group specific disturbance, similar to Sjt 
except that for each group, with the exception that for each group, there is a single draw 
that enters the regression identically in each period (Greene, 1997) 
3. 6. Empirical results 
We follow the norm in the literature by using ordinary least squares, with robust 
standard errors (White's heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors). We also employ a 
number of panel data estimation techniques. The results of our benchmark regression are 
presented in table 3.2. The typical empirical success of the gravity specification is 
manifested in a good fit, with a R-squared value of 0.79, which denotes that almost 80 
percent of the variation in trade flows is explained by the variables used in the model. 
On the basis of the estimated results, it is possible to conclude that the 
conventional variables in the gravity equation (economic size and distance) are important 
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in explaining bilateral trade flows among the countries considered in this study. All the 
corresponding parameter estimates show the expected sign and they are statistically 
significant. 
The pooled OLS model confirms that economic size has a highly significant and 
less-than-proportional impact on bilateral trade. The magnitude of the coefficient on the 
product of real GDP suggests that a one percent increase in economic activity at home or 
abroad raise bilateral trade by about 0.80 percent. The coefficient on the product of per 
capita income is statistically significant and positive. This indicates that richer countries 
trade more than poor ones. Hence, a 1 percent increase in per capita income raises trade 
by almost 0.1 percent. As expected, a longer distance between trading partners has a 
negative impact on trade. The estimated coefficient shows that the elasticity of trade with 
respect to distance is close to unity (in absolute value). On average, a 1 percent increase 
in transportation costs will reduce trade by about 0.4 percent. The coefficient on the 
bilateral exchange rate volatility is correctly signed but it is not statistically significant. 
Our results support the Linder hypothesis which states that similar countries trade 
more than dissimilar ones. The estimated coefficient of the log difference of per capita 
income appears to be negative and" significant for the model. This implies that a 1 
percent reduction in per capita income differential will increase bilateral trade by about 
0.076 percent. 
Let's now turn to the interpretations of our dummy variables60. The results show 
that having a common border and speaking the same language increase trade by 300 
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Model 1 is estimated without FTA and Currency union dummies. Model 2 includes the FTA dummy while 
model 3 includes both FTA and currency union dummies in the estimation. 
All variables except dummies are expressed in natural logarithms. 
Estimation uses White's heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
(*), (**) and (***) denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
0
 The marginal effect of the dummy variables can be calculated by taking the exponential of the estimated 
coefficient minus one. Thus, for the common curency and the FTA dummies, we get e0'742 - 1 = 1.1 and 
eo.832_ j = 1 3 j respectively. See Bussiere, M., J. Fidrmuc, and B. Schnatz (2005) 
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percent and 26 percent, respectively, while the fact that, when at least one of the two 
trading countries is landlocked, reduces bilateral trade by about 80 percent. We also find 
that, in terms of bilateral trade flows, colonial links matter. The two dummy variables 
introduced in the model to ascertain the impact of colonial ties on trade are positive and 
statistically significant. Moreover, it shows that trade between a given country and its 
former colonizer is 4 times more than with another trading partner. Similarly, two 
countries which had the same colonizer trade on average 63 percent more than with each 
other. 
In this study, we are mostly interested on the combined effect of a common 
currency and a free trade agreement in explaining bilateral trade. We then introduce two 
dummy variables to account for these effects. The pooled OLS model shows that the 
estimated coefficients for both dummy variables are positive and statistically significant. 
The estimated coefficient for the common currency dummy is 0.74, and this estimate is 
close to that the FTA dummy, 0.832. This means that pairs of country sharing the same 
currency trade on average 110 percent more than those with separate currencies, while 
the impact of a FTA is equivalent to an increase on trade of about 130 percent. 
The impact of a common currency on trade, estimated in this study, is comparable 
to the values found in the literature and the effect found in this study is close to the 
median value of 100 percent as presented by Alesina et al. (2002). (see Table 3.1 or 
different values estimated by Glick and Rose (2002), for instance). 
In Appendix 3.3, we present the estimated results for the three different years 
taken individually. However, the estimated results from the gravity model using panel 
estimation techniques are shown in Table 3.3. 
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Having estimated the gravity model, we now turn to our next step which consists 
of using the estimated coefficients to calculate the trade potentials for SADC countries in 
the case where these countries decide to share a common currency. 
3. 7. Trade potentials 
In most analyses where the gravity model is estimated, the results have been used for the 
prediction of additional bilateral trade that might be expected if integration between two 
countries (or more than two countries) is fostered. In this type of exercise, two main 
strategies have been developed in order to calculate trade potentials: 
(i) The first strategy involves the derivation of out-of-sample trade potential 
estimates. This strategy was used by Wang and Winters (1992), Hamilton and Winters 
(1992), for example, in the case of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). 
Referring to the EU-CEEC case, for instance, De Benedictis and Vicarelli (2004) 
mentioned that the parameters for EU or OECD countries are estimated by a gravity 
model and then the same coefficients are applied to project "natural" trade relations 
between EU countries and CEECs. By using this strategy, it is assumed that that the 
intra-OECD or the intra-EU trade relations should reflect a kind of steady-state that East-
West and also East-East (within CEEC) trade relations should approach in the medium 
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term. It has to be noted that, in this approach, the data for CEECs are not included in the 
estimation of the gravity equation. Thus, as noted by Egger (2002), the difference 
between the observed and predicted trade flows is then interpreted as the un-exhausted 
trade potential. 
(ii) In the second strategy, employed Baldwin (1994) and Nilsson (2000), for 
instance, the CEECs are already included in the regression analysis, and the trade 
potentials are the residuals obtained by taking the difference between predicted and 
observed (actual) trade flows (Egger, 2002). The second strategy is called in-sample 
trade potential estimates. 
Egger (2002) provides a criticism of the strategies outlined above and proposes a 
new way of calculating trade potentials. Since in our analysis and model specification, 
we follow the model of Rose (2000) and other researchers who investigate the effect of 
currency union on trade, we use in this section the second strategy outlined above. 
The trade potentials for each individual SADC member to the rest of SADC is 
calculated in Table 3.4 as a ratio between the potential and the observed (actual) trades, 
while Table 3.5 presents the trade potentials for these individual SADC countries with 
South Africa, the largest economy of the region. They may be greater or lower than one. 
A ratio higher than one represents a potential trade flow higher than the observed trade 
flow. Since we are interested in the effect of a common currency, combined with a FTA, 
on the level of bilateral trade, we first use the benchmark model (Table 3.2, column 4). 
We calculated trade potentials using data for the year 2002 . 
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 Regarding the interpretation of the potential trade in general, we should bear in mind that these values are 
based on 2002 observed data and on expected trade flows predicted from a model estimated with year 2002 
data. They should therefore not be viewed as forecasts. If we wish to adapt the potentials to future years, 
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Overall, for each SADC country, the predicted trade flows to the rest of the region are 
lower compared to the actual trade flows. Thus SADC countries trade more than the 
predictions of the gravity model. For five countries in the region, namely Malawi, 
Mauritius, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe, their actual trade flows to the rest of 
SADC are at least five times greater than the predicted values from the gravity model. 
Whereas, for Angola and South Africa, their predicted trade flows represent 
approximately 48% and 26% of their observed trade flows, respectively. DR. Congo and 
Mozambique have predicted trade flows of over 50% of the observed ones. Tanzania is 
the only country in the region which under-trades with its SADC partners. 
While our finding seems to be contrary to our expectations, following the results 
of Rose (2000), similar results have been obtained by Masson and pattillo (2005) in the 
case of WAEMU and CMA, but not for the CEMAC, using the same model specification. 
For the case of SADC, this can be justified by the share of trade between each SADC 
country and South Africa. An examination of the actual trade flows in the two panels of 
Table 3.4. provides an explanation for the dominant share of South Africa in internal 
trade , mainly imports from South Africa. In addition to this, the low level.of predicted 
trade flows can also be explained by large distance between capital cities in the region, 
since this variable is negatively related to trade flows, and also low levels of the 
economic size (GDP and GDP per capita). 
we should note firstly that the GDP levels of all the countries will change, and secondly, that the 
parameters of the model may change as well. 
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Table 3.4: Intra-SADC trade potentials 




















































































Notes: Trade (actual or predicted) = exports + imports, in millions of US dollars) 
In 2002, the share of South Africa in total trade for Angola, for instance, has been more than 50 percent. 
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Due to the large dollar values of bilateral trade between individual SADC country 
and South Africa, we also estimate, in panel B of Table 3.4, the trade potentials of these 
countries to the rest of the region, excluding South Africa. With exception of Angola 
and, in a lesser extent Tanzania, whose predicted trade exceeds largely the observed ones, 
the situation depicted above prevails for the other SADC countries. This means that 
Angola and Tanzania may significantly gain from the implementation of a FTA and a 
common currency with the rest of the region in terms of bilateral trade flows. Even 
though the two countries have their actual trade with South Africa greater than the 
predicted ones (see table 3.4.), there are still room for increase in their trade with the rest 
of the region. 
The bilateral trade flows in southern Africa is largely dominated by trade between 
each single SADC country and South Africa. Results in Table 3.5 show that, for most of 
the SADC countries, their predicted trade with South Africa are less than 20% of the 
observed trade flows in 2002, the exception being Mozambique and Tanzania with a ratio 
of 0.50 and 0.65, respectively. Here again, the numbers demonstrate that South Africa 
over-trade with its SADC partners compared to the predictions of the gravity model. 
In the light of the above results, we find that each country in southern Africa over-
trades with the rest of its SADC partners. There is a tremendous gap between the 
predicted and actual trade flows for these countries. Therefore, on the basic of bilateral 
trade flows, the implementation of a free trade areas as well as a common currency may 
not have a large impact as expected in the level of intra-S ADC trade in general. 
The results obtained in this paper are in line with the conclusions reached by 
Yeats (1998) and Chauvin and Gaullier (2002). Yeats finds that African countries tend to 
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have exports concentrated in a few commodities, reducing their possibilities of intra-
regional trade while for the case of SADC, Chauvin and Gaullier (2002) find that SADC 
countries have similar disadvantages in manufactured goods (except South Africa) while 
having similar advantages in primary goods. South Africa appears to be the only source 
of manufactured goods, and even here, the range of products is limited. They argue that 
the potential to expand trade within SADC is small and existing opportunities may 
already have been exploited. 
Table 3.5: SADC trade potentials with South Africa 
Country Actual Trade Predicted Trade P/A 





































Notes: see Table 3.4. 
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3. 8. Conclusion 
In the light of the European integration experience, southern African countries are 
placing a remarkable emphasis on the regional integration process. The issue of a 
regional free trade agreement has been elaborated and almost completed, while that of a 
monetary union is still on the debate. Several studies have already investigated the 
impact of a FTA on the regional trade. However, the effect of a regional single currency 
on the intra-SADC trade has not been examined empirically. In this paper, we provide an 
empirical contribution to this issue. 
In this paper, the gravity model of international trade was used to analyze the 
determinants of bilateral trade flows for the period 1992-2002, and the study used a large 
dataset comprised of 70 countries. The effect of a currency union and that of a FTA on 
trade have been discussed. The main result shows that the currency union impact on 
trade found in this study is comparable to those obtained in other studies (see Table 3.1). 
The estimated coefficients allowed us to calculate trade potentials of SADC 
countries and analyze whether these countries would significantly gain, in terms of trade 
flows among them, when they will share the same currency. Our results demonstrate that 
the" observed trade flows among SADC countries are largely greater than the ones 
predicted by the empirical model. Hence, there are no unexploited trade potentials in the 
region. However, sharing the same currency as well as a FTA would certainly have an 
impact on the economy of the region for other reasons. Honohan and Lane (2000) show 
that, in the case of Africa, a common currency would increase economic stability, provide 
greater insulation for central banks from pressures to provide monetary financing, and 
lower transactions costs. Thus, the argument that common currency would increase the 
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intra-regional trade in Southern Africa is not supported by the evidence found in this 
study. 
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CHAPTER 4: OPTIMAL PEG FOR SOUTHERN AFRICAN CURRENCIES 
4.1. Introduction 
Following the emergence of the euro as the single currency of the twelve western 
European countries, there has been a renewed and a growing interest in the monetary 
integration around the world. The experience of Europe has raised the question as to 
whether countries in other regions of the world should follow a similar path towards 
adopting a common currency. One special case is the monetary union project in the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) which is a regional group of 14 
countries. The SADC has monetary union in the cards, with a project of a SADC 
common currency by 2016. 
The main justification for promoting monetary cooperation in southern Africa is 
to promote closer regional trade integration as a way to speed up economic growth in the 
region. It has been argued that monetary agreement reduces real exchange rate instability 
and prevents rough and repeated monetary adjustments. The stabilization of the 
macroeconomic environment is an important condition to the expansion of intra-regional 
trade. Hence, for countries seeking to increase their intra-regional trade, a monetary 
coordination mechanism is necessary. In this line of reasoning, Volz (2006) shows that 
there are numerous problems faced by countries what are close partners but follow 
different exchange rate regimes: 
(i) Exchange rate disagreements could lead to reduced exports from the country 
that loses competitiveness to its partners. This could evoke increased 
protectionism and even a scaling back or elimination of trade agreements, 
(ii) Investments may be relocated because of severe exchange rate disagreements. 
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(Hi) A change of the exchange regime in one of the partner countries may cause 
an exchange rate crisis in the other. Exchange rate depreciation in one country 
may reduce the credibility of the partner's commitment to a fixed parity and can 
generate speculative attacks on its currency. (Volz, 2006) 
It has been argued that exchange rate cooperation is necessary for countries which 
compete against one another in third markets, as is the case for SADC members, in order 
to avoid competitive depreciation under the floating exchange rate mechanism for 
seeking competitive advantage both within the region as well as in third markets (Volz, 
2006; Corsetti et al., 2000). 
In terms of strategies to achieve full monetary unification in the African regions, 
Cobham and Dobson (1994) suggest that the strategy depends upon whether the countries 
are committed to monetary union or governments are attracted to monetary integration 
but are unwilling to commit themselves. Two stages are required in the case where 
countries are commited to the goal of achieving a monetary union: a preparatory period 
during which fiscal policy in each country is stabilized, the existing currencies are made 
convertible, the union-level central bank is established and the transformation of the 
existing national central banks into subordinate agencies is prepared; and a subsequent 
transitional period during which the old currencies would be phased out and the new one 
phased in, with monetary responsibility being transferred to the new union-level central 
bank. However, when countries are not committed to the goal of monetary integration, 
but are interested in moving at least some way towards it, Cobham and Dobson (194) 
suggest two policies64: first, they should peg their currencies to the same anchor; and 
secondly they should make current and capital account transactions convertible. 
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 Such policies can be expected to bring about a considerable convergence in terms of macroeconomic 
policies and inflation rates, and place the countries concerned in a position from which they could decide, if 
they so wished, to embark on the basic strategy outlined above.(Cobham and Dobson, 1994). 
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In many situations at least it would be useful for the preparatory period to involve 
a process of convergence of inflation rates and stabilization of exchange rates. Under the 
SADC's Memorandum of Understanding65, the question of the convergence of inflation 
rates has been addressed and a timetable has been proposed. However, the issue of 
exchange rate coordination has not been addressed yet, to our knowledge. Hence, we 
suggest that the next step towards monetary unification in Southern Africa must be the 
issue of exchange rate coordination, for which we provide some rationale below. 
Wypsolsz (2001) argues that while optimum currency area arguments have not 
been prominent in the European debate, exchange rate stability has been the paramount 
objective among countries seeking to achieve and maintain a high degree of trade 
integration. Fear of competitive devaluation and of protectionist reactions that they 
create has always been a key concern and the incentive for a cooperative approach to 
interdependence. He also argues that some degree of exchange rate stability may be 
desirable for countries that trade heavily - or wish to expand trade links - among 
themselves. He then recommends that, for countries which have good reasons to pursue a 
regional strategy, currency pegs (in form of a soft peg) remain an appealing option. 
Although common currency pegs have been suggested for many emerging 
countries, several economists, including Eichengreen (2004), have expressed some 
reservations on the issue of exchange rate coordination as a way of promoting trade and 
growth in regions with an objective of regional economic integration. Using the examples 
of MERCUSOR in Latin America and NAFTA in North America, as well as the case of 
East Asia, he questioned the relevance of macroeconomic stability and exchange rate 
65
 The Memorandum of Understanding is a document designed by the SADC Central Bank Governors in 
2002. 
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stability, in particular, in generating support for regional trade integration. He, thus, 
suggests as alternative to exchange rate coordination an harmonized inflation targeting 
which provides an anchor for inflation expectations and hence for exchange rate 
expectations as well. Where inflation targeting has been adopted, floating rates have 
worked to limit macroeconomic pressures without allowing currency volatility to 
undermine support for a FTA (Eichengreen, 2004). 
However, while inflation targeting seems to be advisable for countries with deeper 
financial markets, less short-term debt, and greater transparency, those countries with 
more volatile exchange rates may find it more difficult to inflation target because, for 
instance, the domestic price level will be more difficult to forecast and exchange rate 
fluctuations will have disruptive effects (Eichengreen, 2004). Eichengreen (2004) added 
that harmonized inflation targeting will not succeed to reconciliate national policy 
autonomy with regional integration since many developing countries have chronic fiscal 
and financial imbalances, making central banks unable to commit to low inflation, 
therefore inflation targeting will lack credibility. On the other hand, Jadresic et al. 
(2001) argue that, for many developing countries with less linkage to global capital 
markets, traditional exchange rate pegs and intermediate regimes are more viable and 
retain important advantages. Exchange rate pegs can provide a useful and credible 
nominal anchor for monetary policy and avoid many complexities and institutional 
requirements for establishing an alternative anchor (such as a credible inflation target 
backed by an operationally independent central bank). In addition to the absence of 
sophisticated financial systems, many of these countries lack a deep and broad market for 
exchange rate, which can provide reasonable exchange rate stability in the absence of 
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official guidance. Moreover, the few developing countries that still confront the problem 
of stabilizing from very high inflation may also find virtue in exchange-rate-based 
stabilization plans, while giving due attention to timely implementation of an exit 
strategy. This is the case for many SADC (non-CMA) countries with a long track record 
of double digit inflation rates. 
The obvious choice for exchange rate coordination would be the adoption of a 
common peg for the countries of the regional grouping. Thus, the peg must be supported 
by adequate institutions as well as procedures to enforce and verify the arrangement. In 
the case of pegging SADC currencies, an important issue concerns the choice of the 
nominal anchor. Mundell (2003) explores different choices of nominal anchors for Asian 
countries, and we find that this applies as well for southern African countries. 
Henceforth, the countries could commonly peg their currencies either to an internal 
anchor as is the case for the CMA countries66 or to an external anchor (a major currency: 
the US dollar or the euro, for example). 
This chapter is concerned with the optimality of the pegging strategies of the 
SADC countries. In this paper, we consider the optimal pegging strategies in the light of 
the optimum currency areas (OCA) theory. Hence, this study will try to provide answer 
to the following two questions. (1) What is the appropriate nominal anchor currency for 
southern African countries? and, (2) What are the country-pairs which are suitable for 
currency union, on the basis of the OCA index? This chapter deals mainly with the 
calculation of OCA indices for Southern African countries in an effort to estimate the 
CMA: Common Monetary Area which includes South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. The 
latter three countries peg their currencies to the South African rand. 
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cost-benefit ratio of adopting a common currency peg, as well as a single common 
currency. 
Recent studies of common currency pegs have focused on Asian countries and the 
transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe. To our knowledge, there are no such 
studies for African countries in general and Southern African countries, in particular. 
Note, however, that currency pegs are not new in Africa since the 15 CFA countries peg 
their currency to the euro, an external anchor, and the CMA countries have their 
currencies pegged to South African rand, an internal anchor. This paper will attempt to 
fill the gap since there is a clear indication that the SADC will probably move, in the next 
decades, towards a monetary union, and a common currency peg could be an option prior 
to adoption of a common currency as it was the case for European countries. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a 
short review of the optimum currency area theory. Section 3 discusses the present 
exchange rate regimes in the region. Data and methodology used in this paper are 
presented in section 4. Empirical results and their interpretations are discussed in section 
5. Section 6 concludes. 
4. 2. Review of the optimum currency areas (OCA) theory 
The aim of this section is to give a short review of the Optimum Currency Area 
theory. Originated from the seminal work of Mundell (1961), who defines the appropriate 
geographical domain of a currency area as a domain within which exchange rates are 
fixed against each other although flexible vis-a-vis the outside world, the OCA theory 
serves as an approach for thinking about monetary integration. In other words, the OCA 
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theory provides properties or criteria for determining whether countries or groups of 
countries are best suited to form a monetary union, and also discusses benefits and costs 
which may arise from creating such an area. 
The OCA theory arose from debates among exchange rate regimes and 
adjustment under balance of payments disequilibria. Mundell (1961) challenged 
Friedman's (1953) view on the floating exchange rate regime as means of adjustment 
under balance of payments disequilibria due to exogenous shocks. In his model of an 
asymmetric shift in demand between two countries, Mundell (1961) offered some non-
exchange rate means of adjustment, such as mobility of factors of production and 
nominal price and wage flexibility. Later, McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969), among 
others, extended the list of non-exchange rate means of adjustment by considering 
economic openness and national product diversification. 
Based on the OCA literature, there were two essential approaches that have been 
formulated to evaluate the merits and the readiness of countries to form monetary unions. 
The first approach consists of identifying sets of criteria which assess the viability of a 
monetary union while the second approach deals with the costs and benefits of a 
monetary union. This section elaborates on both of these approaches. 
4.2.1. Overview of some OCA criteria 
In his seminal work on the theory of OCAs, Mundell (1961) argued that the key to 
forming a currency union is a higher degree of factor mobility (capital and labor) between 
regions in a given nation or between nations, and nominal wage and price flexibility. To 
demonstrate his argument, Mundell (1961) presents a simple model consisting of two 
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entities (countries or regions) A and B with fixed exchange rates. He assumes that the 
two entities are initially in full-employment and balance of payments equilibrium, and 
that each country maintains its own national currency. 
Mundell considers an "asymmetric shock" that shifts demand from B to A, and 
this causes unemployment in country B and inflationary pressure in country A. For this 
purpose, Mundell presents two alternative cases depending on whether the two entities 
are countries with separate national currencies or-regions of the same country with the 
same currency: 
(1) Assume, in the first scenario, that the two countries are tied by a fixed 
exchange rate regime and that wages and prices are sticky. In the absence of exchange 
rate adjustment, the demand shift from B to A would necessitate a drop in employment in 
country B and inflationary pressures in country A. Moreover, if these pressures are 
restrained by restrictive monetary policies in A, all the burden of adjustment falls 
completely on country B which has to go through a severe recession. Therefore, in the 
absence of factor movement the two countries and also with domestic wages and prices 
being sticky (rigid), an adjustment mechanism which would correct the external balance 
and also relieve unemployment in country B and restrain inflation in country A will 
require either a depreciation by country B or an appreciation by country A. In the case 
where factors of production are mobile across countries, a system of flexible exchange 
rate is not necessary since the high unemployment in country B is offset by the 
movement of labor and capital from deficit country B to the surplus country A until 
equilibrium is restored in both countries. Another way of adjusting to the disequilibrium 
67
 Asymmetric shock can be referred to an unexpected disturbance in the national output that affects one 
country differently from another (Jurek, 2004) 
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without using exchange rates is the flexibility of nominal prices and wages between and 
within countries A and B because wage claims in country B would be reduced cushioning 
the economy from unemployment while the opposite would be valid for country A. 
(2) In the second scenario, Mundell assume that the two entities are regions of the same 
country, unemployment in B will trigger money expansion which will magnify inflation 
pressures in A. Consequently, a full-employment policy of the central bank will raise 
prices in region A and turn the terms of trade in favor of B which will complete the 
adjustment process. 
From the two cases mentioned above, it has been shown that a currency area 
whether comprising countries or regions will always imply a trade-off between 
willingness of countries/regions to inflate or thrusting the burden of adjustment on the 
real sector and provoking recessions in deficit countries/regions. From this analysis, 
Mundell suggests that the domain of the currency areas should correspond to the 
homogeneous regions rather than heterogeneous nations or states. He also adds that 
regions should be entities with high internal and low external mobility of factors of 
production. 
McKinnon (1963) argues that the effectiveness of exchange rate adjustments to 
restore balance of payment equilibrium is lower in small and highly open economies68. 
McKinnon demonstrates that in small highly open economies, the tradable sector is 
relatively larger than the non-tradable sectors, and in this case nominal exchange rate 
variations cannot have significant effects on the terms of trade and real wages. In sum, 
68
 Economic openness has a range of dimensions that include the degree of trade integration (ratio of 
reciprocal exports plus imports over GDP) with member countries; the share of tradables versus non-
tradables goods and services in production and consumption; the marginal propensity to import and 
international capital mobility (Mongelli, 2002). 
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we should note that the smaller the size of the economy, the more open it is likely to be, 
and thus, the more inclined to join in a currency area. 
According to Kenen (1969), emphasis should be placed on economic 
diversification in both production and consumption as another non-exchange rate 
adjustment process to deal with the effects of an asymmetric disturbance on the economy 
of a country69. Economic diversification is supposed to insulate countries against a 
variety of shocks, i.e, countries with more diversified economies are more likely to 
endure small costs from forsaking nominal exchange rate changes. Therefore, countries 
that are highly diversified economically are good candidates for forming a currency union 
as compared to those whose economies are less diversified because shocks focused on 
one or more sectors of the economy would offset each other in the aggregate. 
Another criterion for forming an optimal currency area is the flexibility of 
nominal prices and wages. According to Fleming (1971), flexible adjustment of prices 
and wages to excess demand and excess supply would bring automatic adjustment in the 
event of an asymmetric shock (Horvarth, 2003). In this instance, the need for nominal 
exchange rate adjustment becomes negligible. However, Mongelli (2002) points out that 
nominal price and wage flexibility may be more effective in the very short run in 
smoothing the adjustment process following a disturbance. When a shock is permanent, 
changes in real prices and wages may be required. 
Ingram (1962) shows that a high degree of financial integration among a group of 
countries can reduce the need for exchange rate adjustments, in the face of temporary 
adverse disturbances through capital inflows. This can be done, for example, by 
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borrowing from surplus areas or de-cumulating net foreign assets than can be reverted 
when the shock is over (Mongelli, 2002). Greater financial integration also implies fewer 
opportunities of arbitrage and smaller interest differentials, hence, fostering a more 
efficient allocation of resources. Moreover, similarity in financial institutions and markets 
would also make it less costly to transition to a single currency area since they would be 
easily governed by similar rules and regulation, hence, minimizing possibilities of 
financial crises. 
When countries experienced similar rates of inflation over time, this could be an 
indication that the countries have similarities in economic structures, economic policies, 
and social preferences. According to Fleming (1971), when inflation rates among 
countries are low and similar over an extended period of time, terms of trade will also 
remain somewhat stable. In turn, this stability is expected to foster a more equilibrated 
current account transactions and trade, therefore minimizing the need for nominal 
exchange rate adjustment (Mongelli, 2002). 
OCA theory also suggests that a higher level of fiscal integration between two 
areas increases their ability to smooth out diverse shocks through endogenous fiscal 
transfers. This transfer mechanism is supposed to lessen the need for nominal exchange 
rate adjustments in dealing with shocks. Mongelli (2002) explains that countries that 
share a supra-national fiscal transfer system that allows for a redistribution of funds to a 
member country impacted by a negative asymmetric shock would smooth the adjustment 
to such a shock, hence they would need less nominal exchange rate adjustment. 
In the same line of reasoning, Mongelli (2002) explains that highly diversified production and 
consumption, and similarity in imports and exports between countries, dilutes the effect of specific sectoral 
shocks. 
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While many authors focused on the economic criteria for forming a monetary 
union, political integration appears to be one of the most important OCA properties. 
Mundell (1961) referred to currencies as being an "expression of national 
sovereignty"and that changes would necessitate "profound" political changes. Likewise, 
Mintz (1970) argued that "the major, and perhaps only, real condition for institution of 
monetary integration is the political will to integrate on the part of the prospective 
members". In sum, political will fosters cooperation on various economic policies and 
encourages institutional development, thus forming a real currency area is (and has to be) 
a political process (Jurek, 2004). 
Vaubel (1976) introduced the variability of the real exchange rates as another 
criterion for currency area and argues that a stable real exchange rate between two 
countries gives evidence that in the past there were not too many shocks which required 
exchange rate adjustment (Jurek, 2004). Under the assumption that the situation of a 
stable real exchange rate would prevail in the future, there would be less need for the 
nominal exchange rate adjustment, and the cost of giving up an exchange rate tool would 
be negligible (Jurek, 2004). 
Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1994) introduce the "similarity of shocks" property 
which covers interactions among several other OCA properties. From this OCA 
criterion, net benefits from establishing a currency area are higher when the supply and 
demand shocks and the speed with which the economy adjusts are similar within a group 
of countries (Eichengreen and Bayoumi, 1994, and Jurek, 2004). Thus, if the impact of 
an economic shock is symmetric on all possible members of a union, the exchange rate 
changes needed for adjustment would be the same for all and there would be no need for 
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separate currencies. However, the case for a separate currency is especially strong if the 
impact of a shock is asymmetric between countries because the economic costs of 
altering the exchange rate is lower than those of adjustment through changes in wage and 
price levels, or through factor mobility (labour and capital). 
4.2.1.2. Costs and benefits approach to OCA theory 
An interesting aspect of the OCA literature is mat it attempts to identify and 
quantify the potential benefits and costs of participation in a currency area. It has to be 
noticed that the relevant benefits are usually at microeconomic level, while costs at 
macroeconomic level. 
A single currency confers benefits of reducing volatility in the real exchange rate, 
thus reducing uncertainties and contributing to better allocations of resources initially 
used for foreign exchange reserves and to hedge against the risk of sharp exchange rate 
adjustments70, and the welfare gains due to increased volume of trade in goods, services 
and financial assets. It also helps to save on transactions costs associated with multiple 
exchanges, further fostering trade, investment and cross-area foreign direct investment 
(Mongelli, 2002). Further, if the same currency circulates in a greater area, the 
usefulness of money is enhanced due to economies of scale (Fleming, 1971; Grubel, 
1970; Tavlas, 1993). 
For countries experiencing severe macroeconomic disequilibrium and where 
domestic policy formulation may be lacking discipline, as evidenced by high or rising 
70
 The union member countries pool their reserves together and give the role of reserve management to a 
supranational monetary authority. Pooling of reserves help to reduce the amount of reserves each country 
would have help independently. 
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inflation rates, currency union membership may be one option for importing a stable 
monetary policy. This benefit stems from the credibility of the exchange rate as a 
nominal anchor for monetary policy. A credible fixed exchange rate will provide a clear 
commitment that can be monitored by private agents consequently eliminating 
speculative attacks that have been blamed to cause currency and financial crisis. 
The most important cost normally associated with the creation of a common 
currency area is the loss of monetary and exchange rate policy instruments that could be 
used to restore equilibrium in the economy, in the event of asymmetric disturbances. 
Another cost of joining a currency area is the loss of seigniorage revenue, which is also 
frequently called the "inflation tax". Seigniorage represents a benefit to the central bank 
that comes from its authority to create money and can be used as an alternative source of 
revenue for the government outside what can be raised via taxation or borrowing from 
financial markets, to finance expected emergencies (Cohen, 2003)71. Other identified 
costs include the loss of a national symbol, as indicative of some level of sovereignty or 
national pride. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the costs and benefits of an OCA and follows Krugman 
(1990) and De Grauwe (2000). Using the traditional OCA criteria, these authors show 
that the costs and benefits for a country of joining a monetary union are both functions of 
the degree of dependence on intra-union trade. The benefits are positively related to the 
degree of dependence on intra-union trade while the costs are known to be inversely 
related to the degree of dependence on intra-union trade. A plausible justification for this 
is that in terms of costs, the need to pursue an effective independent exchange rate policy 
would be small if the country concerned is heavily dependent on other members of the 
9 2 . . - . : . . • . 
monetary union for trade. The positive slope of the benefits curve can be explained by 
the effects of the reduction in transaction costs and exchange rate risks. Thus, the net 
benefits of joining a monetary union increase with the size of intra-union trade relative to 
GDP, and a country should join when the net benefits are positive72. 
% Of GDP) 
Benefits 
(Intra-union Trade, 
% of GDP) 
FIGURE 3.T. Costs and Benefits of a Monetary Union. 
Source: Krugman (1990) 
It is largely a policy question how seigniorage would be distributed in the case of monetary union. 
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4.2.2. The 'new' theory of Optimum Currency Areas 
The theory of optimum currency areas lay dormant through most of the 1970s 
until the mid-1980s due to problems of inconclusiveness and inconsistency and the lack 
of strong empirical support (Jurek, 2004). In the mid-1980s, the revival of interest in the 
OCA theory is primarily due to the process towards the European monetary integration. 
According to Tavlas (1993), two broad sets of factors have been responsible for this 
interest on OCA theory. The first reflects developments on the international monetary 
scene, particularly the reinvigoration during the late 1980s and early 1990s of the process 
toward European monetary integration and the subsequent emergence of intense 
pressures with the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System 
(EMS) in late 1992, and in 1993. The second set of factors contributing to the theory's 
rejuvenation involves developments in macro-theory (Tavlas, 1993). These developments 
have allowed the reconsideration of the original OCA theory and also a reexamination of 
the assumption about stability of OCA properties in time. 
4.2.2.1. Costs and Benefits of OCA revisited 
One of the recent developments in macroeconomic theory involves the credibility 
issue, which is based on expectations theory and the debate between discretionary and 
fixed policy rules . According to this theory, monetary integration may be more 
beneficial when there is divergence of inflation rates among the group of countries under 
the assumption that the regional (newly created) central bank adopts a credible policy 
stance of optimal inflation. This can be explained by the fact that the high inflation 
72
 In this case, the size of intra-union trade relative to GDP lies to the right of the intersection of the two 
curves. 
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country can achieve a low inflation reputation by surrending itself to the control of the 
low inflation central bank. This is possible when there exists in the region a hegemenon 
country with a strong track record of low and stable inflation rate and the fact that this 
country could guarantee that it is not going to change its monetary discipline once 
monetary union is established. 
In Southern Africa, the South African Reserve Bank pursues an inflation targeting 
policy framework and has succeeded in keeping low inflation for several years, and this 
is also translated in low inflation rates for its CMA partners. The governor of the SARB 
also chaired the CCGB of SADC. Therefore, the credibility of SARB may play a crucial 
role in the formation of a monetary union in the region. 
The "monetarists'critique" of the Phillips curve, provided by economists such as 
Friedman (1968) and Lucas (1972), demonstrates that in the long-run monetary policies 
are ineffective in balancing unemployment and inflation. In the long-run, the Phillips 
curve becomes vertical implying that a perfectly foreseen change in monetary policy has 
no effect on real variables like real GDP or unemployment (Jurek, 2004). The long run 
ineffectiveness of monetary policies reduces the assumed costs of monetary integration, 
i.e. the loss of monetary policy independence to achieve the desired tradeoff between 
inflation and unemployment (Adams, 2005). 
The role of exchange rate as a stabilization tool has also been challenged. The 
major ciricism is that the exchange rate changes operate with longer lags due to the slow 
adjustment of financial asset prices (Tavlas, 1993; Jurek, 2004) and this reduces their 
effectiveness. From this outcome, it seems that the cost of losing exchange rate control 
would be lower than it has been expected in the traditional OCA theory. 
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 This work was developed by Kydland and Prescott (1997) and subsequently by Barro and Gordon (1983) 
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In sum, the credibility issue provides an additional benefit for countries to form a 
currency area. On the cost side, the long-run ineffectiveness of monetary policies as well 
as the long lags in the operation of exchange rate adjustment show that the costs of losing 
monetary policy instruments are lower than it was originally expected. 
4.2.2.2.Specialization versus Endogeneity of OCA 
The exogeneity of the criteria discussed in subsection 4.2.1 has been contested by 
Frankel and Rose (1998). They argue that though some countries may fail to comply 
with OCA criteria ex ante they may do so ex post once the currency zone is established. 
However, there is disagreement, among economists, whether forming a currency area 
induces a rise or a fall in the correlation of shocks among members of that area. Two 
opposite hypotheses with different implications were formulated on whether entry into a 
currency union may raise international trade linkages, which could result in either tighter 
or looser correlations of national business cycles. 
Endogenous OCA theory was introduced by Frankel and Rose (1998) and the 
basis of their argument is that there may be no pre-requisite for a country to meet OCA 
criteria for entry into a currency union or adopting a common peg ex ante; that trade 
intensity and macroeconomic convergence can significantly increase ex post. Frankel 
and Rose (1998) build an argument that the international trade pattern and international 
business cycle correlation is endogenous, i.e., countries with closer trade links tend to 
have more tightly correlated business cycles. In their opinion, joining a currency union 
moves countries closer to meeting the optimum currency area criteria. Hence, entering a 
monetary union increases the symmetry in the business cycle of the prospective member-
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country due to common monetary policy and closer international trade ties. Empirical 
evidences from Frankel and Rose (1998a, 1998b) demonstrate that the higher trade 
integration the higher the correlation of business cycles among countries. Finally, the 
authors conclude that a mere analysis of historical data does not provide an accurate 
picture of a country's suitability to join a currency union since the OCA criteria are 
endogenous in the first place74 and that they evolved over time. 
The economic specialization by member states that could follow the adoption of a 
common currency constitutes a major challenge to the endogeneity property of OCA 
theory. Specialization occurs when individual countries capitalize on their comparative 
advantage after joining a monetary union and this may lead to dissimilarity in production 
structures among members of a monetary union and as such hinders, rather than promotes 
economic policy coordination. Krugman (1993) argues that higher trade integration leads 
to a higher specialization. The Krugman argument is based in trade theory and increasing 
returns to scale in the sense that sharing a common currency removes obstacles to trade 
and promotes economies of scale. Because of the economies of scale, higher integration 
leads to a regional concentration of industrial activity. As a result, countries will become 
less diversified and more exposed to asymmetric shocks, as correlation of shocks among 
their economies will tend to lower (De Grauwe 2000, Mongelli 2002, Jurek, 2004). 
4.3. Present exchange rate regimes in southern Africa 
In this section, we first briefly review the evolution of "reported" exchange rate 
arrangements of SADC member states. However, official exchange rate arrangements 
74
 Using 30 years of data for twenty industrialized countries, they also found that countries with closer trade 
links tend to have closely correlated business cycles. 
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registered with the IMF may not accurately describe the exchange rate policies in 
Southern African countries. Several economists, including Ghosh, Guide, Ostry, and 
Wolf (1997); Bubula and Otker-Robe, (2002); Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, (2003); 
Benassy-Quere and Coeure (2004), and Reinhart and Rogoff, (2004) have highlighted the 
fact that the exchange rate regime a country claims to follow often differs from the 
regime actually in place. Hence, they have developed different de facto exchange rate 
regime classifications as an alternative to the IMF's dejure classification. We present in 
Appendix 4.1. the IMF's exchange rate classifications. 
4. 3.1. Reported Exchange Rate Arrangements 
It is essential to first have a clear picture of the various exchange rate regimes 
currently employed by nations in the region. The present state of exchange regimes 
adopted in Southern Africa is much varied and diverse, ranging from hard pegs to 
independent floats. The IMF classification suggests a range of arrangements . Table 4.1 
summarizes the present exchange rate arrangements in Southern Africa. Three of the 
SADC members, namely Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia, have their currencies pegged 
at par to the South African rand while Botswana has a peg to a basket of currencies with a 
large weight for the rand. In December 2004, more than half of the Southern African 
countries have a floating exchange rates (managed or independent) for their currencies. 
The IMF uses a de facto classification that combines quantitative and qualitative information, including 
the authorities' stated exchange rate policy (IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
restrictions, various years). Although the IMF changed from a dejure to a de facto classification in 1999, 
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4. 3.2. Observed Exchange Rate arrangements 
In this sub-section, we employed two different approaches for investigating de 
facto exchange rate regimes for SADC countries. The first approach deals with the 
exchange rate volatility for SADC currencies. In this approach, a currency is a good 
candidate to serve as a nominal anchor if a country's exchange rate vis-a-vis this 
particular currency exhibits the lowest volatility among the currencies studied as potential 
nominal currency anchors (Kawai and Akiyama (1998)). The second approach, initiated 
by Frankel and Wei (1993, 1994) assumes an implicit basket of currencies and therefore 
the weights assigned to different currencies (in the basket) are obtained from a regression 
of exchange rates. The second approach assumes that the monetary authorities are 
pegging their national currency to a basket of currencies without explicitly announcing it. 
4. 3.2. 1. Exchange Rate Volatility 
We calculate the exchange rate volatility of the SADC currencies to that of the 
U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, the euro (ecu76 for data prior to 1999), the UK pound and 
the South African rand. These five potential currency anchors are widely regarded as 
freely floating. We then compare the magnitude of the volatility of each SADC currency 
vis-a-vis the five potential currency anchors mentioned above. 
the data for previous years were obtained from Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002), who constructed the back 
series using the same de facto methodology used since 1999. 
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Table 4.1: SADC Currencies and Exchange Rate Arrangements 
Country Currency Exchange rate arrangements 

















































































































Notes: The Bubula and Okter-Robe de facto classification (2002): 
1 = Another currency as legal tender; 2 = currency union; 3 = currency board; 4 = conventional fixed peg to 
single currency; 5 = conventional fixed peg to a basket; 6 = pegged within a horizontal band; 7 = forward-
looking crawling peg; 8 = forward-looking crawling band; 9 = backward-looking crawling peg; 10 = 
backward-looking crawling band; 11 = tightly managed floating; 12 = other managed floating; and 13 = 
independently floating. 
ECU: European Currency Unit. 
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Since we do not have data on observed exchange rates from country i to country;', 
we use the IMF or World Bank exchange rate data which are expressed as number of 
units of currency i or j for one unit of US dollar or SDR77. Hence, the nominal bilateral 
exchange rate between countries i andj" is calculated as follows: 
Currency, I US$ 
E.= (1) 
,J
 Currencyj I US% 
The percentage change in nominal exchange rates is then computed as 
tet=et-e^=HE,)-ME,_,) (2) 
no 
where Et is the level of the nominal exchange rate for currency j vis-a-vis currency i . 
The exchange rate volatility is obtained by the standard deviation of the change in 
nominal exchange rates between each individual SADC country and a potential nominal 
anchor. In order to obtain reasonable estimates of exchange rate volatility, we follow 
Kawai and Akiyama (1998) by removing data observations with values of log of first 
differences greater than 0 . 1 . 
The results are shown in table 4.2. Except for Botswana and the CMA countries whose 
currencies are less volatile to the South African rand compared to other major currencies, 
the majority of SADC currencies exhibit a lower volatility vis-a-vis the US dollar than 
the other potential currency anchors. This volatility ranges from a low 1.45 percent for 
Seychelles to a high 5.45 percent for Congo on a monthly basis. In the case of Congo, as 
77
 SDR: Special drawing Rights. 
In this case, currency / is the potential nominal anchor. 
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 These authors have done so because countries often devalue their currencies to accommodate persistent 
differences in inflation rates vis-a-vis their nominal anchor-currency country. Without the effects of such 
discrete currency devaluations (or revaluations) being eliminated, the estimated volatilities would become 
too large in order to conclude the presence or absence of a nominal anchor currency. 
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Beaugrand (1997) showed, the roots of hyperinflation in Congo in the 1990s and, hence 
higher exchange rate volatility, were essentially political, as the collapse of the traditional 
form of government was accompanied by an explosion in government spending and 
• on 
dwindling revenue collections . 
4.3.2.2. Regression analysis 
Using an econometric technique proposed by Frankel and Wei (1993,1994)81, we 
estimate the relative weights of the five potential currency anchors in the composition of 
their implicit currency baskets for each SADC member state82. The goal is to see whether 
countries try to stabilize their currencies in terms of a particular major currency. For this 
purpose, we use monthly exchange rate data spanning the period from January 1993 to 
December 2005. We follow Frankel and Wei (1993, 1994) by using the Swiss franc as a 
numeraire for measuring exchange rate volatility. We present in Appendix 4.1 the 
methodology we used for estimating implicit basket weights in the line of Frankel and 
Wei (1993,1994). 
During 1991-92, opposition forces derailed the gradual liberalization process laid out by the President, 
and by 1993 Congo (then Zaire) political system had all but disintegrated. A measure of control over 
monetary and fiscal policies were restored in 1995, but in late 1996, political conditions further deteriorated 
and inflationary pressures reemerged. (Beaugrand, 1997) 
81
 Frankel and Wei (1993, 1994) examine the influence which the most important international currencies 
have on the determination of the values of currencies of smaller countries located around the world. They 
use the Swiss franc, and the purchasing power over local goods as numeraire, in addition to the SDR. Any 
other outside currency could serve equally well as numeraire. Under the basket-peg null hypothesis, the 
choice of numeraire makes no difference in the estimation of the weights. 
82
 Even though, the pound sterling is no longer considered as a world major currency82, we also include it in 
our estimation since a large number of countries in Southern African region are fonner British colonies. 
102 




























































































Source: Author's calculations based on IMF's International Financial Statistics (line rf) 
Notes: a: sample period 1993:02 to 2005:12. 
b: prior to 1999, we use ecu (European currency unit) as proxy for euro. 
We also include the South African rand, a regional nominal anchor, due to the dominant position (in 
economic terms) that South Africa82 has in the region. 
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The results in Table 4.3 show the implicit weights assigned to the different 
currencies in the basket for individual SADC countries. Due to the fact that we used a 
constrained regression in our estimation, the weight for the pound is obtained by the 
difference between one and the sum of the estimated four coefficients. The SADC 
countries, as shown in Table 4.3, give heavy weights to the U.S. dollar in their implicit 
basket, with the exception of Botswana and Angola which show a strong linkage to the 
South African rand. However, in the case of Congo, none of these currencies is 
statistically different from zero and the estimated equation does not explain the change in 
its exchange rate, i.e. a R2 close to zero. 
In the majority of the estimated regressions, the coefficient for the US dollar is 
large and statistically significant. This means that monetary authorities in Southern 
African countries are more concerned about the changes in US dollar in their exchange 
rate management. This also confirms the finding in the previous subsection which shows 
that the US dollar is the major currency with lower volatility for the SADC currencies. In 
addition to Botswana, only two others countries, namely Mozambique and Zambia, show 
some sign of a small weight on the South African rand ranging from 15 to 18 percent for 
the full sample period. 
When we look at the weights of the euro in the estimated regressions, the 
coefficient is significant for Botswana, Mauritius and Tanzania, with a weight of 15, 29 
and 13 percent respectively. However, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania and Zambia give 
significant weight to the Japanese yen. 
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Table 4.3: The linkages of SADC currencies with the potential nominal currency anchors, 
(constrained estimation). 











































































Notes: a: Since Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland currencies are pegged at par to the South African 
currency, the results for South Africa apply to these countries as well. 
b: As in the previous exercise, we have removed data observations with values of log first 
differences greater than 0.1. 
In sum, we used in this section two different approaches for investigating de facto 
exchange rate regimes for SADG countries. In the majority of cases, both approaches 
yield the same results, that is, the US dollar is the dominant currency in the exchange 
rates of SADC countries. 
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4. 4. Methodology, data and estimation procedures 
In this study, we first apply the methodology developed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1997a, 1997b) in order to derive OCA indices for Southern African countries vis-a-vis 
potential nominal currency anchors and then use the calculated indices to find the 
appropriate currency peg for SADC countries. Then, we derive OCA indices for pairs of 
SADC countries and use it to ascertain the suitability of different country-pairs to enter a 
currency union. 
4.4.1. Brief review of OCA index 
In their seminal paper, and using economic characterisitcs outlined in the literature on 
the OCA theory for suitability of countries to form a monetary union, Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1997a, b) show that the variability of the bilateral exchange rates for each 
pair of countries is explained by the asymmetry of their business cycles, the share of their 
bilateral trade and the relative size of each country pair. Through cross-section 
estimations, they derive the OCA index which relates nominal bilateral exchange rate 
variability with output movements, trade linkages and economic size. 
Benassy-Quere and Lahreche-Revil (1998) provide the following justification for 
the choice of the factors in the calculation of the OCA index: (i) asymmetric business 
cycles should come from either asymmetric shocks or asymmetric structures that justify 
frequent exchange rate adjustment, (ii) industry-specific shocks have relatively 
symmetric effects in two countries whose bilateral trade is mostly intra-industry, reducing 
1 0 6 . . - • . . . . 
the needs for exchange rate variations. In terms of economic size, Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1997a, b) argue that the costs of a common currency, in terms of 
macroeconomic policy independence forgone, should be balanced against the benefits, 
which will be greatest for small economies where there is least scope for utilizing a 
separate national currency in transactions. That is, small countries should benefit the most 
from the unit of account, means of payment, and store of value services provided by a 
common currency. 
Roughly speaking, where the index is relatively low, OCA characteristics predict 
a low level of bilateral exchange rate variability and therefore a high suitability for 
monetary integration (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997a, b). The variability of nominal 
exchange rates between those two countries is expected to be low where bilateral trade is 
high and where output movements between countries are similar. 
4. 4. 2. Model specification 
Following Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a, 1997b, 1999) and other economists 
who use this methodology, we use cross-country estimations in order to derive the OCA 
indices for southern African countries. Because we are mainly interested in currency 
pegs, we consider the behavior of exchange rates against five potential international 
anchors: the US dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen, the UK pound and the South African 
rand. 
The basic model, as specified by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a, 1997b), is as 
follows: 
SD(ey) = a0 + ai SD(Ayi - Ayj) + a2 DISSIMjj + a3 TRADEy + a4 SIZEy + ey (3) 
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where subscripts / andj denote the two countries in the pair. SD(ejj) measures 
the volatility of bilateral exchange rates, SD(Ay; - Ayj) captures the asymmetric shocks at 
national level, DISSIMy is the sum of the absolute differences in the shares of 
agricultural, mineral, and manufacturing trade in total merchandize trade83, TRADEy is 
the proxy for the intensity of trade linkages, and SIZEy measures the size of the 
economy. 
However, taking into account the fact that SADC members are developing 
countries, and major commodities producers, we use in the model the variability of the 
terms of trade as an explanatory variable. Another variable used in the regression is the 
variability of inflation differentials. These two variables have been suggested by Kim 
and Papi (2005) since it takes into consideration specific characteristics of emerging and 
developing countries, and these authors argue that the variability of bilateral exchange 
rates of developing countries is determined to a large extent by monetary phenomena. 
We also take into consideration the particular situation for the southern African 
countries by adding to the above model a set of dummy variables. It has been argued, in 
the literature, that there are strong colonial ties between African countries and their 
former colonial power, thus it is possible that these African countries would prefer to peg 
their currencies to that of their former colonial power. Moreover, in the gravity model of 
trade used by Rose (2000) and many other researchers who investigated the effects of 
currency union on trade, the dummy variable associated with 'colony" used to be 
statistically significant. Hence, we employed one dummy variable to ascertain colonial 
ties in the conduct of monetary policy. There is also a fact that many countries would 
83
 We did not use the DISSIM variable in our study since there is a lack of of disaggregated trade for most 
African countries and whenever data are available, there is no a long time series of observations (i.e., data 
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prefer to peg their currencies to that of their main trading partners. Hence, a set of 
dummy variables have been included for the different currency zones under 
consideration. 
Hence, our estimated equation is as follows: 
SD(ey)=a0 +ai SD(Ayi - Ayj)+a2 SD(TOTjj) +a3 TRADEy +a4 SIZEy +a5 SD(Pij) + 
4 
a6COLij+£a7 /£L + Sy (4) 
The proxies are computed as follows: 
SD(ejj) is the standard deviation of the change in the logarithm of the year-end bilateral 
(nominal or real) exchange rates between countries i andj. (see equation 2 for calculation 
of the bilateral exchange rates). 
SD(Ayj - Ayj) is the standard deviation of the difference in the logarithm of real output 
between the country-pair. 
SD(TOTjj) is the standard deviation in relative changes in the terms of trade. 
TRADEy is the average value of bilateral trade, weighted by GDP between the two 
countries i andy . 
SIZEy is the mean of the logarithm of the real GDPs of the country pair. 
SD(Py ) is the standard deviation in relative inflation differentials. 
COLjj is a dummy variable taking value of 1 if country i is a former colony of j and 0 
otherwise. 
covering our sample period). 
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 Since Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a, 1997b) give very few details on how their trade variable was 
constructed, and in order to overcome the relative shortage of trade statistics reported by some African 
nations, we have chosen to measure total trade (the average of imports and exports) rather than exports 
alone. 
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Djj is a dummy variable taking value of 1 if country i is the main trading partner for 
country j in 2002 (in millions of dollars). We use for this purpose four dummy variables: 
for USA, European Union, United Kingdom and South Africa. 
The expected signs of the explanatory variables are as follows: the exchange rate 
volatility is expected to depend positively on the business cycle, and negatively on the 
trade linkages. The estimated regression is used to predict bilateral values for the 
dependent variable, and the predicted values are called "OCA indices". 
4. 4.2. Data 
In this paper, we use annual data for a set of 63 countries85which includes both 
developed and developing countries. We selected fourteen members of the SADC, the 
four countries whose currencies are considered as potential nominal anchors in addition 
to the South African rand. We finally add other 45 largest trading partners of South 
Africa86. 
Exchange rate data87 are obtained through the IMF International Financial 
Statistics CD-ROM (2005). Real GDP in constant U.S. dollars (2000, base year), terms of 
trade and inflation rate data are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators 
CD-ROM (2005) using real GDP (in constant US dollars, base year 2000). The bilateral 
trade data are from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DoTS) in current US dollars. 
We convert it in real figures by deflating it using the US consumer price index. 
The list of countries used in this paper is presented in Appendix 2. Most of the data used in the 
estimation were only available at annual basis. 
86
 We choose the largest trading partners for South Africa using 2002's trade data (IMF DoTS). 
87
 National Currency Units per US dollar. 
no 
The standard deviations and the means are calculated for a panel of 63 countries 
over the sample period 1993 to 2002. With 63 countries, there are 1953 pairs of 
observations and hence potentially 1953 observations in the regression. In practice, the 
regressions include 1843 observations as a result of missing values in the data. We also 
exclude in the estimation, pairs of countries with no trade data for the entire period. 
4. 5. Empirical results 
4.5.1. A preliminary look at the exchange rate volatility 
In this subsection, we focus on the variability of nominal and real exchange rates 
for SADC countries using annual data. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 display the variability of 
nominal bilateral exchange rates for SADC countries for the sample period 1993 to 
2002. While table 4.4 presents exchange rate variability between each individual SADC 
members and a potential nominal anchor, table 4.5 displays the exchange rate variability 
for each pair of SADC countries. 
An examination of table 4.4 shows that there are three groups of countries in terms of 
the variability of their exchange rates vis-a-vis the potential nominal anchors for the 
period under consideration. 
(i) Angola and Congo are the only two SADC members which experienced a 
highly unstable exchange rates for their currencies. The variation in their 
exchange rates is well above 100 percent. A possible explanation is that these 
two countries experienced a period of hyperinflation in the 1990s. 
We present in Appendix 4.3 the results for real exchange rate variability. 
I l l 
(ii) Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe form the second group of countries with 
an exchange rate variability ranging from 16 to 33 percent during the sample 
period. Tanzania and Zambia may also be included in this group, 
(iii) The last group is comprised of Botswana, Mauritius, Seychelles and the CMA 
countries. These countries have a lower volatility for their exchange rates and 
it ranges from 4 to 10 percent. 
Looking at table 4.5, we find the same pattern as the one exhibited in the previous 
table. Three groups of countries emerge and correspond to the one described in the 
previous paragraph. 
4.5.2. Regression results 
Table 4.6 reports the results of estimating the coefficients on these OCA variables 
for our sample period. We focus on the results for nominal exchange rate variability89. 
In almost all cases, the OCA coefficients are statistically significant at standard 
significance levels, the exception being the variable explaining colonial ties. They also 
are all jointly significantly different from zero, suggesting that the OCA criteria do 
explain some of the variability of exchange rates. We also estimate equation (4) using 
only data for the five potential nominal anchors and find results which are quite similar to 
those reported below90. 
A series of papers, including Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997,1998) and Benassy-Quere (1997) find 
similar results when using real exchange rate variability. We also estimate the above regressions using real 
exchange rate variability and the results are shown in Appendix 4. 
90
 These results are shown in Appendix 5. 
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Table 4.4: The Variability of Nominal Exchange Rates for SADC Countries 



















































































































































































































Note: ANG = Angola, BOT= Botswana, CON = Congo, LES = Lesotho, MAL = Malawi, 
MAU = Mauritius, MOZ = Mozambique, NAM = Namibia, SEY = Seychelles, 
SWA = Swaziland, TAN = Tanzania, ZAM = Zambia, ZIM = Zimbabwe. 
The entries in this table differs from those in table 4.2 since the former are computed on annual basis 
(sample period: 1993-2002) while the latter are calculated on monthly basis from a sample running from 
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In regressions 1 and 2, the OCA .variables enter with their anticipated signs, and 
they are hence consistent with our theoretical expectations; increased output variability 
and size increased the level of bilateral exchange rate variability whilst increased bilateral 
trade reduced the bilateral exchange rate variability. However, the strength of these two 
regressions in terms of their predictive power (14%) compares poorly with the results 
found by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a, 1997b) for developed countries for the 
period post-1980 (almost 50%), but they are quite close to that of Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1997a) for the developed countries for the period 1960s (15%) and that of 
Benassy-Quere (1997,1998) for the sample including developed and developing 
countries. 
The variability of terms of trade and of inflation differentials are expected to be 
positively related to bilateral exchange rate variability. In regressions 3 and 4, the results 
show that these two variables are statistically different from zero at 1 percent confidence 
level and they enter the regressions with their expected signs. Their inclusion improved 
the goodness of fit of the model, since the OCA variables now explain almost half of 
cross-section differences in bilateral exchange rate variability, up from about 14 percent 
in the previous specifications. In the estimated regressions, the variable COLij is not 
statistically significant, so we drop it. 
In regression 5, we added four dummy variables for assessing whether major 
trading partners may have an effect on the variability of exchange rates, but only one 
dummy variable appears to be significant. Surprisingly, the inclusion of these additional 
variables (in regressions 3 through 5) affects the anticipated signs of the variability of 
January 1993 to December 2005. 
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Notes: Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard-errors in parentheses. 
a
 significant at the 1% level;b at the 5% level;c at the 10% level. 
The dependent variable is the variability of nominal bilateral exchange rates, 
output and size of the economies, and this is inconsistent with the theoretical 
expectations. Moreover, by using the estimated coefficients of regressions 3, 4 or 5, we 
have obtained several negative values for the predicted exchange rate variability (OCA 
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index). With respect to this fact, we use our results from the regression 1 (second column 
of table 4.6.) in the next step. 
4.5.3. OCA indices 
We consider in this exercise the regression 1 as our standard OCA estimated 
equation since its coefficients are consistent with our theoretical expectations, i.e. the 
significance and correct signs of the estimated coefficients for the OCA variables. From 
this regression, we calculate the OCA indices which measure the variability of the 
exchange rates that would fit the OCA theory (Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a, 
1997b)). These indices are the predicted value of exchange rate variability from the 
estimated equation. The lower is the OCA index, the higher is the benefit-cost ratio for 
monetary integration for the country pair. 
The OCA index for each case is the predicted value of the following equation: 
SD(ey)=- 0.04 +1.61* SD(Ayi - Ayj) - 13.30* TRADE,; + 0.009* SIZEy (5) 
We first construct OCA indices for Southern African countries with respect to the 
five potential nominal anchors, namely USA, Germany (a proxy for Eurozone), Japan, 
United Kingdom and South Africa. As mentioned earlier, the currencies of the first four 
countries are considered as external nominal anchor while the South African rand is an 
internal (regional) nominal anchor. The estimated OCA indices are shown in the Table 
4.7 below. 
A first look at these indices demonstrates that they exhibit a wide variation from 
0.165 to 0.506. We also find that more than half of the SADC countries have a lower 
OCA indices vis-a-vis South Africa while four of them exhibit a lower OCA index vis-a-
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vis the USA. Democratic Republic of Congo is the only country which has a lower OCA 
index vis-a-vis Japan while Swaziland, on the other hand, exhibits a lower OCA index 
with United Kingdom. When we consider South Africa92, we find that it presents a lower 
OCA index vis-a-vis the United Kingdom, followed by the euro and the USA. 
We expected to see the CMA countries with a lower OCA index vis-a-vis South Africa 
since their currencies are pegged at par to the South African rand. There is only Lesotho 
which fulfills our expectations, while Namibia and Swaziland have lower OCA indices 
with USA and United Kingdom, respectively. 
Table 4.7: OCA Indices for Southern Africa vis-a-vis Anchor Country 



























































































Note: The OCA index represents the predicted value obtained from estimating equation (5) 
Since South Africa is a SADC member states, we only compute OCA indices vis-a-vis the other four 
anchor countries. 
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In sum, the OCA index is the predicted volatility of exchange rates being function of 
output movements, changes in trade, and other variables. Based on OCA criteria, the 
predicted volatility is higher for SADC countries vis-a-vis potential anchors in this study 
in comparison to the OCA indices obtained by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) for 
developed countries vis-a-vis to Germany. Hence, suitability for monetary integration is 
not high for SADC countries. 
4.5.4. Excess Volatility 
Like Benassy-Quere et al. (1998), we use the OCA indices obtained in the 
previous table and compare them to observed volatilities to assess whether the estimated 
volatility over-or-under-predicts the observed volatility of nominal exchange rates. In 
this exercise, we eliminate the Japanese yen since, in the majority of cases, the OCA 
indices vis-a-vis Japan are higher than the others. We compute the excess volatility, i.e. 
the ratio of observed volatility over OCA index92. 
The entries in table 4.8 show that, for the majority of SADC countries, the 
predicted variability of the exchange rates (OCA indices) are greater than the observed 
nominal exchange rate volatility. Similar results have been obtained by several authors 
who estimated OCA indices, including Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997), Benassy-Quere 
et al. (1998), and Kim and papi(2005)93. Angola, Congo and Malawi94 are the only 
countries where the observed volatility is greater than the predicted one, hence their 
excess volatility is greater than 1. For the remaining SADC members, their excess 
92
 Instead of using the ratio of the two volatilities as did Benassy-Quere et al. (1998), Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1997b) take the difference of predicted and observed volatilities (residuals) to assess the 
prediction of the estimated model. 
93
 Bayoumi and eichengreen (1997) estimated OCA indices for 21 developed countries while Benassy 
Quere et al. (1998) and Kim and Papi (2005) included both developed and developing countries in their 
samples. 
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volatility is less than 1. From this analysis, we observe that, in most cases, our estimated 
model over-predicts the variability of nominal exchange rates of most SADC members 
against the major currencies considered in our study. 
4.5.5. Choice of a nominal anchor currency 
After obtaining the OCA indices, we can now use them in order to select the 
appropriate peg in each SADC country and find the currency which empirically is the 
most appropriate nominal anchor for a common peg in the case of Southern African 
countries. In order to do so, we follow Benassy-Quere and Lahreche-Revil (1998) who 
Table 4.8: Excess Volatility for SADC countries 
SADC Countries Excess Volatility against 






































































Note: Excess volatility is the ratio of observed volatility over estimated OCA index. 
Except when the US dollar is considered. 
The currencies of the CMA countries are pegged at par to the rand, so the observed volatility is zero. 
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use a normative approach. They make use of the excess volatility in order to calculate 
relative excess volatility indices, i.e. the ratio of excess volatility. In other words, we 
compute the ratio of the excess volatility against currency i over the corresponding index 
against currency/. Thus, currency i should be preferred to currency/ if this ratio is lower 
than one. 
Table 4.9 presents the calculated ratios of excess volatility. We made six 
different combinations using our four nominal currency anchors. 




























































































In the light of the relative excess volatility indices presented in table 4.9, we get 
the following insights: 
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- When we compare the US dollar to the euro, as shown in column 2, we find that the 
former is preferred to the latter in most Southern Africa countries with exception of 
Angola, Mauritius and Seychelles. In column 3, we observe that the US dollar is 
preferred to the British pound for nine SADC countries. Finally, as shown in column 4, 
all SADC countries, with the exception of the CMA members96, would peg to the US 
dollar when it is compared to the South African rand. The results for South Africa also 
demonstrate that this country would prefer to peg to the US dollar when compared to 
both the euro and pound. 
- When we look at the ratio of euro over British pound, only two countries, namely 
Angola and Mauritius, would prefer to peg to euro rather than pound. In the other side, 
the euro is preferred to the rand in most of the SADC countries. 
- With respect to the British pound, this currency is preferred to the South African rand 
for all SADC countries in terms of relative OCA index. 
We also computed relative excess volatility indices using the estimated model with the 
five potential anchors only. The results are quite similar to those presented in table 4.9. 
This analysis presented above demonstrates that for the SADC countries the 
obvious choice in terms of nominal currency anchor for a common peg is the US dollar. 
Hence, in the light of the optimum currency area, the South African currencies need to be 
pegged to a major international currency, the US dollar. Due to the dominant position of 
South Africa in the region, one would expect the South African rand to be the preferred 
currency peg since it is the case for three of the SADC members, namely Lesotho, 
Namibia and Swaziland, which have their currencies pegged to the rand. While 
96
 We do not compute relative excess volatility for the CMA countries with respect to South African rand 
since their currencies are pegged at par to the rand, hence their observed volatility is zero. 
1 2 2 . . . . • • - . ' • • • • " 
Botswana has a peg to a basket of currencies, the weight of the rand is more than 60 
percent, that is why Botswana used to be considered as a de facto CMA member. 
However, we find that this is not the case. 
Several economists have discussed the possibility for African countries, in 
general, to peg their national currencies to an external currency anchor. Using trade 
weights, Honohan and Lane (2000) suggest that the euro could be an appropriate anchor 
for African currencies. Alesina et al. (2002) find similar results for the African countries 
included in their sample using the criteria of trade weights, price and output co-
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movements . 
When we look at the entries in table 4.9, we also observe that everal values of the 
relative excess volatility indices are close to unity. According to Benassy-Quere et al. 
(1998), this may suggest the possibility of pegging the national currency to a basket of 
currencies. Cohen et al (1999), quoted by Honohan and Lane (2000), suggest a weigth of 
50 percent for the euro and 50 percent for the US dollar. This is an issue we will explore 
in the future as an extension to the present study, i.e., to estimate the relative weights of 
different major currencies in a common currency basket for southern African countries. 
4.5.6. Intra-SADC OCA indices 
As a second objective of this study, we intend to use our estimated OCA indices 
for each pair of SADC countries in order to assess their suitability for a common 
currency. The estimated OCA indices are shown in table 4.10. Recall that when the 
index is relatively low, OCA characteristics predict a low level of bilateral exchange rate 
variability and therefore a high suitability for monetary integration. 
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 DR Congo and Mauritius are the only two SADC members which are included in their sample. 
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The indices presented in this table show that there are two groups of pairs of 
countries in Southern Africa: (1) the pairs of countries which exhibit a relatively high 
level of nominal exchange rate volatility and (2) pairs of countries with relatively low 
level of volatility. However, these OCA indices are similar to those obtained by 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997b) for European countries using data on industrial 
countries. But our indices are quite similar to those obtained by Kim and Papi (2005) for 
Central America countries using a panel of 53 countries including both industrial and 
developing countries. 
As we mentioned earlier, in Southern Africa, there exists a long standing 
QO , 
monetary union which includes South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. If we 
take the OCA indices for these countries as indicative for suitability for a currency union 
among pairs of countries, we consider a benchmark for OCA indices of 0.22 . Therefore, 
those country-pairs with an OCA index of less than 0.22 may be considered as suitable 
for a currency union. We find 20 country-pairs which satisfy this condition. For the 
remaining countries, we find different combinations of country-pairs which may enter a 
currency union, such is the case for Zimbabwe-Malawi, Zimbabwe-South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe-Zambia. 
Angola, Congo and Mozambique are the countries whose OCA indices with their 
SADC partners are higher than 0.22. Hence, these countries cannot, for the moment, 
enter the currency union with any of the SADC countries. 
The CMA is more close to a currency board than a real monetary union (Grandes, 2003). 


























































































































Southern African countries, which are members of the SADC, are planning to 
have a monetary union in the next ten years. Following the experience of Western 
European countries, this involves a long period of transition. Since these countries have 
different exchange rate regimes and to avoid a high volatility of their nominal exchange 
rate, we suggest that these countries should start exchange rate coordination just like the 
exchange rate mechanism (ERM) for the European countries. For this, the SADC 
countries have to find a common nominal anchor for which they have to peg their 
currencies. 
In this paper, we use the optimum currency area theory in order to find the 
optimum currency peg for Southern African countries. We follow the model developed 
by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a, 1997b) who operationalise the OCA theory to 
obtain OCA indices. Using a panel of 63 countries which include both industrial and 
developing countries, we obtained OCA indices for SADC countries vis-a-vis five 
potential nominal anchor currencies. Using a methodology developed by Benassy-Quere 
et al. (1998), we find that the optimal nominal currency anchor for these countries is the 
US dollar, which is a major international currency anchor. This study suggests that 
SADC countries should commonly peg their currencies to the US dollar. Since most of 
the Southern African countries are primary commodity producers and that Western 
World being the main destination for their exports, pegging their currencies to a major 
currency anchor such as the US dollar would be preferable than pegging to an regional 
anchor. 
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We also find that several pairs of SADC countries are suitable for a common 
currency when we use the OCA indices. However, for countries such as Angola, Congo 
and Mozambique, the evidence found so far does not favor their membership to a 
monetary union with their SADC partners. 
One would expect that the SADC countries might be willing to use the rand as the 
anchor currency such is the case for their CMA partners. However, Khamfula and 
Huizinga (2004) argued that if the rand is used as the anchor currency, then fluctuations 
of the rand against other currencies outside the union will have a major impact on the 
export revenues of SADC countries. Since South Africa, on the one hand, mainly exports 
industrial products and the other countries, on the other hand, primary goods, the 
fluctuations of the rand may, in fact, hurt export revenues of commodity exports. This is 
because movements of tile rand will be driven by fluctuations of prices of industrial 
goods and will therefore not synchronize with commodity price movements. From this 
argument, we conclude that pegging the SADC currencies to the rand is not a better way 
for the stability of SADC exchange rates. The results obtained in this paper, i.e. pegging 
the SADC currencies to the US dollar, are also consistent with the views expressed by the 
SADC Ministers of Finance to have a single currency in the region or adopt the dollar 
(IMF, 2003). 
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CHAPTER 5: CONVERGENCE OF MONETARY POLICY IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
5.1. Introduction 
In Africa, there has recently been a proposal for the creation of a single currency 
following the gains made in Europe after the implementation of the Euro. The African 
Union's plan for an African monetary union relies on the earlier creation of monetary 
unions in five existing regional economic communities which could be strengthened, and 
ultimately merged to a common African monetary union with a single central bank and 
currency". However, Masson and Pattillo (2005) argue that a straightward move to a 
single African currency may not be feasible, and they suggest a selective expansion of 
existing monetary unions in order to induce countries to improve their fiscal and 
monetary policies, stimulating growth and fostering good governance in Africa. 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has an ambitious 
program for economic integration, including completion of negotiations on a customs 
union by 2010, a common market by 2015 and the launch of a regional currency in 2016 
(IMF, 2003). The region has a long-lasting monetary union, the Common Monetary Area 
(hereafter, CMA), which is led by South Africa, and has proven to be credible, especially 
from the inflation targeting monetary framework of the South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB)100. Monetary cooperation in the SADC could eventually entail an entirely 
different framework or it could come about by the extension of the CMA arrangements to 
include more SADC countries when they are willing and able to join. In the second case, 
the other SADC members can take advantage of the credibility of the CMA if they could 
Notice that there already exist two functioning monetary unions in Africa. 
3
 SARB is de facto responsible for monetary policy in the CMA zone 
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join it. However, an expanded monetary zone could involve shared monetary policy 
responsibility by South Africa's Reserve Bank with neighboring central banks. But, as 
Van Zyl (2003) shows, expanding the membership of the CMA would be complicated 
because new members would not share the history of the South African currency being 
legal tender. However, the CMA arrangements have in the past proved to be very 
flexible and this could be a big advantage. 
While several scholars have looked at Southern Africa regional integration, there 
has been little research on the specific issue of expanding CMA. Jenkins and Thomas 
(1998) use the convergence hypothesis to investigate the possibility of monetary 
integration in the region. Sparks (2002) uses annual data covering mostly the 1995-1998 
period and focuses on six potential criteria that are essential for the feasibility of a 
monetary union. Agbeyegbe (2003) has sought to investigate the feasibility of monetary 
union in SADC by looking at evidence of nominal exchange rate and inflation 
convergence. Masson and Patillo (2005) simulate and calibrate a model for the existing 
asymmetric monetary union, the CMA, assuming that monetary policy is set by South 
Africa. They also consider whether adding other SADC countries individually to the 
CMA is incentive compatible, both for the new member and for the countries that form 
the CMA, and assuming that the current asymmetric arrangement would continue. While 
the first three studies which use the concept of convergence fail to find evidence of 
convergence of macroeconomic variables in Southern Africa and, henceforth, a low 
probability for monetary union at this stage, the study presented by Masson and Patillo 
(2004) finds evidence of monetary integration in the region and that the expansion of the 
current arrangement will be in the interest of both the current members of the CMA and 
129 
the new entrants. However, Sparks (2002) suggests that if the CMA has to be expanded, 
it would be one new member at a time. 
The purpose of this chapter is to empirically assess the expandability of the CMA 
within the SADC. Following the recommendations made by Sparks (2002) and Masson 
and Pattillo (2005), the possibility for individual SADC countries to join the existing 
regional monetary arrangement in Southern Africa is analyzed. We use as criterion for 
joining the monetary union the convergence101 of monetary policies of the potential 
member candidates to that of South Africa, used here as proxy for the CMA102. We 
assume that a country is suitable to join the monetary arrangement if there is a long-run 
relationship between its monetary base growth rates103 and that of South Africa. The logic 
behind it is that a country, whose monetary base growth rates are cointegrated with that 
of South Africa in the past, would be able to follow the leadership of the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) in setting its monetary policies. While some authors, (Sparks, 
2002; and Agbeyegbe, 2003, for instance) have investigated the convergence in SADC, 
to our knowledge, the issue of convergence in monetary base growth rates has not yet 
been conducted. This paper tries to fill this gap. 
This paper follows the methodology used by several authors (Brada and Kutan, 
2003; Hafer and Kutan, 1994, for instance) which investigate the so-called German 
dominance hypothesis (or 'leadership' hypothesis) in the European Monetary System 
(EMS), the precursor of the EMU. The German dominance hypothesis meant that other 
101
 See section 5.2. for the definitions of convergence used in economics. 
102
 A good proxy would be the weighted average of the CMA countries. However, the size of South Africa 
is almost 96 percent in the CMA. 
103
 Interest rates and inflation rates could also be used in this type of analysis. But in the SADC region, the 
financial system is less developed for many countries while some countries have experienced high inflation 
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members of the EMS closely aligned their monetary policies to those of Germany in 
order to benefit from the reputation of the Bundesbank and the credibility of its policies. 
And in a recent paper, Brada and Kutan (2003) investigate the convergence with German 
monetary policy, a proxy for the European Monetary Union (EMU), of the Balkan and 
Mediterraneen country candidates for EU membership in order to assess their suitability 
to join the EMU in the near future. In the case of accession countries, they argue that a 
necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the long-term viability of such an exchange rate 
regime is that the potential members be able to follow the lead of the ECB, proxy by the 
Bundesbank, in setting their monetary policy. Therefore, in our analysis, we import the 
logic behind the German dominance hypothesis and apply it to an economic community 
in developing world, namely the SADC. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews 
the convergence theory. In section three, we present the theoretical and methodological 
frameworks while section four discusses data and estimation procedure. The empirical 
results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
5.2. Review of the economic convergence theory 
This section explains the concepts and definitions of convergence and the 
econometric approaches that have been used to investigate convergence among 
economies. 
Neoclassical theory of growth, built on the pioneering work of Solow (1956), 
predicted that due to diminishing returns to physical capital the growth rate of a country 
rates for the past three decades. Hence, the money supply growth rates seem to be the most appropriate 
indicator of monetary policy. 
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is likely to be inversely proportional to its initial level of income, as in the long run 
countries with low initial stocks of capital would tend to grow faster while those with 
high initial capital would tend to slow down. This implies a tendency on the part of 
countries to eventually converge to a single steady state level of growth. This prediction 
of neoclassical growth theory has led to much theoretical and empirical debate. 
As an alternative to the neoclassical growth theory, Romer (1986, 1990), Lucas 
(1988), and Aghion and Howitt (1992) developed the endogenous growth model which 
argues that positive externalities associated with inputs such as technology and education 
can lead to increasing returns to scale and, in turn, prevent any tendency towards 
convergence. 
5.2.1. Definitions 
Ever since the Solow model predicted the convergence of economic growth, the 
concept of convergence has been defined in a variety of ways though they are closely 
linked to one another. The definition of convergence depends on what the study focuses 
on and how it is operationalized. Several definitions of economic convergence have been 
proposed in the literature: (i) Convergence could be defined as the reduction in dispersion 
of per capita income among a group of countries or the catching up of relatively low-
income countries with relatively high-income countries as in Baumol (1986) and Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1991); (ii) Anderton, et al. (1992) defined convergence as the long-run 
reduction of international differences in the development of certain economic variables; 
(iii) Convergence of macroeconomic variables for a group of countries is defined as each 
country having identical long-run stochastic or deterministic trends, and this definition of 
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the convergence hypothesis is based on time-series techniques (Bernard and Durlauf, 
1995). These authors gave definitions to both convergence and common trends, and 
defined convergence as "countries i and j converge if the long-term forecast of output for 
both countries are equal at a fixed time t". If countries do not converge in this sense, they 
may still respond to the same long-term driving process. - Therefore, they defined the 
common trends as "countries i and j contain a common trend if the long-run forecast of 
output are proportional at a fixed time t". 
5.2.2. Concepts and empirical measurements of convergence 
Using cross-sectional data, there are two major concepts of convergence. The 
first concept, called cr (sigma) convergence, means the decline of the dispersion in the 
level of per capita income among countries while the other concept, j5 (beta) 
convergence, is the convergence of growth rates (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991). 
a-convergence involves looking at the dispersion of levels of some economic 
variables (mainly, the real per capita income levels) across countries and its change over 
time. If the cross-sectional dispersion, measured by the standard deviation of the 
logarithm of per capita income across a group of countries, declines over time, there is a 
process of a-convergence. The sample variance of log of income at time t, a], is used to 
measure the cross-sectional dispersion of income. 
^=(btbog(yil-nl)f, (5.1) 
•ft /=i 
where u.t is the sample mean of log(^ / r) and log(j,,) is the logarithm of the ith 
economy's GDP per capita at time t. 
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The P-convergence concept involves examining the relationship between the 
growth rate of per capita output over some time period and its initial level. The presence 
of P-convergence is indicated by a negative correlation between the rates of growth and 
initial income levels, and it implies that poor economies tend to grow faster than rich 
ones in the level of per capita income. Depending on the assumption about the steady-
state level, we distinguish two sub-concepts of p-convergence: absolute and conditional 
convergences (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). Absolute convergence104 requires that per 
capita income levels be equalized across economies in their steady-states under the 
assumption that economies have identical preferences and technologies. Because 
economies converge to the same steady-state which guarantees the same per capita 
income, poor economies should grow faster than richer ones without conditioning on any 
other characteristics of the economies, such as technology and preferences. In testing 
absolute convergence, the cross-section approach runs a cross-country growth regression 
with the growth rate as the dependent variable and the initial income level as the 
explanatory variable: 
1, ' * / 
= a+/31ogO / 0) + £,,i=l,2,...,N (5.2) 
where yjTis real per capita income of economy i at time T, yj0denotes economy i's 
initial income, and et is an error term. It should be noted that the left hand side of the 
equation depicts the average growth rate of per capita income for economy i between 
periods 0 and T. Then, equation (5.2) is used to test for the null hypothesis of no 
convergence, f3 > 0, against the alternative of convergence, /3(0 . 
1
 Absolute (3-convergence used also to be called unconditional p-convergence. 
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The concept of conditional convergence relaxes the strict assumption of absolute 
convergence by taking into account the differences of characteristics of economies that 
determine the respective steady-states of the economies. This concept implies that per 
capita income in a given economy converges to its own steady-state which can differ 
permanently from steady-state income levels of other countries and the speed of this 
convergence has an inverse relationship with the distance from the steady-state. 
Therefore, an economy which starts out proportionately further below its own steady-
state position tends to grow faster. Because a lower starting value per capita income 
tends to generate a higher per capita growth rate to the extent that the determinant of the 
steady-state are controlled for, convergence is conditional on the determinants of the 
countries' steady-state levels per capita output. 
To test conditional convergence, we need to hold the steady state constant by 
estimating a regression which includes a vector of variables that proxy the steady state. 
The following equation is estimated to test conditional convergence. 
'P 
W J 
l o g ( ^ ) = a + j31og(j;/0) + y ^ ; . + e / , i=l,2,3,...,N, (5.3) 
y,,o 
where Xj is- a vector of observations on exogenous variables which are designed to 
control for the cross-sectional heterogeneity in levels and growth rates of per capita 
income, a and P are parameters, y is a parameter vector, and s is an error term with mean 
zero and finite variance. According to the above equation, growth rates can vary from 
country to country either due to differences in the parameters determining their steady 
states captured in the term X; or due to differences in initial positions captured in the term 
log(.y,.0). Therefore, convergence is conditional on the determinants of the economy's 
135 
steady state level of per capita output. A significantly coefficient of p is taken as 
evidence for conditional convergence. If p<0, economies that are initially rich grow more 
slowly than economies that are initially poor, after controlling for the mean differences 
associated with their Xs and any economy-specific fixed effects embedded in the ss. 
In general, the process of P-convergence tends to generate a-convergence but the 
former does not necessarily imply the latter because the dispersion can be invariant or 
increasing even if a country is converging towards the sample mean. Hence, P-
convergence is a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition for c-convergence 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991)105. Sala-i-Martin (1996) argues that the two concepts 
examine different phenomena: cr-convergence studies how the distribution of an 
economic variable, per capita income for instance, evolves over time while P-
convergence studies the mobility of the same variable within the same distribution. 
In addition to the two concepts stated above, another concept of convergence is 
called stochastic convergence and it exploits time series properties of macroeconomic 
data by placing the convergence hypothesis in a dynamic and stochastic environment 
(Carlino and Mills, 1993; Bernard and Durlauf (1995). Bernard and Durlauf (1995) 
introduce two related definitions of convergence. The first definition (convergence as 
catching up) considers the behavior of output difference between two economies over a 
fixed time interval by equating convergence with the tendency of the difference to 
narrow. Bernard and Durlauf (1995) test for convergence by examining if \xtt - x j t J is 
a zero mean stationary process. The test of convergence thus amounts to testing for a 
105
 (3-convergence works toward a-convergence but may be offset by new disturbances that tend to increase 
cross-sectional dispersion. 
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unit-root in the process(x-n - * , , ) • The rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root 
implies a form of convergence in expectation between the two series x, and x.. 
The second definition of convergence (convergence as equality of long-term 
forecasts at a fixed time) is based on whether the long run forecasts of output differences 
tend to zero as the forecasting horizon increases. This notion holds that two series 
converge when they share a common stochastic trend (cointegrated) and hence that there 
are p-1 co-integrating equations, where p is the number of series (that is, countries) 
included in the co-integration analysis. A finding of less than p-1, but at least one, co-
integration vectors would imply that some of the countries are converging and some 
others are not, at least in the long-run106. 
5.2.3. Macroeconomic Convergence and Monetary Integration 
Monetary integration in a region should involve some form of convergence of 
macroeconomic policies across countries. Several authors have used the concept of 
economic convergence to empirically assess the suitability of countries to form or to join 
a monetary union. Kocenda et al. (2006) distinguished two strands of convergence 
literature which deal with this issue. One strand of convergence literature is based on the 
concept of the optimal currency area (OCA) and used the methodological approach 
developed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) which test whether potential members of 
a monetary union displayed a significant correlation of their supply (real) and demand 
(nominal) shocks. They applied this approach for the case of European Union as well as 
for other regions in the world. In the case of African countries, several studies have used 
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this methodological approach, including Bayoumi and Ostry (1997), and Howarth (1997), 
A second strand of literature focuses on the nominal and real convergence107 of the 
potential members of a monetary union as well as of candidate countries with the existing 
members of a monetary union. A set of studies applied this approach to assess whether 
new EU members could join the Eurozone, and this includes Brada and Kutan (2003), 
Kutan and Yigit (2004,2005). In Southern Africa, Jenkins and Thomas (1998), Honohan 
(1992) and Agbedgebe (2003), among others, applied the concept of convergence to 
investigate the possibility of forming a monetary union among the SADC members. 
Following Hafer and Kutan (1994), the notion of convergence generally used in 
the studies of European Union's economic convergence is that: complete convergence is 
achieved when there exist "n-1" cointegrating vectors or one common trend; and partial 
convergence is claimed when there exists one to "n-2" cointegrating vectors or multiple 
common trends among "n" countries. Complete convergence implies that economic 
variables in different countries converge to a single common long-run path, dominated 
perhaps by policy preferences of one country {e.g., that of Germany, which motivates the 
test of the German Dominance (or Leadership) Hypothesis in several studies} or a 
combination of countries (i.e. a common policy shared by several countries). On the 
other hand, partial convergence implies that countries set their policies independently in 
the long-run. 
106
 Hafer and Kutan (1994) refer to the case of less than p-1 co-integrating vectors as to a situation of 
"partial" convergence. 
107
 Convergence of economic variables can be broadly categorized into two areas: nominal and real 
economic convergence. Separation into two categories is based on representative variables and their degree 
of involvement with policy coordination. Nominal economic convergence is measured by convergence of 
monetary bases, inflation rates, interest rates, government deficit/GDP ratios and government debt/GDP 
ratios. Real convergence, on the other hand, is measured by convergence of real GDPs and industrial 
production. 
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5.3. The model of "Leadership hypothesis" 
Several economists, including De Grauwe (2000), Camarero and Ordonez (2006) 
among others, argue that in an exchange rate arrangement, i.e. an incomplete monetary 
union108, the so-called n-1 problem faced by fixed exchange rate systems may ultimately 
arise. This is due to the fact that there are only n-1 exchange rates among the n countries 
participating in an exchange rate arrangement and just one degree of freedom in order to 
set the monetary policy in the system. Therefore, only one common authority (a common 
central bank, for instance) or just a single country can set its monetary policy 
independently and the other countries following it. This policy, through the exchange 
rates commitment, will be the one for the whole system. However, in this situation, the 
question, as asked by De Grauwe (2000), is to decide who is going to use this degree of 
freedom. 
Prior to the implementation of the European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) was established through the European 
Monetary System (EMS), 1979 to 1998, with the original intention of maintaining a 
system of fixed-but-adjustable exchange rates within Europe. In the ERM, Each 
participating country was to exhibit symmetric behavior in maintaining the exchange rate 
arrangement. However, it is frequently argued that the EMS had worked in an 
asymmetric way, with Germany being the center country and the remaining countries 
passively adjusting to German monetary policy actions. In turn, these countries would 
have benefited from behaving in such a way, since they would have taken advantage of 
the firmly established anti-inflation credibility of the Bundesbank (Kirchgassner and 
Wolters, 1993). This leads to the so-called German Dominance Hypothesis (GDH). 
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According to the German Dominance Hypothesis (GDH), Germany was the EMS leader 
and sets its monetary policy quite independently, using therefore the degree of freedom, 
while the rest of the member countries follow that policy. This implies that other EMS 
countries only respond to german monetary policy but not the reverse. Kutan (1991) 
derives a simple theoretical model explaining the German dominance in the EMS. 
In this chapter, we use the name of "leadership hypothesis" instead of German 
dominance hypothesis, and the discussion below follow Fratianni and Von Hagen (1990), 
Kutan (1991), Hafer and Kutan (1994), and MacDonald and Taylor (1991) among many 
others. 
Fratianni and Von Hagen (1990) proposed a useful framework for the analysis of 
monetary policy convergence in terms of interest rate linkages or monetary base in the 
context of EMS. They argued that "German dominance could be established if: i) 
monetary policy in the rest of the world did not Granger-cause the policies of the other 
EMS members; ii) no two-way Granger-causality existed between the policies of EMS 
countries; and Hi) German monetary policy Granger-caused policies in the other EMS 
countries". Furthermore, MacDonald and Taylor (1991) distinguish between short-run 
(or high-frequency) and long-run (or low- frequency) policy convergence. The short-run 
policy convergence implies that the growth of narrow money stock in each of the 
countries under investigation show a tendency to converge toward one another during the 
sample period while long-run policy convergence assesses whether or not monetary 
policy variables show a tendency to move together over long periods of time. In this 
study, we will follow previous studies by examining the long-run policy convergence. 
as the CMA and the European Monetary System (EMS). 
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The empirical analysis investigates policy convergence among countries under 
consideration within a long-run framework by using cointegration procedures which 
determine the number of shared common stochastic trends among their monetary policies 
and test whether a complete convergence of policies has been achieved in these countries. 
Rejection of the complete convergence - a finding of two or more shared common 
stochastic trends - indicates that some countries' policies are set independently at least in 
the long-run. If this is true, then the notion that the bank in the leading country 
dominated monetary policy in the other countries is rejected. Such a result also suggests 
that any credibility gain from tying policy to that of the leading country is probably 
outweighed by other considerations, such as domestic growth or international 
competitiveness. 
The method used to test for cointegration in this study is the Johansen maximum 
likelihood procedure introduced in Johansen (1988) and extended in Johansen and 
Juselius (1990). If there are p-1 cointegrating vectors among p policy measures, then 
there is only one common policy shared by all countries and so there is complete long-
run convergence of policies. If, however, the number of cointegrating vectors is less than 
p-1, but greater than one, then this implies that there is some partial convergence of 
policies. Finally, if the number of cointegrating vectors is zero, then this means that there 
are several (p) common trends and so no long-run convergence of policies. A lack of 
cointegration should not necessarily imply that convergence did not take place at the end 
of the period. In other words, if monetary policies become closely linked at the end of 
the sample period, rather than during the period, our cointegration tests will not capture 
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such a change and hence policy convergence will be rejected. As can be seen from the 
above procedure, cointegration does not automatically imply convergence. 
In assessing the leadership hypothesis, it is also interesting to investigate the 
short-run connection among policy measures used by different countries. For this 
purpose, causality test can be employed to detect whether short-run changes in the 
leading country's policy alone are transmitted to the other countries, which is evident 
from the unidirectional causation from the leading country to the other countries, or 
whether there is general feedback among policy actions. If the "leadership hypothesis' is 
correct, then the Granger-causality should run from the leading country to the other 
countries but not vice versa. 
5.4. Data and Methodology 
5.4.1. Data 
The empirical analysis below employs a monetary base measure for each country. 
It must be noted, however, that for the sample of countries under investigation, there is 
lack of large dataset for other monetary instruments for most countries, like Ml and M2, 
as well as market interest rates. However, concerning the choice of monetary base as the 
preferred measure, Hafer and Kutan (1994) argued that "...the monetary base is the 
preferred measure to gauge changes in the direction of monetary policy since using 
broader measures to represent central bank policy actions may confuse policy-induced 
changes with unforeseen movements in the money multiplier or money demand. Hence, 
changes in the monetary base generally reflect actions taken by the central bank in their 
attempt to alter reserves of the banking system and, hence, some financial market rate or 
some monetary aggregate". 
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The data used in this paper are on monthly basis and are taken from the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD-ROM of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Monthly data on base money are in national currency units. Like many other 
authors (e.g. Hafer and Kutan (1994), Brada and Kutan (2003), etc..) we use "reserve 
money" which is obtained from line 14 of the IFS's CD-ROM. The data were 
deseasonalized using the seasonally adjusted moving average (SAMA) command in TSP. 
Due to data availability, our sample consists of monthly monetary base spanning the 
period from January 1980 to December 2003109 for Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. The focus of this chapter is the 
investigation of the South African leadership hypothesis within the SADC in a strict 
sense, hence in this analysis we do not take into account the effects of other major 
countries's monetary base110, such as U.S.A, EU, UK or Japan. 
Three other SADC members are not considered in this analysis and that the other 
CMA countries (Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) are not included. There are not 
enough observations for Angola, Mozambique and Zambia. However, since 1998, DR 
Congo has changed its national currency, from the New Zaire to Franc Congolais. 
Moreover, the exclusion of Angola and DR Congo is also due to the fact that both 
countries experienced a period of hyperinflation in the 1990s. 
5.4.2. Econometric Methodology 
The testing procedure involves three steps. The first step is to test for the order of 
integration of the natural logarithm of monetary base. This would be done by computing 
109in order to coincide with the beginning of the SADCC, the precursor of SADC. 
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the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistics (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) which tests 
for the presence of unit root under the alternative that the monetary bases are stationary 
around a fixed time trend and by another unit root test, the KPSS test (Kwiatowski et al, 
1992). Conditional upon the outcome, the second step is to test for cointegration of the 
money supplies using the Johansen and Juselius (1990) maximum likelihood approach. 
If cointegration exists, then either uni-directional or bi-directional Granger-causality must 
exist in at least the 1(0) variables. The third step is to carry out a standard Granger-
causality test augmented with an appropriate error-correction term derived from the long-
run cointegrating relationship. 
5.4.2.1. Unit Root Tests 
The investigation of time series properties, checking for the presence of a unit 
root for instance, usually precedes the use of several econometric tests. A time series 
variable has the property of stationarity when it possesses a finite mean, variance and 
autocovariance function that are all independent of time. This implies that shocks to the 
series are necessarily transitory, and the effect of the shock will vanish over time and the 
series will tend to revert to its long-run equilibrium value. On the other hand, a non-
stationary series possesses a time dependent mean or autocovariance function. However, 
if the series is not stationary, shocks to the series will be permanent and the series will 
have no tendency to revert to its long run equilibrium value (Hamilton, 1995). Moreover, 
a stochastic time series is said to be integrated of order d if the series requires 
differencing d times in order to achieve stationarity (Engle and Granger, 1987). Thus the 
110
 Including major countries' monetary base in the model would have produced an impact on all countries' 
money supply. 
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time series Xt is said to be integrated of order one, denoted Xt ~ 1(1), if its level series Xt 
is nonstationary but its first-differenced series AXt is stationary, that is, AXt ~ 1(0). 
Determining the order of integration of a time series variable involves testing for 
the number of autoregressive unit roots that the time series contains. Different testing 
procedures have been proposed, and this includes, among other, the ones developed by 
Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981), Phillips and Perron (1988) and Kwiatkowski et al. 
(1992). In our analysis, unit root is tested using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and 
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) (KPSS) tests. Since the ADF test is know to be a low power 
test that is biased toward not rejecting the null hypothesis, we run both the ADF and the 
KPSS tests in order to get the optimum advantage of both tests. These two tests make a 
good combination, as the null hypothesis in one test is the alternative hypothesis in the 
other one. However, non-rejecting the null hypothesis of one test does not necessarily 
imply accepting the null hypothesis of the other test. 
a. Augmented Dickey - Fuller (ADF test) 
The standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to assess the degree of integration of 
the variables is based on the following specifications: 





Ay, = a0 + a2t + yyt_x + £ A 4vr_m + £, (5-7) 
;=2 
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Equations (5.6) and (5.7) are based on the equation (5.5) with anadditional drift term ao 
and time trend t added to the equations. Our interest is in testing whether y = 0. In the 
three specifications above, the null hypothesis is that the time series variable is 
nonstationary, i.e., it contains a unit root. The procedure is to estimate the above 
regressions using ordinary least squares (OLS) and then test the significance of y based 
on the resulting t statistic. However, the test statistic does not have the conventional t-
distribution because we are regressing an 1(0) series on a 1(1) series under the null 
hypothesis. 
To implement the ADF tests, we follow the method suggested by Campbell and 
Perron (1991) and Ng and Perron (1993), where the lag length p is chosen by starting 
with an upper bound Pmax oxip and estimates an autoregression of the order pmax . If the 
last included lag is significant, then p = praax; if not, reduce the order of the estimated 
auto-regression by one until the coefficient on the last included lag is significant. This 
procedure is repeated until the last lag becomes significant. If no lag is significant, then p 
is equal to zero. 
In this study, we will perform the ADF test by using three specifications outlined 
above, i.e. equations 5.5-5.7. The critical values of the ADF test are taken from 
MacKinnon (1991). The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected if the value of the t-
statistics for y (in absolute value) is greater than the critical values. 
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 As recommended by Schwert (1989), we use the Bartlett criteria to choose the maximum lag-
length p: 
int 12(T/100)1/4 where int denotes the largest integer less than or equal to 12(17100)1/4 and T is 
the sample size. 
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b. Kwiatowski et al. test CKPSS test) 
It is generally accepted that in the standard unit root tests (ADF(DF) or PP) in 
which the null hypothesis is that the series contains a unit root against the alternative of 
stationarity that the null hypothesis for many aggregate economic time series cannot be 
rejected unless there is strong evidence against it. Therefore, the reason for the failure to 
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root is due to the lack of power in the standard unit 
root tests. Kwiatkoswski, Phillips/ Schmidt, and Shin (1992), (KPSS hereafter), have 
developed a test statistic which test has the null hypothesis of stationarity and the 
alternative of nonstationarity. KPSS considers a component representation of an 
economic time series variable yt as the sum of a linear deterministic trend, a random 
walk, and a stationary error: 
yt=St + r,+e, (5.8) 
where st is a stationary process and rt is a random walk given by 
rt=r,-i+u,> ( 5 - 9 ) 
where ut is i.i.d. (0, a\ ). 
Kwiatowski et al. (1992) derive the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistic for the null 
hypothesis of stationarity, cru = 0. under the assumptions that the st are i.i.d N(0, o\). 
Following Kwiatkoswski et al (1992), to test the null hypothesis of level 
stationarity, in which case under the null hypothesis yt is stationary around a level or 
deterministic mean, we define et as the residuals from regressing yt on an intercept only. 
However, for the null hypothesis of trend stationarity, the residuals et are obtained from 
the regression of yt on a constant term and a time trend. Let's define the partial sum of 
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deviations of residuals from the sample mean as St = ^ e , . , and let S* be the estimate of 
7 = 1 
the variance of st. The LM statistic can be written as: 
LM = r2^Ts?/Sl (5.10) 
S2 is appropriate to use only when the residuals are iid N(0, S2). Hence, the LM test 
statistic should be modified to account for the possibility that the errors are not iid N(0, 
S2 ). Under this assumption, we need to find a consistent estimator, S2(l), of the long run 
variance, a , of the regression error. This can be done by using residuals et: 
52(/) = r-1fer2 +2rlYJw{s,l)fjetet_k (5.11) 
(=1 S=\ (=4+1 
In equation 5.11, / represents the lag truncation parameter while following Newey and 
West (1987), the optimal weighting function w(s,l) = l-s/(I+ Y) is used to guaranteed 
the is non-negativity of S2(l). Finally, we end up to a following test: 
T 
LM^r^Sf IS2(I) (5.12) 
;=i 
As for the case of the ADF test, we use the formula / = int[12(T/100)1/4] suggested 
by Schwert (1989) to determine lag truncation parameter, /. The null hypothesis of level 
(or trend) stationarity is accepted if the value of the KPSS test statistics is less than its 
critical value. Since the distribution of LM is nonstandard, Kwiatowski et al. (1992) use 
Monte Carlo simulation to provide critical values of the test (Chang et al., 2002). 
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5.4.2.2. Cointegration Tests 
The notion of cointegration has been introduced by Granger (1981) to investigate 
the long-run relationship between economic time series variables and the concept was 
further developed by Engle and Granger (1987). If we have variables that are 
cointegrated then least squares estimation will lead to consistent estimation of the 
coefficients. Cointegration means that one or more linear combinations of time series 
variables are stationary even though individually they are not. In other words, 
cointegration assures that if two variables are nonstationary and they have the same order 
of integration 1(1) then a linear combination of the two variables is stationary. Therefore, 
the two variables can achieve a long run relationship. 
Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) provide a multivariate 
cointegration test procedure which allows us to test for the number of cointegrating 
vectors (r) existing between a number of economic time series variables (n). It also 
allows us to test selected restrictions on these vectors. In other words, we can both 
estimate and test the equilibrium relationship among a set of nonstationary variables 
while at the same time abstracting from short run deviations from the equilibrium. 
Johansen's methodology takes its starting point in the vector autoregression 
(VAR) of order p given by 
y, = M+Ay,-i + -+APy,-P + s<> (5.12) 
where yt is an n x 1 vector of variables that are integrated of order one, i.e.; 1(1), and e, 




where Et = ^ 4 • ~ I a nd T, = - ^ ^j 
i=l j=M 
This process from a VAR model to equation (5.13) is called the cointegrating 
transformation. The long-run information matrix n is the key to Johansen's 
cointegration test because its rank r determines the number of cointegrating vectors. II 
can also be expressed as a{3', where a and P are nxr matrices, a indicates the speed 
of adjustment of variables to the deviations from equilibrium and each column of p is a 
cointegrating vector. 
Johansen proposed two statistics to test the rank of the long-run information 
matrix II, the trace and the maximum eigenvalue (L-max) statistics: 
The trace test statistic is implemented by 
KacM^-T^W-^), (5.14) 
t=r+l 
while the maximum eigenvalue statistic is given by 
Xmm=-T\n(l-Li) (5-15) 
where A, are estimated eigenvalues ranked from largest to smallest. The trace statistic 
,A,trace is a likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis that there are at most r 
cointegrating vectors. The null hypothesis for this test is that the number of cointegrating 
vectors is less than or equal to r against general alternative hypothesis. However, the 
second statistic Xmax tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating vectors against the 
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hypothesis of r+1 cointegrating vectors. If the null hypothesis is r=0, then the alternative 
hypothesis is r=l (one cointegrating vector). The first (second) test tends to have higher 
power than the second (first) test does when A,i are evenly (unevenly) distributed. 
Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Osterwald-lenum (1992) provided asymptotic critical 
values for the Trace and Max statistics. 
The determination of the optimal lag length is very important in econometric 
estimation due to the fact that there exists a trade-off between reducing the sum of 
squares through the estimation of additional coefficients and the associated loss of 
degrees of freedom. For this purpose, we applied three different statistical criteria: 
(1) The Akaike information criterion (AIC), 
AIC = T*ln(residual sum of squares) + 2n, (5.16) 
(2) The Schwartz information criterion (SBC), 
SBIC = T*ln(residual sum of squares) + n*ln(T), (5.17) 
and (3) the multivariate likelihood ratio (LR) test, as suggested by Sims(1980). 
LR==(r-c)(ln |E4 | - |Sw | ) ) , 
where n = number of parameters estimated, T = number of observations, k = number of 
lags in each equation of the system, c = number of parameters estimated in each equation 
of the unrestricted system (k+1 lags), In |S t | = natural logarithm of the determinant of 
2 , (Enders, 1995). 
We first estimated the model and get the lag length from the AIC and SBC. To 
choose between the outcomes of these two lag selection procedures we performed LR 
multivariate test adjusted for small samples. It is important to mention that we perform a 
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set of diagnostic tests such as a test for autocorrelation in the residuals by using the 
Ljung-Box Portmanteau test and the test for normality (Jacque-Bera test). 
5.4.2.3. Granger-Causality Tests 
Granger Causality is a testing technique intended to check for the dynamic 
relationship between time series variables. Specifically, this technique is employed in 
economic literature to test the direction and magnitude of the relationship between two 
variables. Granger (1969) defined causality as a one time series variable predicting 
another time series variable. Granger (1980) assumes that Xt "Granger causes" Yt if Xt 
helps in prediction of Yt. It assumes that the time series of both variables Xt and Yt 
contain all information to help to predict Xt and Yt. By taking lagged valued of both Xt 
and Yt a time series variable Xt Granger causes another time series variable Yt if lagged 
values of Xt and Yt help to a better prediction of Yt rather than using past values of Yt 
alone. Also, we say that a time series variable Yt Granger causes another time series 
variable Xt if lagged values of Yt and Xt helps for a better prediction of Yt rather than 
using past values of Xt alone. The test is performed using the following bivariate 
regressions for variables X and Y. 
X, = A + fialX_ + £ 'ii,Y„ + su (5.19) 
(=1 ;=1 
S = &+£5,yM+£*,*,.,+** (5.20) 
Here, slt and s2t are random errors which are assumed to be uncorrelated with zero mean 
and constant variance. Note that the current values of the variables Xt (Yt) is explained 
by lagged values of itself and lagged values of the other variable Yt (Xt). For equation 
152 .. ; . 
(5.19), the null hypothesis that X does not Granger-cause Y is tested against the 
alternative hypothesis that X does Granger-causes Y. Accordingly, if the null hypothesis 
of no causality is rejected, then we can say that X does Granger-causes Y. The same 
procedure is also performed for equation (5.20). 
The Granger test has one substantial drawback: it is only valid if the time series 
data are stationary or 1(0). In order to determine the direction of causality by using the 
Granger test it is therefore necessary to test for the integration properties of each variable. 
If the series have been determined to be cointegrated, and once a long run relationship 
has been established between the variables, the Error Correction Model (ECM) is more 
appropriate for causality analysis112. The difference between the standard Granger 
causality test and the error correction based causality test is that the ECM introduces an 
additional channel for Granger causality to emerge since the error term itself is a function 
of Xt-i and Yt-i. According to Engle and Granger (1987), independent variables "cause" 
the dependent variables either if the error-correction term carries a significant coefficient 
or if the first difference independent variables are jointly significant. 
The error correction model is presented in the following equations: 
Xt = /3l+ECTl_1+fjaiXt_i+fjptiYl_i +eu (5.21) 
(=1 ;=1 
Y,=02+ ECTt_x + £ 8,YM + £ « _ , . + s2t (5.22) 
;=1 i = l 
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5.5. Empirical results 
5.5.1. Unit Root Test Results 
We use the natural logs for all series. The first step in the analysis will be to 
determine whether the individual country-specific monetary bases are non-stationary. 
We tested for the order of integration of the variables by means of two alternative tests. 
On the one hand, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) was applied under the null 
hypothesis that the variable has a unit root. And on the other hand, given the small power 
of this test under certain stochastic properties of the series, the KPSS test for which under 
the null hypothesis is that of stationarity was used. 
Since, for the ADF test, the critical values are sensitive to the presence of a 
constant and/or a trend term and number of lags used in the estimation, we tested three 
different models depending on whether we included in the estimated equation a constant 
and/or a trend term or not. We use a maximum of 12 lags that were initially included in 
the ADF tests for the error-term. Then, the appropriate number of lags for each model 
was selected on the basis of the Akaike and Schwartz's information criteria. The ADF 
results for the monetary base series are presented in panel A of table 5.1. The results 
indicate that stationarity is rejected for the monetary base series in levels (i.e., 1(1) 
accepted), but stationarity is not rejected for the first-difference of the monetary base 
112
 Accordingly, if the variables are cointegrated and we use the standard Granger causality test to 
investigate the causality between variables, the regressions can produce misleading results. 
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Table 5.1: Unit Root Test Results: 






























































































Notes: T (i) ,T
 (2) , and T p) represent values of ADF statistics with drift and trend, with drift only and 
without drift and trend, respectively 
Critical values for ADF tests are taken from McKinnon, 1993. (*),(**),and (***): significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. 
Critical Values for KPSS tests are taken from Kwiatoski et al. (1992). 
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series, the only exception being the case for Zimbabwe. Hence,- for these countries 
results indicate that the level of series are all 1(1). For the case of Zimbabwe, further 
analysis shows that the levels of monetary base series are 1(2). One plausible explanation 
of this result is that Zimbabwe had recently experienced hyperinflation. 
According to the KPSS test whose results are presented in panel B of table 5.1, 
the null of trend stationarity in levels is not rejected for all the monetary bases considered 
and for both the model with and without trend (with the exception of Malawi and 
Tanzania, where the null is rejected in the model without trend), while the opposite 
happens for the levels of the variables. However, as for the ADF test result, the null of 
stationarity is rejected for the case of Zimbabwe for both models. Even though, we 
planned to rely on the results from the KPSS test for the next step, both tests lead to the 
same outcome. 
5.5.2. Cointegration Test Results 
Having established that all variables are 1(1), with the exception of Zimbabwe, we 
are now free to test for multivariate cointegration. We have applied three alternative lag 
length-selection criteria in order to choose the appropriate lag length in the VAR. These 
include the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) 
and the likelihood ratio (LR) test. The application of all three criteria for monetary base 
led to the following lags for these countries: 7, 4, 3, 1, 2 and 2 for Botswana, Mauritius, 
Malawi, Seychelles and Tanzania, respectively. For the case of Zimbabwe, where we did 
not perform a cointegration test, the lag length of 2 has be obtained and this will be used 
in the next step. 
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We tested for cointegration between the South African monetary base growth rate 
and that of the non-CMA members in our sample in a bivariate setting. Trace statistics 
for the cointegration of South African and other SADC members'monetary base series 
are presented in table 5.2. The hypothesis of a single cointegrating vector is not rejected 
at the 5 percent level of significance in the case of South African monetary base and 
those of Botswana and Mauritius. For the case of Seychelles, the level of significance is 
slightly greater than the conventional levels (almost 11 percent). On the basis of such 
results we conclude that the monetary base series are cointegrated and therefore causality 
related. 
Since there are only two countries for each test, a finding of one cointegrating 
vector would indicate one common policy shared by the two countries; i.e. full 
convergence of monetary policy. However, a finding of no cointegrating relationship, 
means that there has been zero convergence of policy. From the above results, we infer 
from the fact that there is a long-run relationship between monetary base in South Africa 
and that of the two countries, namely Botswana and Mauritius. Therefore, these two 
countries have the ability to follow South African monetary policy. It is not surprising in 
the case of Botswana since this country is considered a de facto member of the CMA. 
For Mauritius, its economic indicators, especially the rate of inflation and the growth of 
monetary base, are similar to the CMA average. This result supports the evidence found 
by Sparks (2002) who suggests that these two countries could be among the first non-
CMA members of SADC to join the monetary union if this happens. 
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5.5.3. Causality Test Results 
We run causality tests in order to check whether the non-CMA members were 
able to follow the SARB leadership in setting this monetary aggregate. The estimated 
coefficients for the two regressions are reported in tables 5.3 and 5.4. The regression we 
are mostly interested is the one with South Africa monetary base as dependent variable 
since we want to know if short-run movements in South African's monetary base have 
influence on the monetary base of the other countries, this is shown in table 5.3. 
Table 5.2: Cointegration Tests: Johansen's Trace Test Results. 




















Notes: Critical values are from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). 
The following vector error correction models were estimated: 
/&, = &+ Zt_x + £ a , A X , , + £ rt A7M + eu 
/=i 1=1 




AXt represents growth rate of monetary base for South Africa at time t, 
AYt the growth rate of monetary base for another SADC country and, 
p is the lag length. 
In table 5.5, we present the results of the Granger-causality tests. As we noticed above, if 
the hypothesis is correct, movements in South Africa "monetary base should temporally 
precede movements in the others, i.e., the causality relationship must run from South 
Africa to the other countries. For the non-CMA members which exhibit long-run 
relationship with South Africa, we use a Vector Error-Correction Model (VECM). The 
likelihood ratio tests indicate that there is a bi-directional causality between South Africa 
and Mauritius as well as Botswana. The error-correction coefficient for the case of 
Mauritius is not statistically significant when South Africa is the dependent variable, but 
the reverse occurs when Mauritius is the dependent variable. In the case of Botswana, 
the opposite occurs, i.e. the error-correction coefficient is statistically significant in the 
former case and insignificant in the latter. The Granger-causality results do not provide 
evidence of South African leadership in the strict sense since, in order for this hypothesis 
to be valid, the causality must run from South Africa to Mauritius or Botswana, without 
feedback. This evidence shows that there is a room for these countries to set independent 
monetary policies. 
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Table 5.3: Estimation Results for Granger-Causality Tests: 
Dependent Variable: South Africa Monetary base 












































































i==t=* £4 57*** 272 87*** 
7.04 23.4 
10.8 25.1** 
Notes: (*), (**), and (***) represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
JB and Q are the values for Jacque-Bera test for normality and Ljung-Box for serial correlations. 
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Table 5.4: Estimation Results for Granger-Causality Tests: 
Dependent Variable: SADC country's Monetary base 

















































































Notes: (*), (**), and (***) represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
JB and Q are the values for Jacque-Bera test for normality and Ljung-Box for serial correlations. 
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Using a VAR model, Malawi presents evidence of being able to follow South African 
leadership. There is a causality running from South Africa to Malawi. Malawi is 
responsive to short-run movements from South Africa's monetary base. For the 
remaining countries in our sample, there is lack of evidence for these countries to follow 
the leadership of the SARB in setting their monetary policy. 
Table 5.5: Granger-Causality Test Results 
Sum of ECM LR-stat. DF P-Value 
coefficients term 


































































Notes: (**) and (***) mean significance at 5 and 10%, respectively. 
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5. 6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have investigated whether the SADC countries which are not 
currently members of the Common Monetary Area could join the monetary union. We 
conjecture that for a country to become member of the union, it must satisfy a set of 
criteria. For our case, membership is conditional on the convergence of monetary policy, 
using monetary base growth rate, of the potential members to that of the South Africa 
which is the dominant player in the monetary union and de facto responsible for 
monetary policy. To test such a convergence we use Johansen cointegration procedure, a 
testing framework which has long been used in Europe in the case of the German 
dominance in the European Monetary System. 
As we assume that the non-CMA members could join the monetary union on 
individual basis, our analysis is conducted in a bivariate setting. In order for a country to 
join the union, we have to find evidence of a long-run relationship between its monetary 
base growth rate and that of South Africa through a Johansen cointegration test. We also 
conducted Granger-causality test to see whether short-run movements in South Africa's 
monetary base have impact on that of the other countries taken individually. 
Empirical tests find evidence of long-run relationship between Botswana and 
Mauritius. These two countries show that they are able to follow the leadership of the 
SARB in setting their monetary base. Thus, they are good candidates for membership in 
the CMA. Whereas the Granger-causality test results show that short-run movements in 
South Africa can influence that of Mauritius and Botswana, there is also a reverse 
causality from these countries to South Africa. Hence, this shows evidence of possibility 
for these countries to set independent monetary policies. The leadership hypothesis in the 
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strict sense is therefore rejected for the case of Mauritius and Botswana. The only other 
country which shows evidence of following the South Africa's leadership in terms of 
Granger-causality is Malawi. The relationship runs from South Africa to Malawi. For 
the remaining countries, there is lack of empirical evidence for them to be able to follow 
South African's leadership in an expanded Common Monetary Area at this stage. 
The results obtained in this study are similar to that of Sparks (2002) in which 
Botswana and Mauritius were among the countries which could be the first to join the 
CMA if possible. We have to recall that Botswana is considered de facto as a CMA 
member since its currency is pegged to a basket of currencies where the weight for the 
South African rand is between 60 to 70 percent. Mauritius is one of the most prosperous 
countries in the region and its economy is stable. Its inflation rate is comparable to that 
of CMA countries. 
Empirical evidence suggests that most SADC countries were not able to follow 
the South African's leadership and this can be explained in several ways. First, our 
sample period includes a period where South Africa, our proxy for the CMA, was not 
member of the SADC or its precursor, the SADCC, and there was no economic link 
between these countries and South Africa as a result of the Apartheid system in South 
Africa. Second, there was not a worldwide interest in monetary union as it became after 
the European countries adopted the Maastrich Treaty and the creation of a single 
currency in Europe. The accession of South Africa came shortly after the adoption of the 
Maastrich Treaty which we assume that this could implicitly lead to the emergence of the 
idea of monetary union in the region since South Africa is the leading country for the 
CMA. These events should be taken into consideration. We think that a sample period 
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starting from the accession of South Africa into SADC, more precisely in 1995 where 
South Africa was given the responsibility for the financial sector, or the creation of the 
EMU, could provide a better indicator for the convergence in the region. This period is, 
however, very short in order to conduct test for long-run relationships. 
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CHAPTER 6:. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The launch of a common currency for large industrialized countries in Europe has 
renewed interests in monetary integration worldwide, and in particular, in the African 
continent. Even though the idea of creating a continent-wide monetary union has been 
rooted in the African union's treaty, the European experience constitutes a lesson for the 
African countries. Several regional economic blocs in Africa are planning to launch a 
common currency in the next decade as an intermediary step towards the emergence of a 
single currency for the entire continent. In Southern Africa, through the SADC 
organization, the goal is to create a regional central bank and to launch a single currency 
by 2016. 
Rather than investigating whether the 14 member states of
 ;the SADC constitute 
an optimum currency area (OCA) or are suitable for a monetary union, we rely on the 
literature on monetary integration and apply empirically three different economic issues 
in the context of Southern African countries. 
In Southern Africa, a regional free trade agreement has been elaborated and 
almost completed, while that of a monetary union is still in debate. Several studies have 
already investigated the impact of a FTA on the intra-regional trade. However, the effect 
of a regional single currency on the intra-SADC trade has not been examined empirically. 
In the first essay (Chapter 3), we intend to provide an empirical contribution to this issue. 
For this purpose, the gravity model of international trade was employed to analyze the 
determinants of bilateral trade flows for the period 1992-2002 using a large dataset 
comprised of 70 countries. Our results demonstrate that the observed trade flows among 
SADC countries are largely greater than the ones predicted by the empirical model. With 
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respect to the trade potentials between each individual SADC member and South Africa, 
and we found overall that these countries over-trade with respect to South Africa. 
However, there is still some unexploited trade potential for several pairs of SADC 
countries. Hence, this analysis shows that the argument of improving intra-regional trade 
flows when the countries of the economic grouping share the same currency cannot be 
empirically sustained in the case of SADC. Moreover, sharing the same currency as well 
as a FTA would certainly have an impact on the economy of the region for other reasons. 
In terms of implementing a single currency in a group of countries, the experience 
of Western European countries demonstrates that this involves a long period of transition, 
and this may include pegging bilateral exchange rates. Since SADC member states have 
different exchange rate regimes and to avoid a high volatility of their nominal exchange 
rate, we suggest that these countries have to start an exchange rate coordination similar to 
that of the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) followed by the European countries. For 
this, the SADC countries have to find a common nominal anchor to which they will peg 
their currencies. In the second essay (chapter 4), we used the optimum currency area 
theory to find the optimum currency peg for Southern African countries. We follow the 
model developed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997). Using a panel of 63 countries, 
we obtained OCA indices for SADC countries vis-a-vis five potential nominal anchor 
currencies. Then, we employ a methodology developed by Benassy-Quere et al. (1998), 
and we find that the optimal nominal currency anchor for these countries is the US dollar. 
Hence, SADC countries have to peg their currencies to the US dollar. We should note 
that most of the SADC countries have as main destination for their exports the OECD 
countries, which are also the main source of their imports. Therefore, pegging SADC 
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currencies to a major currency such as the US dollar would be preferable than pegging to 
a regional currency anchor, such as the South African rand. If the rand is used as the 
anchor currency, then fluctuations of the rand against other currencies outside the union 
will have a major impact on the export revenues of SADC countries1' . 
A further objective of the second essay was to find pairs of SADC countries 
which are suitable for a common currency using the estimated OCA indices. We found 
almost 20 country-pairs which appears to be suitable for a single currency in the 
region114. However, for countries such as Angola, Congo, and Mozambique, the 
evidence found so far does not favor their membership in a monetary union with their 
SADC partners. 
Finally, in the last essay (Chapter 5), we have investigated whether the SADC 
countries which are not currently members of the Common Monetary Area could join the 
existing monetary union in the near future. We conjecture that for a country to become 
member of the monetary union, it must satisfy a set of criteria. For our purpose, 
membership is conditional on the convergence of monetary policy, using monetary base 
growth rate, of the potential members to that of the South Africa115. To test such a 
convergence we use Johansen cointegration procedure116. Empirical tests find evidence of 
long-run relationship for the cases of Botswana and Mauritius. Whereas the Granger-
causality test results show that short-run movements in South Africa can influence that of 
113
 As noted by Grandes (2003), South Africa mainly exports industrial products while the other 
countries export primary commodities, so the fluctuations of the rand may, in fact, hurt export revenues of 
its SADC partners. 
114
 We use estimated OCA indices for pairs of CMA countries as benchmark. 
115
 South Africa is the dominant player in the monetary union and de facto responsible for monetary policy. 
116
 Finding evidence of long-run relationship between any given non-CMA country and South Africa 
implies that the country is able to follow the leadership of the South Africa Reserve Bank in setting their 
monetary policy. 
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Mauritius and Botswana, and there is also a reverse causality from these countries to 
South Africa. Hence, this shows evidence of a possibility for these countries to set 
independent monetary policies. The leadership hypothesis in the strict sense is therefore 
rejected for the cases of Mauritius and Botswana. The only other country which shows 
evidence of following the South Africa's leadership in terms of Granger-causality is 
Malawi. The relationship runs from South Africa to Malawi. For the remaining 
countries, there is lack of empirical evidence for them to be able to follow South 
African's leadership in an expanded Common Monetary Area at this stage. 
As mentioned earlier, the African Union's 1999 Sirte declaration retained the 
African economic and monetary union agenda, but made a case for an accelerated 
implementation of the process for creating institutions of the union. We should bear in 
mind that the single currency for the entire African continent remains a longer-term 
possibility and it would depend on the level of integration since the European Union had 
taken more than 40 years from its inception to the introduction of a single currency, the 
euro. I think that it would be better for the African Union to start solving the problem of 
overlapping memberships in economic integration arrangements which undermines 
collective efforts towards the achievement of the common goal of the African economic 
and monetary union. Several countries are members of different economic groupings 
which are planning to have a single regional currency117. Hence, in order to deal with the 
case of overlapping memberships and to maximize collective efforts to reach the goal of a 
continental single currency, the African Union should require each country to choose the 
projected regional monetary union in which it may participate. 
117
 Tanzania, for instance, is members of EAC, SADC and COMESA, and these three regional economic 
arrangements plan to launch a single currency. 
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Following the European example, I think that Africa needs more time to achieve 
its goal of an economic and monetary union. This can be justified by the fact that a 
monetary union is only feasible if we have stable macro-economic policies throughout 
the continent, but few AU member countries can claim to have those policies right now. 
Moreover establishing a monetary union would also mean that economically stronger 
countries carry the economically weaker ones, as fiscal decisions affect all members. 
This has always been a major point of debate within European Union member countries, 
however overcoming the gaps between the rich and the less rich countries in Europe is 
relatively manageable. But Africa is a continent where we have many countries which 
are still economically and politically unstable. Many of these countries do not even have 
a functional central bank. At this moment, I think that it would make more sense to 
strengthen the existing regional economic groupings. We should also make sure that 
Nepad delivers on its peer-review mechanism and in that way achieve economic growth, 
good governance and strong fiscal policies. 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) agenda is to achieve the 
goal of a single currency by 2016. For the time being, this deadline seems unrealistic. 
The organization has several countries which have a track record of bad economic 
management. Even though these countries show good progress in terms of achieving the 
targets of the macroeconomic convergence criteria, outlined in the Memorandum of 
Understanding (See Roussow, 1996), some countries such as Congo and Angola needs 
time to strengthen their production capacity. These deadlines are helpful in the sense that 
it would push different countries to work towards these targets and it would also allow 
countries to compare their performances over time with their peers in the region. The 
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SADC needs to be more flexible in the adjustments of these deadlines, hence, not only 
countries which satisfy these criteria would enter the monetary union, but also those 
which show good progress in the achievement. The road to a single currency in Southern 
Africa is too long. We should bear in mind that gradualism and realism in designing and 
implementing regional integration arrangements are very important to achieve the goal of 
a single currency. 
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Appendix 1.1: Stages towards African Economic Union 
1. Strengthening of existing regional economic communities (RECs) and 
establishment of RECs where necessary (not to take more than five years). 
2. Stabilisation of tariff and non-tariff barriers, customs duties and internal taxes 
within each REC and the strengthening of sectoral integration, particularly in the 
areas of trade, agriculture, finance, transport and communications, industry and 
energy. Harmonisation of the activities of the RECs (not to take more than five 
years). 
3. Establishment of free trade and customs union areas at the level of RECs with the 
associated harmonization of tariff and non-tariff barriers (expected to take ten 
years). 
4. Co-rodination and harmonization of tariff and non-tariff systems among RECs 
with the movement towards a continental customs union (to take two years). 
5. Establishment of an African common market and the adoption of common 
policies (to take four years) including the fee movement of peoples. 
6. Integration of economic, political, social and cultural sectors towards a single 
African market and a Pan-African economic and monetary union. The setting up 
of a single African central Bank, single pan-African currency and the election of 
the Pan-African Parliament (to take no more than five years) 
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Source: Masson and Pattillo (2005), and Adams (2005) 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/treaties/aec.htm 
Appendix 1.2: Proposed regional monetary unions in Africa 
1. The Arab Monetary Union (AMU) made up of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco, and Tunisia; 
2. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) with member 
states including Angola, Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe; 
3. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) membership 
includes Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and Sao Tome and 
Principe; 
4. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that constitutes 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote dTvoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. 
5. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) that has Angola, 
Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe as its members. 
(Masson and Pattillo, 2005) 
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Note: Percentage increase in trade calculated as the average change in imports. 
Source: Evans (2002). 
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All variables except dummies are expressed in natural logarithms. 
Estimation uses White's heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
(*), (**) a nd (***) denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Appendix 4.1: IMF's Exchange Rate Classifications 
This classification system is based on members' actual, de facto, arrangements as 
identified by IMF staff, which may differ from their officially announced arrangements. 
The scheme ranks exchange rate arrangements on the basis of their degree of flexibility 
and the existence of formal or informal commitments to exchange rate paths. It 
distinguishes among different forms of exchange rate regimes, in addition to 
arrangements with no separate legal tender, to help assess the implications of the choice 
of exchange rate arrangement for the degree of monetary policy independence. 
Exchange Rate Regimes 
Exchange Arrangements with No Separate Legal Tender 
The currency of another country circulates as the sole legal tender (formal dollarization),-
or the member belongs to a monetary or currency union in which the same legal tender is 
shared by the members of the union. Adopting such regimes implies the complete 
surrender of the monetary authorities' independent control over domestic monetary 
policy. 
Currency Board Arrangements 
A monetary regime based on an explicit legislative commitment to exchange domestic 
currency for a specified foreign currency at a fixed exchange rate, combined with 
restrictions on the issuing authority to ensure the fulfillment of its legal obligation. This 
implies that domestic currency will be issued only against foreign exchange and that it 
remains fully backed by foreign assets, eliminating traditional central bank functions, 
such as monetary control and lender-of-last-resort, and leaving little scope for 
discretionary monetary policy. Some flexibility may still be afforded, depending on how 
strict the banking rules of the currency board arrangement are. 
Other Conventional Fixed Peg Arrangements 
The country (formally or de facto) pegs its currency at a fixed rate to another currency or 
a basket of currencies, where the basket is formed from the currencies of major trading or 
financial partners and weights reflect the geographical distribution of trade, services, or 
capital flows. The currency composites can also be standardized, as in the case of the 
SDR. There is no commitment to keep the parity irrevocably. The exchange rate may 
fluctuate within narrow margins of less than ±1 percent around a central rate-or the 
maximum and minimum value of the exchange rate may remain within a narrow margin 
of 2 percent-for at least three months. The monetary authority stands ready to maintain 
the fixed parity through direct intervention (i.e., via sale/purchase of foreign exchange in 
the market) or indirect intervention (e.g., via aggressive use of interest rate policy, 
imposition of foreign exchange regulations, exercise of moral suasion that constrains 
foreign exchange activity, or through intervention by other public institutions). Flexibility 
of monetary policy, though limited, is greater than in the case of exchange arrangements 
with no separate legal tender and currency boards because traditional central banking 
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functions are still possible, and the monetary authority can adjust the level of the 
exchange rate, although relatively infrequently. 
Pegged Exchange Rates within Horizontal Bands 
The value of the currency is maintained within certain margins of fluctuation of at least 
±1 percent around a fixed central rate or the margin between the maximum and minimum 
value of the exchange rate exceeds 2 percent. It also includes arrangements of countries 
in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) that 
was replaced with the ERM II on January 1, 1999. There is a limited degree of monetary 
policy discretion, depending on the band width. 
Crawling Pegs 
The currency is adjusted periodically in small amounts at a fixed rate or in response to 
changes in selective quantitative indicators, such as past inflation differentials vis-a-vis 
major trading partners, differentials between the inflation target and expected inflation in 
major trading partners, and so forth. The rate of crawl can be set to generate inflation-
adjusted changes in the exchange rate (backward looking), or set at a preannounced fixed 
rate and/or below the projected inflation differentials (forward looking). Maintaining a 
crawling peg imposes constraints on monetary policy in a manner similar to a fixed peg 
system. 
Exchange Rates within Crawling Bands 
The currency is maintained within certain fluctuation margins of at least ±1 percent 
around a central rate-or the margin between the maximum and minimum value of the 
exchange rate exceeds 2 percent-and the central rate or margins are adjusted periodically 
at a fixed rate or in response to changes in selective quantitative indicators. The degree of 
exchange rate flexibility is a function of the band width. Bands are either symmetric 
around a crawling central parity or widen gradually with an asymmetric choice of the 
crawl of upper and lower bands (in the latter case, there may be no preannounced central 
rate). The commitment to maintain the exchange rate within the band imposes constraints 
on monetary policy, with the degree of policy independence being a function of the band 
width. 
Managed Floating with No Predetermined Path for the Exchange Rate 
The monetary authority attempts to influence the exchange rate without having a specific 
exchange rate path or target. Indicators for managing the rate are broadly judgmental 
(e.g., balance of payments position, international reserves, parallel market developments), 
and adjustments may not be automatic. Intervention may be direct or indirect. 
Independently Floating 
The exchange rate is market-determined, with any official foreign exchange market 
intervention aimed at moderating the rate of change and preventing undue fluctuations in 
the exchange rate, rather than at establishing a level for it. 
Source: IMF's Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
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Appendix 4.2. Frankel and Wei's Regression analysis for de facto exchange rate regimes 
The monetary authorities are assumed to adopt a currency basket peg consisting of the 
five major currencies: the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, the euro, British pound and 
South African rand. For example, if changes in the Angolan kwanza against the Swiss 
franc are largely explained by changes of the US dollar against the Swiss franc, the US 
dollar would have a weight close to one (100%) in the Angolan currency basket: the 
Angolan kwanza can be assumed to be virtually pegged to the US dollar. Alternatively, 
if movements in the kwanza against the Swiss franc are largely explained by movements 
in the euro against the Swiss franc, then the euro would get a weight close to one in 
Angolan's currency basket. This reasoning applies, similarly, to the other nominal 
currency anchors used in this study (euro, yen, pound and rand). 
The exchange rate of a given SADC currency against a numeraire, such as the Swiss 
franc (SF), will be determined as follows: 
E(SF IX,) = E(SF I $)Pl E(SF I euro)"1 E(SF I Yen)13' E{SF I Pound)Pi E(SF I Rand)Pi 
(12) 
5 
with ^ /?. = 1 and where /?, to Ps denotes the weights of the dollar, yen, euro, pound 
and rand, respectively. If the country concerned, for instance, adopts a dollar peg, then it 
means that / J j= l . Equation (12) can be expressed as equation (13) after taking 
logarithmic transformation. Therefore, the equation to be estimated is 
. . . . . .
 1 9 6
 . 
A (value of currency i ) m = j30 + Pi A (value of $) + P2 A (value of Euro) + p3 A (value of 
yen) + P4 A (value of rand) + p5 A (value of pound) + Sj (13) 
where the change in the value of each currency is computed logarithmically. fi0 is the 
intercept and its sign is interpreted as appreciation (positive sign) or depreciation 
(negative sign) of the currency during the sample period and s;t is normally distributed. 
Such an equation is exceptionally well-specified under a particular null hypothesis, 
namely that the value of the local currency is determined as a basket peg (perhaps a 
crawling peg, since we allow a constant term) . 
We impose the constraint that the weights on the five currencies sum to 1 (by subtracting 
the change in the value of the pound from each of the other variables). A F-test does not 
reject the constraint that the sum of the five coefficients is 1 for almost all the countries. 
Prior to the estimation, the different exchange rate series have been tested for 
stationarity. For this purpose, we make use of the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. We 
also employed the two-steps Engle-Granger test for cointegration to assess whether there 
is a long-run relationship among the series under consideration120. The results for unit 
roots and cointegration tests are presented in Table A.4.1. 
The estimated results show that all series, with exception of Zimbabwe, are integrated of 
order one, i.e., the series have a unit root. In terms of cointegration, there is evidence of 
118
 Value of currency i (or $, euro,...) in terms of Swiss franc is calculated as the ratio of the number of 
units of currency i for 1 U.S. dollar over the number of units of Swiss franc for 1 U.S. dollar. 
119
 By "exceptionally well-specified", we mean that the coefficients should be highly significant and the R2 
should be close to 1. 
120
 A better estimated model would probably included the lagged values of the exchange rates but, since 
this is not the main issue in this chapter and to be consistent with the literature on de facto exchange rates, 
we follow the Frankel and Wei approach. 
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cointegration among the Southern African exchange rate series and those of their 
potential nominal anchors, the only exception being Mozambique and Zimbabwe. 
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Notes: *,**,and *** represent statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Appendix 4.5: The Variability of Real Exchange Rates for SADC Countries vis-a-vis 




























































































Appendix 4.6: Optimum Currency Area Regression for Real Exchange Rate Variability 
Variables 
Variability of Output 
Trade ratio 
Size of economy 


















































A. Optimum Currency Area Regression for Nominal Exchange Rate Variability 
. Using Data for the Five Potential Anchors 
Variables 
Variability of Output 
Trade ratio 
Size of economy 

















































B. Optimum Currency Area Regression for Real Exchange Rate Variability 
Variables 
Variability of Output 
Trade ratio 
Size of economy 
















































Appendix 4.8: Relative Excess Volatility Index for SADC Countries 
(Using data for the five potential anchors) 
South Africa 
Angola 
Botswana 
Congo, DR 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Seychelles 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
US/euro 
0.518 
1.350 
0.815 
0.754 
0.751 
1.030 
1.412 
0.944 
1.184 
1.288 
1.071 
0.733 
0.490 
0.815 
US/pound 
0.471 
1.102 
0.998 
0.924 
0.949 
0.998 
0.914 
1.059 
1.103 
1.570 
0.943 
0.807 
0.828 
0.935 
US/rand 
1.011 
1.019 
0.815 
0.733 
0.852 
0.790 
0.848 
0.573 
0.450 
0.499 
Euro/pound 
0.908 
0.816 
1.225 
1.225 
1.264 
0.969 
0.647 
1.121 
0.932 
1.219 
0.880 
1.101 
1.689 
1.147 
Euro/rand 
0.749 
1.250 
1.080 
0.712 
0.603 
0.836 
0.658 
0.782 
0.919 
0.612 
Pound/rand 
0.918 
1.021 
0.882 
0.734 
0.932 
0.746 
0.540 
0.710 
0.544 
0.533 
